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Creditor committees have been characterized as the “watchdogs” of the 
bankruptcy reorganization process of large companies. Not only do creditor committees 
have broad statutory powers to oversee the debtor and its management, but they also play 
a key role in preventing abuses by professionals and other participants in the often 
complex corporate bankruptcy process. Furthermore, recent research has provided 
evidence of abusive fee practices in large corporate bankruptcy cases which point to 
failures in the oversight mechanisms of the process. This dissertation examines the role of 
creditor committees in the bankruptcy process and in selected outcomes of this process, 
with a focus on fees paid to bankruptcy professionals. Based on a unique data set 
comprised of 1,037 bankruptcy cases over the period 1999-2008, the research first 
examines committee characteristics along three separate dimensions of analysis: 
individual characteristics of members serving on committees; changes of committee 
composition over the life of the committees; and social characteristics of committee 
interlocks. The Calpine bankruptcy case is used throughout this dissertation to illustrate 
 vii
the research. This research finds a dense network of interlocks that dominates large cases, 
with financial industry members being significantly more likely to serve on multiple 
committees than non-financial industry members. Analysis of the data shows that over 
50% of creditor committees are never amended and there are no systematic 
recompositions of the remaining committees. A test of small-world topology in the 
member creditor committee network fails to show a strong small-world structure in the 
member social network once it is corrected for imposed network topology. This 
dissertation then employs econometric models to evaluate whether creditor committee 
variables help explain professional fees in large bankruptcy cases. It finds a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between the social centrality measure of the creditor 
committee case and the professional fees paid. This finding points to potential conflicts of 
interest among the repeat creditor committee players and their constituents. The research 
fails to find a significant relationship between the presence of financial firms in creditors’ 
committees and professional fees paid in the case. The dissertation concludes with policy 
recommendations and suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Economic distress and business failures are common events in our economic 
system. Even though most economically distressed businesses do not seek legal 
protection from their creditors, over 100,000 businesses file for bankruptcy 
protection every year.1 The economic ramifications of these failures are enormous: 
an estimated 2 million workers are employed by businesses filing for bankruptcy 
every year. Business failure is not unique to small or privately held firms. From 2000 
to 2009, over 1,500 public companies listing over 2.8 trillion dollars assets filed for 
bankruptcy protection.2 Like most other modern nations, the United States provides 
a legal framework to deal with the orderly reorganization and/or liquidation of failed 
companies and the distribution of value among those holding claims against the 
firms’ assets. Unlike most other economic events affecting the firm’s assets, 
bankruptcy reorganizations are not guided by market mechanisms, but by the 
administrative rules and procedures legislated by Congress and administered by 
federal courts. The current form of corporate bankruptcy legislation, or Bankruptcy 
Code, is the product of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and it is part of Title 11 
of the United States Code. Despite numerous revisions and changes over the last 30 
years, the substantive part of the code dealing with corporate bankruptcy remains 
unchanged.  
The Bankruptcy Code includes a number of oversight mechanisms of the 
reorganization process in order to help insure the preservation of the bankruptcy 
                                                 
1 The actual number of business bankruptcies varies dramatically depending on how they are counted. 
For a discussion on the number of bankruptcies being filed see R. M. Lawless and E. Warren, "The 
Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy," California Law Review 93, no. 5 (2005). 
2 The 2010 Bankruptcy Yearbook & Almanac,  (New Generation Research). 
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estate and the fair and equitable distribution of value among claimants. These 
oversight mechanisms also seek to prevent abuses by professionals and other parties 
involved in the reorganization process. Generally speaking there are three parties 
with a direct statutory oversight of the bankruptcy process of large corporations: the 
bankruptcy court handling the case; the U.S. Trustee, an employee of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, and; the officially appointed committees representing 
unsecured creditors. Yet, despite these multiple oversight mechanisms, there are 
considerable indications of mounting professional costs in the reorganization of large 
companies, and recent literature has provided convincing evidence of systematic 
overcharging by professionals in those cases.3 Such overcharging involves the 
simultaneous failure by the courts, the U.S. Trustee, and the creditor committees in 
fulfilling their oversight duties over large bankruptcy cases.  
The Bankruptcy Code provides official creditor committees with substantial 
powers to perform their duties. First, creditor committees can hire counsel, financial 
advisers, industry experts, and other professionals at the expense of the bankruptcy 
estate to pursue their obligations. Committees also have the statutory powers to 
“investigate the acts, conducts, assets, liabilities, and the financial viability of the 
debtor”4 and have ample access to non-public information and to the debtor’s 
management. They also have the power to request the appointment of a trustee or an 
examiner and effectively ask the court to remove management. The committees also 
perform critical duties in the management of the case, and their representatives 
                                                 
3 See L.M. LoPucki and J.W. Doherty, "Professional Overcharging in Large Bankruptcy 
Reorganization Cases," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 5, no. 4 (2008). , L.M. LoPucki and J.W. 
Doherty, "Routine Illegality in Bankruptcy Court, Big-Case Fee Practices," American Bankruptcy 
Law Journal 83(2009)., L.M. LoPucki and J.W. Doherty, "Routine Illegality Redux," American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal 85(2011). 
4 See section 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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typically sit on the fee committees that, along with representatives from the U.S. 
Trustee’s office and the Court, are often created to review fee applications by 
professionals serving on bankruptcy cases. Even when no fee committee is 
appointed, or whenever the creditor committee disagrees with the Court’s decision to 
approve a fee application, creditor committees have the power to challenge such 
professional fees payments using counsel and professionals paid by the bankruptcy 
estate.  
Unsecured creditor committees, as representatives of the economic 
beneficiaries of the residual value of the firm, are critical in insuring the value of the 
estate is maximized and in preventing abuses by professionals. As fiduciaries, for the 
unsecured creditors, creditor committee members ultimately protect the economic 
interest of smaller unsecured claimants in the case. Not surprisingly unsecured 
creditor committees have been called the “watchdogs”5 of the corporate bankruptcy 
system.  
It is important to recognize the U.S. Trustee does not have discretion in 
appointing members to the creditor committees. In fact, the selection process of 
individual members serving on the committee is purely mechanical; appointments 
are largely the result of self-selection. In order to serve on a creditor committee, a 
creditor must be ranked among the largest holders of unsecured claims against the 
company and express willingness and readiness to serve. In cases where an 
organizational meeting is held, large creditors wishing to be part of the committee 
must attend the meeting and ask the U.S. Trustee to appoint them. Furthermore there 
are significant costs, in terms of time and monetary expenses, associated with 
                                                 
5 The term “watchdog” has been used to describe creditor’s committees functions, see M. G. 
Andrews, "The Chapter 11 Creditors' Committee: Statutory Watchdog," Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal 2(1985). 
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committee service. This is because typical committee service in a single case lasts 
over one and a half years on average, service is unpaid, and courts only allow for the 
reimbursement of direct out-of-pocket expenses related to committee service. Many 
costs associated with service, which can include the set up and maintenance of 
trading screens, personnel costs, etc., are not reimbursed by the bankruptcy estate. It 
should also be added that claims against large bankrupt companies can usually be 
traded and often change hands after bankruptcy. This means investors can increase 
their holdings of unsecured claims even after the bankruptcy filing in order to insure 
appointment to the creditors committee. In fact there are significant numbers of 
investors who specialize in claims issued by deeply distressed and bankrupt firms.6 It 
is not rare to find these distressed securities investors serving on unsecured creditor 
committees in bankruptcy court. 
Previous research on committees has focused on broad legal questions of 
representation,7 function,8 and liability.9 Of these only one journal article has 
                                                 
6 These distressed securities investors are often called vulture investors. 
7 See C. J. Cuevas, "Due Process and Adequate Representation in a Chapter 11 Case: The 
Appointment and Removal of Members of a Creditors' Committee in a Corporate Reorganization," 
New England Law Review 24(1989)., K. F. Gwynne, "Intra-Committee Conflicts, Multiple Creditors' 
Committees, Altering Committee Membership and Other Alternatives for Ensuring Adequate 
Representation under Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code," American Bankruptcy Institute Law 
Review 14(2006)., and sections on committee formation and representation in K.N Klee and K.J. 
Shaffer, "Creditor's Committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code," South Carolina Law 
Review 44(1993)., and A. DeNatale, "The Creditors'committee under the Bankruptcy Code--a 
Primer," American Bankruptcy Law Journal 55(1981). 
8 See D. J. Bussel, "Coalition-Building through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees," UCLA Law 
Review 43(1996)., D. J. Bussel, "Creditors’committees as Estate Representatives in Bankruptcy 
Litigation," Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance 10(2005)., A. Yerramalli, "Deciphering 
the Statutory Language of 11 Usc Section 1002 (B)(3): Information Disclosure Requirements 
Imposed Upon Creditors' Committees," American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 15(2007). plus 
relevant sections in Klee and Shaffer, "Creditor's Committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.", and DeNatale, "The Creditors'committee under the Bankruptcy Code--a Primer." 
9 See J. Gadsden, "Liabilities of Creditors' Committees and Their Members, The," Commercial Law 
Journal 101(1996). and R. S. Blanc, "Putting a Limit on Unlimited Creditors' Committee Liability," 
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 13(1996). 
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collected empirical data on committees.10 This research consisted of a three case 
studies each providing different insights into creditor committee composition, 
processes, and dynamics. The author concludes creditor committees are somewhat 
chaotic battlegrounds with individual committee members battling each other for 
their own self interests. Also, in the cases studied, banks and distressed securities 
investors played critical roles in the functioning of the committees. Finally, one of 
the case studies in the paper provides a clear example of how unsecured creditor 
committee members behave as the de facto owners of the firms and the committee 
simply becomes the arena where the new owners of the company jockey for control. 
Outside the legal literature, creditor committee composition has been acknowledged 
as being relevant in the bankruptcy process,11 but there has been no systematic study 
of creditor committee composition. In one particularly relevant study, Hotchkiss et 
al. (2000) provide convincing evidence of how the presence of distressed securities 
investors in creditor committees affect the way bankrupt firms are valued, thus 
having a direct and measurable effect on the outcome of the bankruptcy process. 
Furthermore, the empirical observation of dense social links (also referred to as 
social interconnectedness or social embededness in the literature) among individual 
creditor committee members is important as social links have proven to have 
significant effects on processes and outcomes of similar groups such as board of 
directors. However, there is no empirical study examining this issue in the context of 
creditor committees and the effect that the social interconnectedness (a concept 
explained in some depth in this dissertation) of committee members, as well as other 
                                                 
10 Bussel, "Coalition-Building through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees." This article presents 3 
short case studies.  
11 For example vulture fund presence in junior creditor committees has been found to be relevant to 
the enterprise valuation in bankruptcy court, see S. C. Gilson, E. S. Hotchkiss, and R. S. Ruback, 
"Valuation of Bankrupt Firms," Review of Financial Studies 13, no. 1 (2000). 
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characteristics of creditor committees, on the bankruptcy process as well as its 
outcomes. Additionally, there is no study examining the effect of creditor committee 
composition and other characteristics of these committees on professional fees. A 
detailed review of the relevant literature is provided on Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
The purpose of this research is to examine membership of creditor 
committees in large bankruptcy cases and study potential conflicts of interest that 
might prevent them from providing an effective oversight of the reorganization 
process. Creditor committees are studied along three dimensions of analysis likely to 
pinpoint conflicts of interests: individual characteristics of the members serving on 
the committees; the changes of committee membership over the life of the 
committee, and; the social links among cases created by individual member service 
in creditor committees in more than one case.   
The proxy for individual characteristics of members used in this dissertation 
is whether the member is a financial or a non-financial firm. This is because, unlike 
other creditors, financial firms have complex balance sheets, ongoing trading 
operations, and often provide investment banking services to companies under 
bankruptcy protection. They are more likely to be routinely involved in bankruptcy 
cases and have greater experience in the complex reorganization of large companies. 
Most of them also engage in risk management strategies that affect their net 
exposure to the debtor’s unsecured claims and, many of them, utilize investment 
strategies that diversify their investment across the capital structure of the bankrupt 
firm. Finally, the rapid consolidation of the financial industry over the last 15 years, 
as well as the increased use of derivative contracts by financial companies, have 
amplified the potential for conflicts of interests faced by financial firms as they serve 
on creditor committees.  
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The second dimension of analysis is the study of the changes in committee 
membership over time. This research specifically investigates two different patterns 
of committee changes over time: early exit and late joining of members serving on 
creditor committees. A pattern of early exit might provide evidence of committee 
membership being used as a vehicle for obtaining non-public information from 
which individual members can profit by trading claims against the debtor. Also, 
systematic patterns of late joining might point to the use of creditor committee 
appointment rules as a tool for investors to alter the ongoing committee workings for 
individual gain. This is a particular concern in cases where large sales of assets take 
place late in the reorganization process.12 In either case, such patterns of changes in 
committee membership also provide evidence as to the motivation of committee 
service and point to additional conflicts of interest that are likely to interfere with 
committee duties.  
Finally, the social analysis of committee membership is particularly relevant 
to creditor committees provided the considerable anecdotal evidence of repeated 
committee service of a small number of “elite” players in large cases. This 
observation reminds us individuals serving on creditor committees do not act in a 
social vacuum and their behavior in each of these committees is likely to be 
influenced by their social environment and history. In fact the social embeddedness 
of committee service creates both opportunities to access resources outside of a 
specific case as well as constraints that limit individual member behavior. Social 
links to the outside add social capital to a committee and, as Robert Putnam puts it in 
his seminal work on social capital, “social networks have value…. like a screwdriver 
                                                 
12 Significant asset sales during the reorganization are typically implemented under Section 363 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. These are discussed in more detail on Chapter 2. 
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or a university degree… social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and 
groups.”13 Yet, by the same token, social linkages also impose constraints that might 
prevent the optimal performance of the committees in pursuing the interests of their 
constituents. This is because not only the social capital created by the inter-
committee linkages can be used by individuals to further their own individual goals 
but it can also enforce norms of behavior that affect individual actions. 
Furthermore, the study of social embeddedness has proven relevant in the 
study of similar social networks where some individuals serve in more than one 
group or team. These include boards of directors, casts of motion movie actors, 
Broadway musical production teams, academic collaboration teams, patent co-
authorship, and even hip-hop music collaborations. The literature on boards of 
directors’ interlocks is particularly relevant as there is considerable evidence that 
interactions of individual members across multiple boards help explain director 
behavior and board policies.  
Using social network analysis tools, this research maps interlocks among 
individual cases and measures the degree centrality of individual cases. Additionally, 
the research attempts to confirm the anecdotal evidence of “elite” members 
repeatedly serving in large cases. It then identifies these “stars” among both 
individual cases as well as among the individual members serving on committees. 
Also of interest is to determine whether there is a significant presence of 
interconnected packs.  That is, the occurrence of groups of individuals serving 
together across different cases in groups that are interconnected among themselves. 
                                                 
13 See p.  R.D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon 
and Schuster, 2001).  
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Such social network structure is known as a “small world”14 and has proven critical 
in the study of social groups similar to creditor committees—such as boards of 
directors and Broadway musical production teams. In the study of conflicts of 
interest in creditor committees, the presence of a small world structure would impose 
significant social constraints to creditor committee behavior that are likely to 
interfere with optimal committee performance.  
Last, this research tests whether differences in creditor committee 
composition that are likely to create conflicts of interest have an effect on fee 
practices that have been shown to be the result of a breakdown of the oversight 
mechanisms of the reorganization process. In other words, can differences in creditor 
committee composition help explain the failure of creditor committee oversight 
duties as they relate to fee practices in large cases?  
Using social networks analysis, this research finds a dense network of 
interlocks that dominates larger cases with financial industry members being 
significantly more likely to serve on multiple committees than non-financial industry 
members. Furthermore, analysis of the data finds over 50% of creditor committees 
are never amended and finds no systematic changes in the remaining committees. A 
test of small-world topology in the member creditor committee network fails to find 
a strong small-world structure in the member social network once it is corrected for 
imposed network topology. The results of the regression analysis evaluating whether 
creditor committee variables help explain professional fees in large bankruptcy cases 
find a statistically significant and positive relationship between the social centrality 
measure of the creditor committee case and the professional fees paid. In other 
                                                 
14 The term “small world” refers to a social network typology where individuals in large social 
groups are connected by counter-intuitively short paths (or degrees of separation).   A detailed 
discussion of small worlds is provided on Chapter 3. 
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words, this research finds that fees in cases for in which creditor committee members 
have previously served in multiple cases are likely to have higher professional fees 
even after controlling for size and complexity of the case. This finding provides 
evidence of the existence of conflicts of interest between the repeat creditor 
committee players and their constituents. This research theorizes the reason for this 
positive effect of the creditor committee degree centrality measure on professional 
fees is that highly connected creditor committees are less willing to oppose fees 
payments to professionals in effort to not antagonize other players they are likely to 
work with in the future. This research also fails to find a significant relationship 
between the presence of financial firms in creditors’ committees and the professional 
fees paid in the case. 
This research makes several original contributions to the literature. First, 
from a methodological perspective, by acknowledging the social interconnectedness 
among individual committee members this dissertation contributes to the growing 
body of literature incorporating the social dimension of economic behavior in policy 
analyses. Such literature includes, for example, social network studies on networks 
of innovation in shaping local economic development policy15 and the use of social 
network analysis tools in financial regulation.16 More specifically, this research tests 
social network structure for small world characteristics and identifies the “star” 
players in the structure (both at a case and at an individual member levels). From a 
policy perspective, this study provides a better understanding of the current 
bankruptcy code, offers insights on how it is being implemented, and provides 
                                                 
15 P. Cooke and L. Lazzeretti, Creative Cities, Cultural Clusters and Local Economic Development 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).  
16 D. Christopoulos and L. Quaglia, "Network Constraints in Eu Banking Regulation: The Capital 
Requirements Directive," Journal of Public Policy 29, no. 02 (2009). 
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guidance for future code reforms. It also adds to the understanding of the current 
literature and academic debate on fee practices in bankruptcy court and the 
effectiveness of oversight mechanisms in the process.  
Finally, this research also compiles a unique database of bankruptcy 
variables from the primary source, particularly those concerning creditor 
committees, complementing data currently available in other databases.17 The 
primary source for committee membership information was PACER (Public Access 
to Court Electronic Records) available online from the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts.18 
This study begins with short overview of corporate bankruptcy in the United 
States. It includes a short summary of the process, roles different actors play in it, 
and the theoretical structures that help us understand it. Next, this research presents a 
background summary of creditor committees. This includes a discussion of how 
these committees are formed and altered, the powers and liabilities of their members, 
and the role committee professionals play. The following chapter presents the 
theoretical mechanisms that provide a basis for analysis and offer hypotheses on how 
creditor committees’ compositions affect the reorganization process. This addresses 
the standards of fiduciary duty and principal-agent problems that shape behavior of 
creditor committee members, as well as the social network theory considerations that 
frame the social embeddedness of their actions. This chapter also includes a 
summary of relevant previous work in the literature.  
                                                 
17 The two databases most frequently used in empirical bankruptcy research include New Generation 
Research’s proprietary database (www.bankruptcydata.com) and the Bankruptcy Research Database 
(BRD) maintained by Prof. LoPucki (http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/)  




The analytical framework that is used to study creditor committees and their 
role in the bankruptcy process  is presented in Chapter 4. It includes the enumeration 
of the research questions and sub-questions and presents a description of the sources 
of data and working datasets, including their collection and analysis. Next, Chapter 5 
provides a detailed analysis of the committee characteristics along the three 
aforementioned dimensions: individual characteristics; changes of committee 
membership over time, and; social characteristics. This chapter also presents the 
social network analysis of the datasets. Chapter 6 presents an econometric model 
explaining professional fees in bankruptcy cases.  This model is used to examine 
whether creditor committee characteristics explain professional fee practices in large 
cases as well as the direction of this relationship. The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, 
provides a review of findings and conclusions and offers a list of policy implications 
and recommendations along with a summary of contributions of this research to the 
field of public policy. This Chapter also outlines directions of future research related 




Chapter 2: Background 
 
In order to better understand creditor committees in bankruptcy court, one 
must first review the basics of the corporate bankruptcy process and see how these 
committees fit in it. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of 
corporate bankruptcy, explain the roles different actors play in it, and summarize the 
theoretical structures that help us understand it. This chapter also presents a 
background summary of creditor committees, including a discussion of how these 
committees are formed and altered, the powers and liabilities of their members, and 
the role professionals play in their operations. This understanding of corporate 
bankruptcy and creditor committees lays out the foundation to study conflicts of 
interest inherent in creditor committee service. 
 
2.1. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 
The United States Constitution (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4) provides the 
U.S. Congress with the authority to enact “uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Thus Congress has the authority, yet not 
the obligation, to provide a bankruptcy code under the jurisdiction of federal courts. 
Congress has exercised this authority several times, although not continuously, by 
enacting a diversity of bankruptcy codes over the years. The current form of 
corporate bankruptcy legislation is the product of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978. It is part of the United States Code Title 11. Despite numerous revisions and 
changes over the last 30 years, the substantive part of the code remains unchanged.19  
                                                 
19 For a detailed reference of the history of the code see C. J. Tabb, "The History of the Bankruptcy 
Laws in the United States," American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 3(1995). 
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Bankruptcy protection is set in motion with a bankruptcy petition before a 
federal bankruptcy court. This petition is usually filed by the firm. In some instances 
creditors can also file a petition to force the firm into involuntary bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy filings can be made under either Chapter 7 (liquidation) or Chapter 11 
(reorganization). With few exceptions, firms initially file for Chapter 11 protection. 
Chapter 11 reorganizations, however, can be converted into Chapter 7 liquidations 
after the original petition is made. Firms are also allowed to file prepackaged 
Chapter 11 petitions (prepacks). These petitions include a plan of reorganization that 
has already been negotiated between the firm and its creditors.  
Chapter 7 liquidations focus on the disposition and distribution of assets. In 
these cases, an interim trustee is appointed immediately following the petition. Once 
appointed, this trustee proceeds to liquidate all of the firm’s assets and distribute the 
proceeds among claimants according to their statutory priorities. Chapter 11 
reorganizations, on the other hand, seek to preserve the ongoing business of the firm. 
More generally, Chapter 11 has three purposes: to provide a space for the firm to 
reorganize, to allow an equitable distribution of the firm’s assets among claimants, 
and to let the firm continue operating while under bankruptcy protection. Continued 
business operation is the essential mechanism used to preserve the ongoing concern 
value of the firm. This is the value above and beyond that of the individual assets of 
the firm. Some of the key features of traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations include: 
creditor protection, debtor in possession, disclosure statement, plan of 
reorganization, exclusivity, solicitation, plan approval, plan confirmation, and 
emergence. 
The creditor protection feature provides a stay on all collection efforts from 
creditors. Creditor protection provides the breathing room for the company to 
15 
 
continue operating its business without the burden of creditor litigation by 
consolidating all proceedings into a single, organized process managed by the 
bankruptcy court. 
The second key characteristic of the current code is debtor in possession 
which provides for incumbent management to continue operating the firm’s assets.20 
The bankruptcy filing in effect creates a bankruptcy estate which generally includes 
all assets owned by the firm. This estate is overseen by the court but the firm’s day-
to-day ordinary course operations remain under management’s control. This means 
that unless there is cause on the part of the current board of directors and their 
appointed managers—i.e. fraud, misconduct, gross negligence, etc…—, incumbent 
management continues running the business. This is in contrast to a significant 
number of bankruptcy systems around the world where a trustee is appointed to run 
the business during the reorganization process.21  
Prior to the presentation of a plan of reorganization, management must 
prepare a disclosure statement containing a detailed valuation of all of the firm’s 
assets as well financial projections for the business. This disclosure statement is 
significant because it provides the basic elements to value the bankruptcy estate and 
at the end of the day shape the plan of how assets are distributed among claimants. 
Business valuation is one of the most problematic features of the current corporate 
bankruptcy system as both creditors and the courts must rely on financial projections 
and expert testimony to value the estate.22 Such valuation is heavily dependent on 
                                                 
20 The term “debtor” refers to the firm and its management.  
21 For a broad comparison of bankruptcy systems around the world see Ziad R. Azar, Bankruptcy 
Policy: A Review and Critique of Bankruptcy Statutes and Practices in Fifty Countries Worldwide 
(SSRN, 2007). 
22 For a more detailed discussion of court valuation of bankrupt firms in Chapter 11 see Gilson, 
Hotchkiss, and Ruback, "Valuation of Bankrupt Firms." 
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assumptions that are ultimately somewhat subjective. The information contained on 
the disclosure statement often times provides the base valuation for the firm and sets 
the stage for negotiations among creditors. Thus, even if the debtor’s plan of 
reorganization fails to be approved by creditors or confirmed by the court, the 
financial projections management develops are likely to shape plans of 
reorganization presented by other parties. Thus current management not only 
continues operating the business on a day to day basis but also plays the central role 
of valuing the firm. 
A plan of reorganization is the document detailing the distribution of assets 
among claimants in the case. More specifically, this document enumerates and 
classifies all claims, shows the treatment for each claim, states which creditors 
classes are impaired by the plan, and provides the details on how the plan is to be 
implemented.23 Impairment is defined as the loss of any right regarding the claim a 
creditor has against the firm.24 A plan or reorganization can only be filed by the 
debtor during the exclusivity period. This exclusivity period originally lasts 120 days 
but can be, and usually is, extended by the court. After exclusivity, any party of 
interest may file a plan of reorganization.25  
The plan is then be submitted to impaired creditors for a vote before it can be 
confirmed by the court. The debtor is required to provide all claimants with both the 
disclosure statement and the proposed plan of reorganization.26 A two thirds majority 
vote in dollar amount and a one half plus one majority vote in number of creditors 
from each class of creditors are required for approval by the class. Creditor classes 
                                                 
23 See 11 U.S.C. Section 1123 for more detail on plan of reorganization content. 
24 See 11 U.S.C. Section 1124 for more detail on impairment.  
25 There are additional instances that allow a party of interest to file a plan of reorganization. See 11 
U.S.C. 1121 for more details on who may file a plan of reorganization. 
26 See 11 U.S.C. Section 1125 for additional information on post-petition disclosure and solicitation. 
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that receive no distribution under the terms of the plan are deemed to reject the plan 
and do not vote on the plan.  
Once the plan has been voted by eligible creditors, the court must confirm it 
in order for the plan to take effect.27 In principle, courts will allow the confirmation 
of plans of reorganization following whatever distribution creditors agree upon that 
is deemed fair and equitable. This means the specifics of the plan of reorganization 
are usually not imposed by the court but negotiated by creditors. The corporate 
bankruptcy code relies on consensus as the mechanism to develop the plan of 
reorganization that is ultimately confirmed. This is one of the more distinguishing 
characteristics of the American reorganization process. Moreover, a consensual plan 
does not need to abide by the absolute priority rule (APR).28 APR is the principle 
that no payments can be made to junior creditor until senior creditors are paid in full. 
Plans of reorganization can also provide for a distribution in the reorganized firm to 
incumbent management as a mean to provide incentives for managers and other 
employees. A plan of reorganization must, however, meet the “best interest of 
creditors” test. This test demonstrates the plan provides creditors not voting or 
voting against the plan at least as much as they would have received had the firm 
been liquidated. Furthermore, courts have the ability to force a minority of holdout 
creditors to accept a plan of reorganization. Finally, under certain circumstances, the 
court can approve a plan of reorganization even when creditors have voted down the 
plan or have been deemed to reject it. This “cramdown” aspect of the bankruptcy 
code allows firms to reorganize even when not all creditors agree on the terms of the 
plan. Once a plan is confirmed a date is set for emergence from bankruptcy 
                                                 
27 11 U.S.C. Section 1129 provides the details on plan confirmation. 
28 A plan that is not consensual must, in the majority of cases, abide by the APR. 
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protection. This is the point where the plan becomes effective and creditors receive 
the distributions stipulated by the plan. 
There are additional important elements of Chapter 11 that should be 
mentioned. The first one is the right to reject contracts as part of the reorganization 
process. In essence, bankrupt companies have the option to reject almost any 
contract they choose. In practical terms this feature of the code results in a 
significant part of the reorganization process is spent reviewing contracts and 
rejecting those that management determines represent liabilities or generally 
unfavorable to the bankruptcy estate. All counterparties to those rejected contracts 
can then file a claim against the firm’s estate in court and abide by the creditor 
seniority determined by the court. The second element is the claims filing and review 
process. This process takes a significant amount of time and effort as the court sets 
deadlines to submit claims against the firm which are then individually reviewed. 
Often claims are challenged by the debtor or creditor committees. The burden to the 
debtor, both in time and expense, is significant in the claims review process. Another 
element often present in Chapter 11 reorganizations is the approval of a key 
employee retention plan (KERP).29 KERPs provide bonuses to key employees that 
remain with the firm during the reorganization process. These payments are justified 
on the grounds of preservation of the ongoing concern value of the firm despite the 
fact they are often made to the same managers that led the company into the 
bankruptcy filing. A final element is the financing of the firm both during 
bankruptcy (DIP, or debtor in possession, financing) as well as part of the 
implementation of a plan of reorganization (exit financing). These financing events 
                                                 




are critical to both the continued operation of the business—conserving the ongoing 
concern value of the estate—as well as the success of a plan of reorganization.  
Compared to previous versions of the U.S. bankruptcy code, the current code 
is clearly debtor oriented. This means there is an assumption the firm—through its 
management—is the party best suited to manage the firm and produce a plan of 
reorganization, at least during the exclusivity period. Thus, it is management who 
knows best how to run the business and maximize its value. This managerial 
discretion allows current management to continue running the business without 
interference from creditors or the court. Management is also believed to be the best 
party to come up with an impartial plan of reorganization that satisfies all creditors. 
In other words, the current code sees bankruptcy as an exogenous event imposed on 
the firm and its management. The role of the code is to help the firm and 
management deal with creditors in an orderly fashion and assists management in 
continuing to maximize the firm’s value.  
In addition to the debtor, there are other important players in the corporate 
bankruptcy process. These include the judge presiding over the case, the U.S. 
Trustee, the creditor and equity committees, and the different professionals—
attorneys, financial advisors, and other consultants—hired by the debtor and 
committees to assist them through the bankruptcy process.  
The judge presiding over the case is one of the star players in the process.30 
This is because of the significant amount of discretionary power the court has over 
the case. In fact, the court hears all litigation regarding the case and the judge’s 
                                                 
30 For more detail on the role of the judge in Chapter 11 reorganizations see H. R. Miller, "The 
Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and 
Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play," American Bankruptcy Law Journal 69(1995). 
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rulings can be crucial in determining the course of a case.31 In addition to the judge, 
the United States Trustee, an employee of the Justice Department, serves as an 
overseer of the estate, the debtor, and those appointed to represent creditor’s interests 
in court. In practice, however, the Trustee’s role is typically limited to appointing 
creditor and equity committees and investigating negligence or fraud by the debtor 
or the committees.  
Creditor and equity committees are appointed to oversee Chapter 11 
reorganizations on behalf of unsecured creditors and equity holders. A case might 
have more than one creditor committee and might not have an equity committee. 
Committees play the role of “watchdogs”32 of the reorganization process and help 
negotiate the plan. The next section of this chapter will look at these committees in 
more detail. 
Finally, because of the inherent complexity of corporate bankruptcy, 
professionals retained by the debtor and the committees are decisive in determining 
the course of the process. Debtors usually have little or no experience with 
bankruptcy and experts play crucial roles in minimizing business disruptions and 
managing the reorganization process.33  The debtor’s counsel, in particular, is a 
central protagonist of the process as it guides the debtor through the case. Other 
professionals retained by the debtor, such as financial advisors as well as 
                                                 
31 There is a significant amount of literature on competition among different judicial districts to 
attract bankruptcy cases and how differences among courts might entice firms to file in specific 
venues. For additional detail see, for example, L. M. LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition 
for Big Cases Is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts (University of Michigan Press, 2006). and K. 
Ayotte and D. Skeel, "Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of 
Venue Choice in Bankruptcy," University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law and Economics Research 
Paper (2004). 
32 The term “watchdog” has often been used to describe creditor’s committees functions, see 
Andrews, "The Chapter 11 Creditors' Committee: Statutory Watchdog." 
33 Sometimes experts are hired to actually run the company during bankruptcy protection. 
21 
 
management consultants specialized in bankruptcy, can also have a deep impact of 
the process through the design of debtor in possession financing, key employee 
retention programs, business plan, asset valuation, plan of reorganization, etc. 
Professionals hired by creditor committees also play important roles throughout the 
reorganization process as they provide direction and decision advice for committee 
members. 
Also relevant in this analysis is the existence of adhoc creditor committees. 
These unofficial creditor committees are created by groups of individual creditors 
who hire their own professionals and participate in the case. They are typically 
formed by groups of creditors dissatisfied with committee structure or wishing to 
enhance their influence in the process. 34 These committees might seek 
reimbursement for expenses only to the extent to which they make a substantial 
contribution to the case. These committees are not appointed by the U.S. Trustee and 
their membership is generally not filed with the court. They might also be short lived 
and can disband themselves at any time. Few cases, however, appear have ad hoc 
committees, and these committees do not enjoy the statutory powers and privileges 
official committees do.  
The following section provides more detail on the official creditor 
committees. 
 
                                                 




2.2. CREDITOR COMMITTEES35 
2.2.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous section, creditor and equity committees are 
appointed to serve as overseers of the Chapter 11 process and to help negotiate the 
plan of reorganization. Creditors’ committees have their origins in the early days of 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Even though Congress did not expressly mention them 
in the law, such committees emerged in an informal basis in corporate bankruptcy 
cases. The 1933 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act finally recognized committees by 
providing them with “supervisory and other control over the debtor’s business.”36 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 further elevated the role of creditors’ 
committees as “Congress envisioned that committees of unsecured creditors would 
serve as ‘bankruptcy watchdogs’ on behalf of the larger groups of creditors they 
represent.”37 In fact, under the new code only creditor committees have the statutory 
powers to closely monitor the firm and its management during the reorganization 
process.  
 
2.2.2. Appointment and Removal 
The United States Code Title 11 Section 1102 outlines the creation of the 
creditor and equity committees. The text of this section of the code is reproduced in 
Appendix A. Creditor committees are appointed to represent different classes of 
                                                 
35 For more complete background information on creditor committees see: DeNatale, "The 
Creditors'committee under the Bankruptcy Code--a Primer."; Klee and Shaffer, "Creditor's 
Committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code."; Andrews, "The Chapter 11 Creditors' 
Committee: Statutory Watchdog." 
36 For a detailed discussion of the powers, obligation, and duties of creditor committees prior to the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 see at C. H. Levy, "Creditors'committees and Their 
Responsibilities," Commercial Law Journal 74(1969). 
37  P. 247 in Andrews, "The Chapter 11 Creditors' Committee: Statutory Watchdog." 
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creditors in the reorganization process. An equity committee can also be appointed 
by the U.S. Trustee based on the expectation of whether there might be residual 
value for shareholders who are, in fact, simply the most junior of unsecured 
creditors. Most large Chapter 11 reorganizations have one creditor committee but 
individual capital structures of the bankrupt business might dictate whether the U.S. 
Trustee appoints additional creditor committees representing additional creditor 
classes.38 The court can also order the appointment of additional committees by the 
U.S. Trustee. Chapter 11 cases filed by small companies might not have any 
committees appointed when there is cause.  
Creditor committee appointment is largely a mechanical process. Either 
creditors can request the appointment of the committees or the U.S. Trustee can 
initiate the appointment on its own. The process starts with a letter soliciting interest 
among the debtor’s largest unsecured creditors to serve in the committee. This letter 
is sent out by the U.S. Trustee and typically goes to the 20 largest holders of record 
of claims. The letter is sometimes accompanied by a “Creditor Committee 
Acceptance Form.” This acceptance forms asks for the creditor’s contact 
information, amount type of unsecured claim against the debtor, inquires about 
creditor’s possession of debtor’s property, whether the creditor is an insider or the 
claim is related to an insider (i.e. officer of the company or other type of insider), 
and finally asks whether the creditor is bound by a lock-up agreement.39 The form 
also informs potential members of the creditor’s committee about the prohibition to 
                                                 
38 For more detail on multiple committees see p. 1024-1030 in Klee and Shaffer, "Creditor's 
Committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code." and Gwynne, "Intra-Committee Conflicts, 
Multiple Creditors' Committees, Altering Committee Membership and Other Alternatives for 
Ensuring Adequate Representation under Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code." 




trade claims against the debtor as long as they serve on the committee. Appendix C 
includes a copy of the “Creditor’s Committee Acceptance Form” used by the office 
of the U.S. trustee for the Southern District of New York. If there are sufficient 
responses to the letter the U.S. Trustee then appoints the creditors with the largest 
claims to the committee. In select cases, the U.S. Trustee conducts an organizational 
meeting where the presence of the creditors—or their authorized agents—seeking to 
participate in the creditor’s committee is required. At the meeting the U.S. Trustee 
then appoints to the creditors committee the largest holders of claims present at the 
meeting. 
Committees are appointed among the largest holders of each claim by class 
willing and ready to serve. Initial committees usually include seven members, but 
the actual number of individual members might be larger or smaller. It is up to the 
U.S. Trustee to decide whether to appoint fewer than seven members fewer than 
seven volunteers express an interest to serve on the committee or to appoint more 
than seven members if the U.S. Trustee believes there is a valid need to include the 
additional members. These additional members must, however, be entitled to service 
because of their rank in holdings of claims against the debtor. Individual members 
can resign from committees at any time. The U.S. Trustee can adjust committee 
composition in order to maintain adequate representation.40 This adjustment includes 
the appointment of additional members to the committee to replace holders of larger 
claims leaving the committee or to increase the size of the committee over the 7 
creditors typically appointed. Again, such appointment as an adjustment to the 
composition of the committee is always done in order of holdings of their individual 
                                                 
40 For a more complete discussion on the maintenance of adequate representation in creditor 
committees see Cuevas, "Due Process and Adequate Representation in a Chapter 11 Case: The 
Appointment and Removal of Members of a Creditors' Committee in a Corporate Reorganization." 
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claims and after having expressed their interest to serve to the U.S. Trustee. After the 
U.S. Trustee appoints a committee, a Notice of the Appointment of a Creditors 
Committee is filed with the court and notice is provided to the debtor’s counsel and 
the appointed creditors. This notice is then made publicly available via PACER. 
Amendments to the committees are also filed with the court and available via 
PACER. 
It is also important to acknowledge that claims against large debtors typically 
continue trading after the bankruptcy filing. Thus, many creditors have the 
opportunity to increase or decrease their holdings prior to the appointment of the 
committee. Furthermore, in most large cases all of the seven largest unsecured 
creditors in a case have a guaranteed spot in the creditor’s committee should they 
chose to serve on it. At the same time, committee service is entirely voluntary and 
those who chose to serve can resign at any time.  
Creditor committee service requires members to hold sizeable holdings of 
claims against the debtor, and actively seek their appointment to the committee. 
Furthermore, service is unpaid and it often times involves significant unreimbursed 
expenses to their members. This is particularly true to firms who engage 
professionals—or even employees—to represent them individually in the committee 
as committee service typically involves a one- to two- years of commitment. Last, 
committee service requires most members to restrain from trading the debtor’s 
securities or to create elaborate trading screen to separate committee service from the 
rest of the activities of the individual committee member. The bankruptcy estate 
does not reimburse committee members for any of these costs. Consequently, 
committee members tacitly agree to bear significant costs in terms of time and 
money as they seek their appointment to the committee.  
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In conclusion, appointment to a creditors’ committee follows mechanical 
rules, requires individual members to actively seek their appointment, and implies 
significant costs to those who get appointed. Furthermore, committee members is 
voluntary and they can resign at any time. 
 
2.2.3. Powers  
The power and responsibilities of committees are outlined in the United 
States Code Title 11 Section 1203 (shown in Appendix B). As mentioned in the 
previous section, committee service is unpaid but the estate does reimburse 
committee members for any out of pocket expenses related to the case. Each 
committee can hire a legal counsel as well as other advisors to help them represent 
their creditor class in court. These advisors often include financial experts, 
accountants, industry experts, and other professionals and are paid by the bankruptcy 
estate. In practice, committees act as a board of directors overseeing their team of 
legal counsel and advisors. Furthermore, committees are allowed to “investigate the 
acts, conducts, assets, liabilities, and the financial condition of the debtor, the 
operation of the debtor’s business and the desirability of the continuance of such 
business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.”41 
This authority gives committee members ample access to non-public information 
about the firm. This is particularly important given the fact that public companies 
operating under bankruptcy protection typically provide very little information to 
public markets. An amendment, however, made by Congress to the code through the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Protection of 2005 enlarged the duties of the 
                                                 
41  11 USC 1102(b)  
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committees to provide certain non-committee members with access to information. 
To date the implementation of this amendment is, at best, troublesome as issues 
surrounding securities laws and attorney-client privilege and confidentiality issues 
are worked out.42 Finally, committees have the power to request the appointment of 
a trustee or an examiner in case of mismanagement on the part of the debtor. A 
trustee in effect replaces management in the day to day administration of the 
bankruptcy estate. An examiner conducts an investigation of “any allegations of 
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the 
management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of 
the debtor.”43 Finally, creditor committees also have the power to prosecute certain 
estate causes of action. This means creditor committees can litigate on behalf of the 
estate recognizing that “in most bankruptcy cases, creditors, rather than equity 
holders or corporate management or a trustee, are the real parties in economic 
interest in such litigation”.44 
In addition to the statutory powers, as likely equity owners of the reorganized 
firm, creditor committees have the potential to exert exceptional levels of influence 
over incumbent managers.45 This is because a considerable number of 
reorganizations of large companies result in unsecured creditors receiving a 
significant portion, if not all, of the corporation’s equity. These creditors then have 
the power to decide on compensation packages, remove incumbent managers, and 
                                                 
42 For a more complete discussion of the issues see Yerramalli, "Deciphering the Statutory Language 
of 11 Usc Section 1002 (B)(3): Information Disclosure Requirements Imposed Upon Creditors' 
Committees." 
43 11 USC 1104(c) 
44 P. 30 in Bussel, "Creditors’committees as Estate Representatives in Bankruptcy Litigation." 
45 There is a substantial body of literature on lender control in Chapter 11. See for example: E. 
Warren and J. L. Westbrook, "Secured Party in Possession," American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 
12(2003)., Kuney, "Hijacking Chapter 11.", and H. R. Miller and S. Y. Waisman, "The Creditor in 
Possession: Creditor Control of Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases," Bankruptcy Strategist 2(2003). 
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even sell assets—or the company itself—to third parties. Section 363 sales, which 
allow the sale of all or substantially all of the firm’s assets before a plan is negotiated 
or confirmed, are particularly threatening elements for management. Furthermore, a 
significant portion of plans of reorganization include equity grants to company 
managers. This means incumbent managers that stay with the company can end up 
receiving a payment from the new equity owners of the firm.46 Even those managers 
that leave the company after emergence from bankruptcy can benefit from key 
employee retention plans (KERPs) usually approved by the court with creditor 
committees’ support.47  Furthermore, managers can negotiate the issuance of liability 
releases from the court as part of the plan of reorganization. 
 
2.2.4. Liability 
Courts provide committee members with qualified immunity in relation to 
their committee service. Such immunity provides protection against litigation arising 
from acts within the scope of committee service and performed in good faith. 
Furthermore, many plans of reorganization include a release of liability in 
connection to committee service. Thus, “recognizing the risk of frivolous claims, 
such qualified immunity and economic self-interest should be sufficient incentive to 
induce continued service by creditors holding significant claims on committees.”48 
Committee members, however, do not enjoy total immunity. They can still be sued 
                                                 
46 For a discussion on payments made as bonuses to managers see Kuney, "Hijacking Chapter 11." 
47 For more detail of employee retention programs see A. M. Dickerson, "Approving Employee 
Retention and Severance Programs Judicial Discretion Run Amuck," American Bankruptcy Institute 
Law Review 11(2003). and Kuney, "Hijacking Chapter 11." 
48 P. 25 in Gadsden, "Liabilities of Creditors' Committees and Their Members, The." 
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for actions outside the scope of duty of the committee or the product of willful 
misconduct.49 
 
2.2.5. Role of Creditor Committee Professionals 
Committees have the power to employ counsel, financial advisors, and other 
experts and consultants at the estate’s expense. Committee’s counsel is usually hired 
during the first meeting of the committee and plays a dual role of advocate and 
advisor. The advisor role is critical as it is assumed “the committee is a client, often 
with little experience in reorganization matters, and as such is in need of, and 
entitled to, the confidential and competent advice of counsel.” 50 Counsel is a critical 
player in designing the committee’s negotiation strategy. The attorney’s client is the 
committee, not the creditor class. The code further imposes a requirement of 
“disinterestedness” with respect to other professionals employed by the committee. 
This means, professionals must have not have a financial interest in, or other 
predisposition toward, a particular resolution of the case. Among other professionals 
retained by the committee, financial advisors often provide key analysis on the 
valuation of the enterprise. They might also provide expert testimony in litigation on 
behalf of the committee. Many cases require the employment of additional experts, 
including industry specialists and accountants, on behalf of the committee. 
The preceding review of corporate bankruptcy and creditor committees is not 
complete without a brief overview of the competing bankruptcy theories. These 
                                                 
49 Some debate still exists as to the limits of liability for committee members. For a discussion of a 
standard of “limited liability” see Blanc, "Putting a Limit on Unlimited Creditors' Committee 
Liability." 
50 P. 1616 in Bussel, "Coalition-Building through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees." 
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provide the intellectual framework that allows us to understand the basic nature of 
bankruptcy and assess the efficiency and fairness of the current code.  
 
2.3. CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY THEORY  
Broadly speaking, theories of bankruptcy can be grouped in two separate 
camps: contractarian theories and traditionalist theories.51 The common thread 
among contractarian theories is that “parties should be free to bargain in advance for 
a set of rules that will govern their rights in the event of bankruptcy. Their bargains 
should be permitted to override the rules of bankruptcy, presumably rendering the 
bankruptcy system applicable only as a default arrangement for those who make no 
private bargains.”52 In other words: “Mandatory regulation is bad; freedom of 
contract is good.”53  
The currently prevailing contractarian theory of bankruptcy is the Creditor’s 
Bargain theory.54 It only recognizes legally enforceable contracts as valid claims in 
the bankruptcy process. Distributions should follow the priorities stated on 
individual claims and any distribution to anyone without a legally enforceable 
                                                 
51 For more detail on the ongoing debate between contractarians and traditionalists see, for example, 
D. G. Baird and R. K. Rasmussen, "The End of Bankruptcy," Stanford Law Review 55(2002). and L. 
M. Lopucki, "The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen's: The End of 
Bankruptcy," Stanford Law Review 56, no. 3 (2003). 
52 P. 1204 in E. Warren and J. L. Westbrook, "Contracting out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Intervention," Harvard Law Review 118, no. 4 (2005). 
53 C. J. Tabb, "Of Contractarians and Bankruptcy Reform: A Skeptical View," American Bankruptcy 
Institute Law Review 12(2004). 
54 The Creditor’s Bargain Theory of Bankruptcy was originally postulated by Thomas Jackson in T. 
H. Jackson, "Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain," Yale Law 
Journal 91, no. 5 (1982). and later developed in a series of articles with Baird and Scott (for further 
detail and a short summary on the development of the theory see see p.4-9 in L. M. LoPucki, "A 
Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization," UCLA Law School, Law and Econ 
Research Paper (2003).  
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contract amounts to “theft.”55 The adherence to the priority ranking of claims (also 
known as the Absolute Priority Rule, or APR) is paramount: not only because any 
deviation from it amounts to stealing but also because such deviations cause 
contracting distortions throughout the economy. From this perspective, the current 
bankruptcy process is unduly complex and inefficient. Some supporters of this 
theory have proposed drastically different bankruptcy processes, the most extreme of 
which calls for a quick auction of the firm’s assets followed by a rapid distribution 
among claimholders. Despite its powerful theoretical appeal, the Creditor’s Bargain 
Theory of bankruptcy seems incapable of explaining bankruptcy entitlements. These 
are payments that commonly take place during bankruptcy proceedings that violate 
both the APR or the requirement of a legally enforceable contract. Most of these 
entitlements appear to be independent of the administrative bankruptcy process as 
higher ranking creditors appear quite willing to make these payments.  
An emerging contractarian theory of bankruptcy, the team production theory 
of bankruptcy,56 seems to be able to explain observed behavior much more 
accurately. This theory also sees the firm as a nexus of contracts but recognizes that 
legally enforceable contracts among parties interacting with the firm do not reflect 
the actual relationships of those parties with the firm. Moreover, the firm’s capacity 
to produce requires inputs that are not always explicitly spelled out in those contracts 
and the distribution of the firm’s rents are also not explicitly detailed on those 
contracts. In other words, in an uncertain environment—such as everyday 
business—it is impossible to determine the exact inputs required from individual 
“team members” as well as the rents available to distribute among them. The firm’s 
                                                 
55 See C. W. Mooney Jr, "A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil 
Procedure," Scholarship at Penn Law Paper 18(2005). 
56 See LoPucki, "A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization." 
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capacity to produce is thus dependent on fair distributions to team members whose 
inputs are required to maintain the firm in business even when they do not hold 
legally enforceable claims. Stakeholders in the firm delegate to the board of directors 
the power to distribute the firms’ rents even in the absence of legally enforceable 
contracts. This theory helps us explain why skilled personnel, for example, might get 
significant distributions ahead of full payment to all holders of senior claims even 
when they do not hold enforceable senior contracts against the bankrupt firm. Thus 
payments that would otherwise be seen as bankruptcy entitlements are actually 
payments to team members that are needed to maintain the firm’s capacity to 
produce. Furthermore, other features of the code, such as debtor in possession and 
the role of the board of directors in the formulation of the plan of reorganization are 
all comfortably explained by this theory.57 Despite its ability to better describe 
observed behavior, its reliance on unquantifiable team production commitments and 
its reliance on board of directors to pursue the “right thing”58 makes it troublesome 
to many bankruptcy theorists.  
In contrast to contractarian scholars, traditionalist theorists argue that market 
frictions and inefficiency considerations ultimately dominate the contractual nature 
of the firm as well as the reorganization process.59 These inefficiencies prevent a 
wide array of claims and obligations to be reflected on legally enforceable contracts 
and also prevent pure market mechanisms to rule the bankruptcy process. Thus, there 
are stakeholders entitled to distributions of assets from the failed firm who might not 
hold legally enforceable written contracts or who might not be members of the 
                                                 
57 Ibid. p. 44 
58 Ibid. p. 43 
59 For representative positions on the traditionalist camp see: Lopucki, "The Nature of the Bankrupt 
Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen's: The End of Bankruptcy.", Warren and Westbrook, 
"Contracting out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention." 
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production team. These theorists argue that a narrowly constructed bankruptcy code 
might allow some claimholders—particularly banks and bondholders—to unjustly 
appropriate the share of assets from others claimants. The practical implications of 
this traditionalist view make bankruptcy a complicated affair. One theorist compares 
it to a divorce:60 there are long lists of written and unwritten commitments that must 
be sorted through in order to determine the actual liabilities of the firm. At the end, 
only a consensus-building negotiation can properly resolve issues among claimants. 
The current bankruptcy code is somewhat more closely aligned with this view of 
bankruptcy than with contractarian theories.   
More recent traditionalist theoretical views of bankruptcy recognize not only 
the inefficiencies in properly accounting for liabilities in bankrupt companies, but 
also the difficulties in accounting for the assets available for distribution to 
claimants. Thus, for example, recent research has framed bankruptcy as the battle for 
corporate control.61 Corporate control is a highly valuable asset that is difficult to 
assess and has been often ignored by both theorists and policy makers. Perhaps, 
more importantly, the struggle for corporate control might help explain creditor and 
debtor behavior during bankruptcy proceedings and explain some of its complexity. 
In summary, and despite the profound differences about the essential 
understanding of the firm and bankruptcy reorganization, theories of bankruptcy 
provide valuable frameworks for examining the current code, previous academic 
research on bankruptcy, and the role and behavior of creditor committees.  
 
                                                 




2.4. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter provided a brief summary of the corporate bankruptcy process, 
definition and role of creditor committees in this process, and corporate bankruptcy 
theories. The most critical points to take away from the chapter include the inherent 
complexity of the bankruptcy process in court, the mechanical character of the 
appointment mechanisms of creditor committees—which essentially is a self-
selection process—, the unpaid nature of committee service, and the significant 
powers given to the committees by the Bankruptcy Code. This understanding on the 
nature of corporate bankruptcy and creditor committee service further motivates the 
need to research potential conflicts of interest that can affect creditor committee 
service.  
The next chapter in this dissertation provides a theoretical framework or 
understanding the nature and role of creditor committees and review of previous 
empirical work examining the role of creditor committees on bankruptcy outcomes 
that will help elucidate the relevant research questions and methods of analysis used 
in this study.   
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Why should we expect creditor committee composition to have an effect on 
the Chapter 11 reorganization process? The first part of the answer lies on the 
inherent complexity of the process and the value of previous experience that 
individual committee members bring to committee service.62 The second part of the 
answer lies in the problematic nature of the fiduciary relationship that defines 
committee service and the mechanisms in place to police conflicts of interest related 
to committee service. In fact, committee members serve dual roles: a fiduciary role 
towards their constituents and a role as individual claimants seeking to protect their 
own individual interests in the reorganization proceedings. These roles have both 
been recognized by the courts. Not only are committee members faced with 
potentially conflicting loyalties, but the Code lacks the appropriate contracting 
mechanisms to customize the terms of committee service in this principal-agent 
setting. Furthermore, the systems in place to manage not only this inherent conflict 
of interest—which include committee self-policing and ultimately court 
supervision—might be inadequate to actually prevent this conflict from affecting 
committee performance. Section 3.2 of this chapter will look into the theory and 
literature of fiduciary role as it relates to creditor committee service.  
The other body of literature relevant to this analysis is that related to the 
social embeddedness of committee service. This is because as we seek to determine 
                                                 
62 The question of experience and committee membership has already been brought up in the 
literature. See Bussel, "Coalition-Building through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees." 
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creditor committee characteristics that are theoretically relevant in committee 
behavior and performance, the social dimension clearly becomes a key aspect of the 
analysis. Social embeddedness analysis has proven to be a significant aspect in 
explaining the performance of other similar complex group efforts such as corporate 
board of directors, Broadway productions, movies, academic collaboration networks, 
patent collaborations, and even in the production of hip-hop music. This theoretical 
observation appears to be confirmed by the empirical observation of the prevalence 
of repeated committee service and the existence of an “elite” of repeat committee 
members. Section 3.4 will address the theoretical aspects of the social embeddedness 
of committee service. This section will further address small world network 
structures and the board of directors interlocks literature63 and it provides a summary 
of previous research involving corporate boards of director interlocks as well as 
studies of small world social networks structures. The chapter continues with a 
review of key bankruptcy outcomes and previous empirical research examining 
factors that affect these outcomes. Finally, section 3.5 presents previous empirical 
work on committee characteristics. 
 
3.2. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF COMMITTEE SERVICE 
A principal-agent or fiduciary role defines the character of creditor 
committee service. Committee members are agents acting on behalf of their 
constituents who are their principals. The standard of behavior of creditor committee 
members is dictated by the fiduciary duty relationship they owe to their respective 
                                                 
63 The phenomenon of corporate board members serving in different boards at the same time is 
known as “board interlocks.” 
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constituents. This fiduciary duty can be interpreted in legal terms using the legal 
literature or in economic terms using principal-agent theory. 
 
3.2.1. Legal Perspective64 
From a legal perspective, the definition of fiduciary duty imposes a standard 
of conduct that tolerates no conflicts of interests: 
 
…many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those 
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A 
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. 
Not honesty alone, but the punctillio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition 
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the 
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of 
undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. 
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level 
higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered 
by any judgment of this court.65 
 
 In theory the application of the legal standard of fiduciary duty to creditor 
committee members is clear: the interests of their respective constituencies must be 
pursued and protected even at the expense of their own interests. This would be an 
ideal standard of care of committee members towards their constituents. In practice, 
                                                 
64  The fiduciary role of committee members is addressed in detail in Klee and Shaffer, "Creditor's 
Committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code."; C. A. Eklund and L. W. Roberts, "Problem 
with Creditors' Committees in Chapter 11: How to Manage the Inherent Conflicts without Loss of 
Function, The," American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 5(1997); Andrews, "The Chapter 11 
Creditors' Committee: Statutory Watchdog.",  and Gwynne, "Intra-Committee Conflicts, Multiple 
Creditors' Committees, Altering Committee Membership and Other Alternatives for Ensuring 
Adequate Representation under Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code." 
65 Chief Judge Cardozo, in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 NE 545 at 546, (NY 1928). A more general and 
through analysis of fiduciary duties in bankruptcy courts can be found at A. D. Shaffer, "Corporate 
Fiduciary-Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) 
Warned You About," American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 8(2000). 
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however, courts recognize individual committee members do have an additional 
relationship with the bankruptcy estate—that of an individual creditor—and thus the 
right to represent their own rights in the bankruptcy case. After all committee 
members are not independent third parties in the cases. Even beyond the individual 
creditor relationship, there are more complex relationships with the debtor, for 
example that of being a key customer for a trade creditor, that further complicates 
the fiduciary relationship. The fact committee members are also allowed to protect 
their own self-interest while serving on a committee is particularly problematic 
given the fact that creditors are many times competing in the distribution of an 
“insufficient pie”.66 Thus, creditors are in fact often times in competition with each 
other. Further exacerbating problematic nature of the fiduciary role for individual 
committee members is the complexity of committees—which are likely to include 
different types of creditors in the same committee—and the existence, in some cases, 
of multiple committees. If courts were to strictly follow the longstanding standard of 
conduct expected from the agent, creditor committees would simply not be 
functional. In order to make the relationship operational, courts have creditor 
committees deal with their inherent conflicts of interest through their own self-
policing measures and, as a last resort, through the court.67  
 
3.2.2. Principal-Agent Theory 
In economics, the principal-agent problem arises when a principal hires an 
agent to perform in accordance to the principal’s interests and in detriment of the 
                                                 
66 See p. 130 in Eklund and Roberts, "Problem with Creditors' Committees in Chapter 11: How to 
Manage the Inherent Conflicts without Loss of Function, The.". He argues creditors are in fact in 




agent’s self-interests in an environment of incomplete or asymmetrical information. 
Under this scenario, the agent will fail to act in the principal’s best interests. The 
principal-agent problem creates the need to align the agent’s self-interests with the 
principal’s or to increase oversight. In their seminal research on the principal-agent 
problem, Milgrom and Roberts provide the four basic principles of contract design in 
order to minimize principal-agent problems: informativeness, incentive-intensity, 
monitoring intensity, and equal compensation.68 The informativeness principle states 
that compensation to the agent should be dependent on a measure of performance 
that reveals information about the level of effort of the agent in pursuing the 
principal’s objective. The incentive-intensity principle dictates that incentives to the 
agent to perform should be commensurate to the principal’s marginal profits, the 
agent’s level of risk aversion, the agent’s level of response to the incentives, and 
how accurately the agent’s behavior can be assessed. The monitoring intensity 
principle relates the level of monitoring with the level of incentives. Finally, the 
equal compensation principle dictates that all of the agent’s tasks must be rewarded 
at the same rate even if their level of monitoring is low or non-existent. 
In the case of creditor committees some of these contracting principles to 
minimize principal-agent problems are clearly present. This is mainly because 
committee members are also creditors in the class they represent. This makes their 
compensation commensurate to that of their principal’s rate of recovery in their 
creditor class. Thus the informativeness and incentive-intensity principles are 
present. But it is not a perfect relationship. Many investors, particularly financial 
firms are typically invested across the capital structure of the bankrupt firm. Such 
                                                 
68 Milgrom et al 1992 P Milgrom and J Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management 
(London: Prentice-Hall, 1992). 
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investment strategy diversifies the creditor’s exposure in the firm and minimizes risk 
from an uncertain valuation of the reorganized entity. This might create conflicts of 
interests between creditor committee members the debtors, other creditors and/or 
other committees. Perhaps the biggest problem is that the principal agent contract 
between the committee member and the constituents of the creditor class cannot be 
customized in order to maximize the four contracting principles. Thus, it is difficult 
to minimize principal-agent problems in the contract between creditor committee 
members and their principals.  
 
3.2.3. Conflicts of Interest 
The resulting conflicts of interest can be classified in two categories: those 
that do not affect the timing and contents of the plan of reorganization and those that 
do.69 The first type of conflicts includes the trading of claims against the debtor both 
during committee service as well as after resignation from the committee. The 
mechanisms that allow current committee members to continue trading in claims 
against the debtor are information screens or “Chinese Walls” arrangements.70 These 
information walls are used for “controlling access to material, non-public 
information within multi-service financial firms”.71 These barriers are designed to 
keep insider information away from the reach of those actively trading in the claims 
                                                 
69 See the two “particular abuses” delineated by the United States Supreme Court (Wolf vs. 
Weinstein) as described on p. 753 in R. C. Pozen and J. K. Mencher, "Chinese Walls for Creditors' 
Committees," Business Lawyer (ABA) 48(1992). 
70 Other terms such as “firewall” have also been used to describe these arrangements. The American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Ethics establish the term “screen” as the preferred 
word to describe this arrangement. The term “Chinese Wall”, however, has been the traditional term 
used and is widely used in both banking and law.  
71 See Gadsden, "Liabilities of Creditors' Committees and Their Members, The."; Pozen and 
Mencher, "Chinese Walls for Creditors' Committees." 
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against the debtor. A more complex problem, and one that is not addressed in the 
literature, is that of trading in claims after resignation from committee service. There 
is clearly a motivation for individuals to join committees in order to gain non-public 
information from which they can profit after resigning from the committee. This 
type of conflict of interest highlights the importance of the dynamic characteristics 
of committee membership: the changes of committee membership over time. This 
research will explore whether individuals joining and quitting committee early in the 
bankruptcy reorganization process is a prevalent phenomenon across the sample as a 
test of the prevalence of this dynamic feature. 
The second type of conflicts of interests, those that affect the timing and 
contents of the plan of reorganization, includes those induced by committee 
members with interests in other classes of claims against the debtor and trade 
creditors with wider trade relationships with the debtor. This type of conflicts of 
interests also includes committee members joining late in the process. These 
members might not only disrupt the consensus building process in the 
reorganization, but they might also bring specific reorganization objectives not 
necessarily in line with those of other committee members.72 This type of conflict of 
interest further highlights the need to investigate the changes of committee 
membership over time. 
Other specific instances of conflicts of interest might include the presence of 
the debtor’s trade creditors in the committees. For these creditors the trade 
relationship might play an important role in the relationship with debtors. For these 
creditors, a prompt normalization of the trade relationship might be an important 
                                                 
72 These might include buyers of claims seeking an asset sale, for example. 
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goal.73 To some types of financial firms, their reputation for toughness is an 
important asset.74 Thus, this type of investors might be more willing to engage in 
adversarial, alienating strategies than a trade creditor, for example, would. To other 
type of financial investors, particularly those offering investment banking services, 
potential fees from debtor-in-possession financing facilities as well as exit financing 
structures might provide additional incentives not shared by other creditors. 
 
3.3. SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF COMMITTEE SERVICE 
3.3.1. Introduction 
In addition to conflicts of interest affecting creditor committee behavior, we 
need to consider the fact creditor committee economic behavior is embedded within 
a social environment. This social environment provides both opportunities as well as 
constraints on individual behavior and has the potential to affect committee 
operations and, ultimately, case outcomes. But, what is the social network structure 
that emerges from the repeated interaction among creditor committee members 
serving in separate cases? How would such structure affect creditor committee 
performance? 
First, a web of interlocks emerges among different cases that share individual 
committee members. This case network provides pathways for knowledge to travel 
from case to case. These connections have proven relevant in other situations where 
access to knowledge facilitates the execution of complex tasks. In fact, access to 
                                                 
73 See Eklund and Roberts, "Problem with Creditors' Committees in Chapter 11: How to Manage the 
Inherent Conflicts without Loss of Function, The." 
74 This point has been argued when discussed vulture funds are present in committees. See T. Noe 
and M. Rebello, "Reputation and the Market for Distressed Firm Debt," Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 38(2003). 
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such knowledge provides a measure of social capital of individual cases that might 
have an effect on the course of the bankruptcy case itself.  
Second, the inter-committee network that emerges from individual member 
service in creditor committees is an affiliation network that should provide some 
measure of the roles played by individual members. Other examples of this type of 
network include board of director networks, academic publishing co-authorship 
networks, and Broadway musical collaboration networks. 75 This network is 
composed of individual nodes, one for each individual who has served in any 
committee in the sample, tied to other nodes through joint committee service. Thus 
each committee is a small cluster (or event) and each instance of multiple 
memberships provides a connection between clusters.  These co-memberships create 
interlocking committees. Events in affiliation networks bring individuals together 
which increases the probability of formation of pairwise ties (i.e. a tie between the 
two individuals independent from their joint membership in a single committee). 
Pairwise ties increase the probability of collaboration and sharing of resources while 
interlocks provide paths for the transfer of knowledge among clusters. Furthermore, 
network centrality in these networks provides a proxy for social capital, as it 
provides access to the information that flows through the network.76 In order to 
better understand network wide effects of the potential for transfer of knowledge and 
collaboration across networks, one must turn to small world theory. From a practical 
point of view, small world analysis allows us to investigate whether creditor 
committee member create “packs” as they serve on committees. 
                                                 
75 See a more detailed overview of affiliation networks in Uzzi et al (2005) B. Uzzi and J. Spiro, 
"Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem," American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 2 
(2005). 
76 G. F. Davis, "Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate 




3.3.2. The Small World Structure 
Stanley Milgram’s seminal work on the small world phenomenon77 provides 
a basis to analyze a sparse network populated by clusters, much like the social 
network expected to emerge from the creditor committee interlocks. The study of the 
small world phenomenon has demonstrated even small numbers of ties connecting 
clusters in a large network provide connecting paths between any two members in 
the network78 that are counterintuitively short. Watts and Strogatz operationalized 
Milgram’s concept by providing an analytical model to study small world 
networks.79 In his model Watts specified four explicit preconditions for a small 
world network: the network is large, each node on the network is connected to a 
relatively small number of different nodes, there are no central nodes, and there is 
local clustering of nodes. These preconditions appear to hold in the creditor 
committee network. First, the network is large with large numbers of individual 
members serving on committees where members appear to have a few ties to other 
members. Also, there are no central individual members in a large number of these 
committees. Finally, by definition, each committee is a local cluster of individual 
members serving on it. Yet, there is strong anecdotal evidence there are at least some 
links connecting some clusters to others.  These links are likely to be provided by 
individual members serving on multiple committees. Confirmation of small world 
social network architecture among creditor committee members could have 
significant theoretical implications on committee behavior and outcomes. This is 
because small world network characteristics provide the connectivity that facilitates 
                                                 
77 S. Milgram, "The Small World," Psychology Today 2(1967). 
78 It is assumed every member of the network is connected to every other member of the network. 
79 Duncan Watts, "Collective Dynamics of 'Small-World' Networks," Nature 393(1999). 
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knowledge to travel across the network. Such sharing of knowledge assists 
collaboration and the execution of complex tasks. Given the inherent complexity of 
the bankruptcy and reorganization process, the presence of a small world structure in 
creditor committees would facilitate interlocked committees’ tasks and improve their 
performance. Small world network architecture has been shown to have successfully 
used to study in other affiliation networks such as the one created by corporate 
boards of directors of corporations. 
It is essential to note most analyses of small world social constructs turn to 
Granovetter’s theory of weak ties80 for a framework of analysis. This theory 
emphasizes the role that weak ties  play in connecting separate clusters of nodes and 
provide critical paths of communication across large portions of social networks. 
Granovetter defines strength as "a combination of the amount of time, the emotional 
intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which 
characterize the tie."  Weak ties theory has been used extensively in the analysis of 
networks of creative production and innovation. Similarly, Burton theory of 
structural holes81 emphasizes the value of brokerage in connecting separate clusters 
independently of the strength of the ties. Under both theories, individual players gain 
importance and social capital by providing critical connecting paths bridging 
separate clusters of nodes in a network. Thus, importance of individual nodes under 
both weak ties and structural holes frameworks of analysis is defined by the 
positioning of nodes as brokers or critical paths among clusters. Such positioning 
can be measured by betweenness centrality.82 Betweenness centrality measures the 
                                                 
80 M.S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," The American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 
(1973). 
81 See R.S. Burt, "Structural Holes and Good Ideas," American Journal of Sociology (2004).  
82 For further discussion on betweenness centrality see L.C. Freeman, "Centrality in Social Networks 
Conceptual Clarification," Social Networks 1, no. 3 (1979). 
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appearance of the node in the shortest path connecting other nodes in the network. It 
provides a measure of the ability of a network to connect other nodes and its ability 
to broker flow among them.  
In studying the social networks created by creditor committee service, 
however, social capital of individual cases should not viewed using either weak ties 
or structural holes theories. Bankruptcy cases are often not contemporaneous and 
their ties are directed (i.e., new cases cannot have an effect on older cases, while old 
cases do have an effect on new cases).83 Furthermore, the fundamental issue facing 
creditor committees is that of complexity of bankruptcy reorganization procedure 
and not the need for innovative creations derived from access to outside resources. 
Thus social capital of individual cases appears to be related to previous experience in 
bankruptcy proceedings and not for the ability to bridge separate clusters in the 
network. Thus degree centrality, or number of ties to other nodes, is a much better 
measure of social capital of individual nodes in the creditor committee network than 
betweenness centrality. Degree centrality, in this case the number of other cases 
individual members has served on within the tie decay provides in effect a measure 
of the accumulated experienced gained by individual members on the committees of 
the case. 
The next section in this chapter describes the empirical methods used to 
measure the degree of small world structure present in social network. 
 
                                                 
83 An older case can only have an effect on a newer case only if it lies within the tie decay period 
defined for the network. Chapter 5 of this dissertation discusses tie decay in more detail. 
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3.3.3. Measuring Small World Topology  
3.3.3.1. Small World Test: General 
Watts and Strogatz provide the model that allows the quantification of small 
world structure using conventional network measures.84 Perhaps more importantly, 
their model generalized small worlds as a class of networks that have both high 
clustering and small connecting paths connecting individual clusters. Such a 
structure provides clusters of cohesive nodes while allowing flow to travel 
efficiently among the different clusters. There are two key parameters that need to be 
defined in order to characterize the small world phenomenon: the clustering 
coefficient and the characteristic path length85. A network’s clustering coefficient 
(C) is defined as the degree to which a node’s directly connected nodes are also 
connected with each other. This coefficient provides a measure for connectedness 
among neighbors of pairs of nodes that are already connected. The characteristic 
path length (L) is defined as the average number of links in the shortest path between 
two nodes for all pairs of nodes. In other words, it provides a measure for the 
average shortest path connecting any two nodes on the network. The test for 
evidence of small world phenomena in a network is performed by comparing the 
actual clustering coefficient of the network, as well as its characteristic path length, 
to that of a random network. This comparison is achieved by the calculation of a 
small world coefficient (Q) that is defined as: 
	  
where  is the clustering coefficient of the actual network,  is 
the clustering coefficient of a random network,  is the characteristic path 
                                                 
84 D.J. Watts and S.H. Strogatz, "Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks," Nature 393, no. 
6684 (1998). 
85 For a more complete description of the methodology to compute small world coefficients see ibid. 




length of the actual network, and  is the characteristic path length of the 
random network. 
 A small world network structure has been defined as a network structure 
with Q value “significantly higher than one.”86 In practice, Q values are compared to 
those of found in similar and comparable networks.  
By definition, small worlds require networks to be fully connected. This 
means all nodes can be reached from any other node in the network. When dealing 
with networks that are not fully connected, individual network components are 
examined (i.e., portions of the network that are fully connected) for evidence of 
small world phenomenon in that component. Also, small world analysis requires 
networks with directional ties to be symmetrized prior to analysis.87 In other words, 
a one way directional tie connecting node A to node B, for example, needs to be 
replaced with a non-directional tie connecting both nodes. 
The actual clustering coefficient for the networks is calculated as the 
percentage of triads (i.e. groups of three nodes with at least 2 ties connecting them) 
that are closed. The Watts-Strogatz model derives the formula to calculate the 
clustering coefficient for a random network with n nodes and k average connection 
per node as: 
	~	  
                                                 
86 There is no hard definition for “significantly higher than one.” See B. Uzzi, L.A.N. Amaral, and F. 
Reed-Tsochas, "Small-World Networks and Management Science Research: A Review," European 
Management Review 4, no. 2 (2007). for a literature review of empirical research of small worlds and 
ranges of typical small world coefficients in different fields and G. F. Davis, M. Yoo, and W. E. 
Baker, "The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001," Strategic Organization 1, no. 
3 (2003). 
87 For an example of symmetrization of directed ties prior small world analysis see the study of the 
small world phenomena in Canadian investments banks in J.A.C. Baum, T.J. Rowley, and A.V. 
Shipilov, "The Small World of Canadian Capital Markets: Statistical Mechanics of Investment Bank 
Syndicate Networks, 1952–1989," Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences/Revue Canadienne 
des Sciences de l'Administration 21, no. 4 (2004).  
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The characteristic path length for a random network with n nodes and k 
number of links can be calculated using the following formula also provided by 
Watts and Strogatz: 
	~	ln	 ln	  
 
3.3.3.2. Small World Test: Bipartite Networks 
Recent literature, however, has demonstrated that the methodology presented 
in the previous section overestimates the clustering coefficients in bipartite, or 
affiliation, networks.88 This is because bipartite networks are defined by nodes 
having at least one obligatory tie to a specific event or group. Examples of this type 
of network include: actors (actors working together in movies/plays), legislative 
committees (legislators working in jointly in committees), court justices making 
decisions, etc. In each of these examples, rules of participation in the network force 
individual members to be affiliated with at least one of the clusters in the network. 
More relevant to the discussion in this research is the bipartite network created by 
board of directors interlocks. In this network all individual board members (i.e., 
nodes) are affiliated with at least one board of a company (i.e., event), and thus each 
board is a cluster of board members. Board members cannot serve in isolation as 
they each must be affiliated with at least one board. Such network topology, in turn, 
artificially increases the clustering coefficient of the network and distorts the 
characteristic path length calculation when compared to a random network where 
                                                 
88 See for example:  M.E.J. Newman, S.H. Strogatz, and D.J. Watts, "Random Graphs with Arbitrary 
Degree Distributions and Their Applications," Physical Review E 64, no. 2 (2001)., Uzzi and Spiro, 
"Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem.", Uzzi, Amaral, and Reed-Tsochas, "Small-
World Networks and Management Science Research: A Review.", and D.J. Watts, "The "New" 
Science of Networks," Annual Review of Sociology 30(2004).  
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nodes are not forced to be part of an event. Thus a small world analysis of bipartite 
networks should include a corrective calculation to remove this artificially imposed 
topology on the data. Newman et al (2001)89 provide us with the appropriate 
mechanisms to deal with these cases. 
The procedure to correct for overestimation of clustering on bipartite 
networks, first involves the identification of the discrete probability distribution of 
the frequency of the number of connections per node. This is the probability 	 that 
a member appears on j cases. In the case of the board of directors’ interlocks 
network, this is the probability distribution of a specific number of instances of 
board service for each individual members serving on boards of directors (or said 
another way, the distribution created by the number of boards each member serves 
on). Second, the discrete probability distribution of the number of nodes per cluster 
on the bivariate structure node needs to be evaluated (i.e. the probability 	 that a 
case has k members). In the case of boards of directors, this is the distribution 
created by the frequency of board sizes. 





 These can then be used in generating the function 	which is defined as 
the probability distribution of first neighbors on the unipartite graph of nodes. Thus, 
                                                 





Newman et al (2001) derives the corrected formulas for characteristic path 
length for bipartite networks as: 
 
	




	 1 1  
	 1 1 1  
 







where N is the number of nodes on the network and M is the number of 
events on the bipartite network. It is worth noting that while Newman et al (2001) 
provide the elaboration of the concept,  the derivation of the formulas, and an 
empirical example, Seaton et al (2004) offer a much more practical and approachable 
illustration of the technique using the networks created by Boston and Vienna 
subway systems.90  
 
                                                 
90 K.A. Seaton and L.M. Hackett, "Stations, Trains and Small-World Networks," Physica A: 
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 339, no. 3-4 (2004).  
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3.3.4. Interlocks: Board of Directors and Others 
The previous section used board of directors’ interlocks to illustrate an 
instance of bipartite network. A more detailed review of board of directors’ 
interlocks literature follows as they have been widely studied91 and their structure is 
very similar to that created by creditor committee interlocks. Recent studies have 
focused on the mechanisms of knowledge dispersion through the social network 
formed by interlocks. Particularly relevant were the findings that board interlocks 
help explain the diffusion of adoption of board policies regarding anti-takeover 
corporate measures.92 That research specifically shows how board interlocks help 
predict the adoption of measures that specifically challenged the fiduciary 
responsibility of the directors.  
The author of that article, Gerard Davis, also published a time series study on 
the structure of the social network formed by board interlocks.93 He tested the 
network for small world architecture and found that one existed and was relatively 
stable. This small world network architecture further reinforces the mechanisms 
through which knowledge dispersion takes place among boards.94 
Another significant recent paper explores the architecture of a similar 
affiliation network, this time Broadway productions, and tests it for small world 
                                                 
91 For a broad overview of this literature see M. S. Mizruchi, "What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, 
Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates," Annual Review of Sociology 22, 
no. 1 (1996).. 
92 Davis, "Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate 
Network." 
93 Davis, Yoo, and Baker, "The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001." 
94 There is additional literature on the small world characteristics of board of directors. See M. J. 
Conyon and M. R. Muldoon, "The Small World of Corporate Boards," Journal of Business Finance 
and Accounting 33(2006)., and B. Kogut and G. Walker, "The Small World of Germany and the 
Durability of National Networks," American Sociological Review 66, no. 3 (2001). This last paper 
uses data from German companies. 
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structure.95 The findings of the paper are compelling: network interlocks help 
explain Broadway show success via collaboration. The small world structure further 
explains the mechanisms for collaboration among different production teams. 
In more general terms, there is significant empirical evidence that board 
interlocks as well as small world topology help explain the outcomes of the 
processes in which these social networks are embedded. This literature review will 
next provide a brief overview of key bankruptcy outcomes. 
 
3.4. KEY BANKRUPTCY VARIABLES 
A significant portion of the empirical literature on bankruptcy variables has 
focused on bankruptcy costs.96 Branch provides a summary of previous work in the 
bankruptcy cost question and provides a model explaining bankruptcy costs.97 In 
general, bankruptcy costs can be grouped into four separate categories: (1) real costs 
borne directly by the firm, (2) real costs borne by the claimants, (3) losses to the firm 
that are offset by gains to other entities—i.e. indirect costs due to loss of market 
share, short run focus—, and (4) real costs borne by parties other than the bankrupt 
firm and/or its claimants. Under category (1), real costs borne by the firm, the 
variables looked at include professional fees and internal staff resources. Category 
                                                 
95 Uzzi and Spiro, "Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem." 
96 See for example: J. R. Franks and W. N. Torous, "An Empirical Investigation of Us Firms in 
Reorganization," The Journal of Finance 44, no. 3 (1989).,E. I. Altman, "A Further Empirical 
Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question," The Journal of Finance 39, no. 4 (1984)., J. S. Ang, 
J. H. Chua, and J. J. McConnell, "The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note," 
Journal of Finance 37, no. 1 (1982)., S. J. Lubben, "Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An 
Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, The," American Bankruptcy 
Law Journal 74(2000)., M. J. White, "The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Us-European 
Comparison," Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives (1996). 
97 B. Branch, "The Costs of Bankruptcy a Review," International Review of Financial Analysis 11, 
no. 1 (2002). 
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(2) includes professional fees—this time those borne individually by claimants-, 
internal staff resources, and reduced marketability of claims. Branch estimates total 
costs for category (1) to be 4.45% to 6.35% of the pre-distressed value of the firm, 
category (2) 3.25% to 4.15%, and category (3) is estimated to be about 5%-10%. 
Using estimates in the literature, Branch estimates the total loss due to bankruptcy to 
cost about 28% of the pre-distressed value, while the cost of pre-bankruptcy distress 
averages 16%, for a total cost estimate of 44% of pre-distressed value.98 For 
methodological purposes, two variables have emerged in the literature as the leading 
indicators of direct costs of bankruptcy to the firm. The first one is professional fees. 
This is the most obvious and available measure of direct costs. The second one is 
time spent under bankruptcy protection. Time under bankruptcy has been argued to 
be a noisy proxy for indirect costs.99  
In addition to costs, the absolute priority rule (APR) has also been studied 
repeatedly in the literature. This variable is of great interest to researchers in the field 
of finance.100 The absolute priority rule (APR) is the theoretical standard by which 
financial contracts are resolved when a debtor is insolvent.101 Furthermore, 
uncertainty about adherence of APR in bankruptcy court introduces a series of 
contracting distortions that must be priced in throughout the economy at great cost to 
society. Furthermore, APR adherence is a key assumption in some of the most 
                                                 
98 Financial distress usually starts imposing costs on the firm well before a bankruptcy filing.   
99 Franks and Torous, "An Empirical Investigation of Us Firms in Reorganization."; A. Bris, I. 
Welch, and N. Zhu, "The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 
Reorganization," Journal of Finance 61, no. 3 (2006). 
100 See A. C. Eberhart and L. A. Weiss, "The Importance of Deviations from the Absolute Priority 
Rule in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings," Financial Management 27, no. 4 (1998). In this paper 
the authors enumerate a series of seminal finance articles – including Black Scholes, Merton, and 
Meyers – where APR adherence is a key assumption.  
101 S. D. Longhofer, "Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency," Journal 
of Financial Intermediation 6, no. 3 (1997). 
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fundamental models widely used in financial economics (including the Black-
Scholes model).102 
Among recent empirical studies Bris et al 103 is significant. Using the most 
comprehensive dataset to date (thanks to the recent availability of PACER data), 
they investigate determinants for time in bankruptcy, APR violations, creditor’s 
recovery rates, and bankruptcy expenses. 
 
3.4.1. Time 
Despite the theoretical importance of time in bankruptcy—typically defined 
as the time from the bankruptcy filing to the time of plan confirmation—as a proxy 
for indirect costs few articles have used it as a dependent variable. Franks and 
Torous 1989 article published in the Journal of Finance was the first significant 
empirical study of Chapter 11 reorganizations since the passage of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Act.104 Even though their focus was an investigation of deviations from 
APR, they collected and published data concerning time spent under bankruptcy. In 
his sample of 31 companies he found a mean of 3.67 years spent under bankruptcy 
protection with a standard deviation of 2.88 years. In similar studies Weiss and 
Gilson et al, find means 2.5 and 2.4 years, respectively, of time spent under 
bankruptcy protection.  
In a much more recent study, Bris et al105 do look at time as a dependent 
variable in their investigation of bankruptcy costs. In their sample of 257 companies 
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
103 Bris, Welch, and Zhu, "The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 
Reorganization." 
104 See Franks and Torous, "An Empirical Investigation of Us Firms in Reorganization." 




they found a mean of 2.27 years spent under bankruptcy protection (with a standard 
deviation of 1.07 years). They found that the number of creditors as well as the 
existence of creditor committees had statistically significant effects on the duration 
of the submission to confirmation phase of the bankruptcy. The fact that the 
existence of creditor committee did matter to the case is a particularly relevant 




Author Estimates Sample Size 
Franks et al (1989) 3.7 31 
Weiss (1990) 2.5 37 
Gilson et al (1990) 2.4 89 
Bris et al (2006) 2.3 257 
Table 1: Previous Literature on Time Spent in Bankruptcy 
 
3.4.2. Absolute Priority Rule 
Longhofer et al106 provide a detailed review of empirical studies of APR 
violations in the literature up to 1996. It finds APR is violated in a large portion of 
cases: Franks et al (1989) 66.67% cases violate APR (n=30), LoPucki et al (1990) 
48.84% (n=43), Eberhart et al (1990) 76.67% (n=30), Weiss (1990) 72.97% (n=37), 
Tashjian (1996), 72.92% (n=48), and Betker (1995) 72% (n=75). Again there is 
                                                 
106 S. D. Longhofer and C. T. Carlstrom, "Absolute Priority Rule Violations in Bankruptcy," 
Economic Review 31, no. 4 (1995). 
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concern about the consistency of the characteristics of the sample of firms (size, 
district, etc.). 
It is important to note the problematic nature of APR violation measurement. 
This is because pricing of all securities distributed among claimants is required in 
order to compute whether any junior creditors receive a distribution ahead of senior 
creditors. Timing of the pricing of the distribution (some price it at emergence, some 
at a predetermined period of time after emergence) ultimately determines whether 
APR is violated or not. 
Bris (2006)107 is one of the most comprehensive studies of empirical APR 
violation data. It finds that firm size, the presence of a creditor’s committee, 
presence of a bank among unsecured creditors, number of unsecured creditors, 
corporate leverage, and unsecured expenses to pre-bankruptcy assets are statistically 
significant in explaining the probability of an APR violation. It finds APR violations 
in 38% of cases, with a sample of 157 cases. The model uses a probit regression and 
only data through 2001 is used. 
A recent working paper by Bharat (2010)108 uses a much larger sample of 
626 cases, and concludes APR violation is in rapid decline as only 22% for cases 
filed from 1991 to 2005. The most recent data used in this paper is from 2005. It 
must be noted, however, a significant portion of the sample used was collection of 
data used in previous studies by other authors.  
  
                                                 
107 Bris, Welch, and Zhu, "The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 
Reorganization." 
108 S.T. Bharath, V. Panchapegesan, and I. Werner, "The Changing Nature of Chapter 11," Fisher 




Author Estimates Sample Size 
Franks et al (1989) 66.7% 30 
LoPucki et al (1990) 48.8% 43 
Eberhart (1990) 76.7% 30 
Weiss (1990) 74.0% 37 
Tashjian et al (1996) 72.9% 48 
Betker (1995) 72.0% 75 
Bris et al (2006) 38.0% 157 
Bharat (2010) 22.0% 626 
Table 2: Previous Literature on Proportion of Cases with APR Violations 
 
3.4.3. Professional Fees 
Professional fees have been studied often times in the past. In one of the 
earliest studies, Altman109 calculates professional fees to total 7.5% of the firm’s 
assets. Other studies, as compiled by Branch, include Warner (1977) 4% (n=11), 
McConnell (1982) 7.5%, (n=105), Weiss (1990), Betker (1995), Tashjian et al 
(1996) similar results, Lubben (2000) 1.8% (n=22), Lopucki et al (2004) 1.8% 
(n=48), Lopucki et al (2008) 3.5% (n=74). A fundamental issue with these studies is 
the widely different samples they used (venue, firm size). There is no consensus as 
to what is “large” or “small” for professional fees. This literature is summarized on 
Table 2. 
                                                 





Author Estimates Sample Size 
McConnell (1982) 7.5% 105 
Weiss (1990) 2.8% 37 
Betker (1995) 3.9% 75 
Tashjian et al (1996) 1.8% 49 
Lubben (2000) 1.8% 22 
LoPucki et al (2004) 1.8% 48 
LoPucki et al (2008) 3.5% 74 
Table 3: Literature on Professional Fees as a Proportion of Total Assets 
 
The Lopucki et al (2008)110 is a particularly important paper. Like his 2004 
fee study, Prof. Lopucki expands the use of the Bankruptcy Research Database 
which is becoming the standard dataset for empirical bankruptcy studies (sample 
size, consistency of data, and consistency of firm characteristics). The results of this 
paper are consistent with his previous research. His findings indicate that asset size, 
case duration, and number of professional firms working on the case account for 
87% of the case to case variance of fees. Also, this paper finds important scale 
effects of fees, which make the reporting of fees as a percentage of total assets 
misleading. Furthermore, this research finds evidence of a “billing opportunity” to 
overcharge in cases of large public companies. This is a critical finding as it points at 
failure of the process oversight mechanisms—in which creditor committees are 
                                                 
110  LoPucki and Doherty, "Professional Overcharging in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases." 
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included–. Finally, this paper compares fees gathered from both the SEC as well as 
that gathered from fee filings with the court (PACER) and finds that, while the SEC 
numbers are on average 58% higher, both sources of fee information are highly 
correlated and provide almost identical results even with a substantially smaller 
sample.  
 
3.5. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON CREDITOR COMMITTEE COMPOSITION 
There is no systematic study assessing the effect of creditor committee 
composition on bankruptcy variables in the literature. There is a single article, 
Bussel,111that provides empirical data with insights into committee composition and 
committee processes. This study provides three separate case studies of creditor 
committees: Maxicare, Leisure Tech, and Smith International. In the Maxicare 
reorganization banks emerged successful in a difficult battle for representation in the 
two committees appointed in the case. The Leisure Tech study tells us how a single 
claimholder, a buyer of distressed assets and owner of the majority of senior claims 
against the company, considered itself as the de facto owner of the company. The 
presence of this creditor in the committee led to a long and expensive clash with 
other creditors that considered their interests were not aligned with those of the 
largest creditor. The plan of reorganization ultimately approved was negotiated by 
the large creditor. The Smith International case shows how banks were able to 
reduce the size of the committee and effectively remove the largest creditor from the 
committee. There are several insights that can be drawn from these case studies. 
First, committees can be somewhat chaotic scenarios where different creditors battle 
                                                 
111 Bussel, "Coalition-Building through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees." 
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for their own self-interests. Second, banks have a powerful presence in creditor 
committees which are likely to have an effect on the functioning of these 
committees. Finally, other financial players, particularly distressed securities 
investors, also appear to have a commanding presence in committees.  
 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter offered an overview of the theoretical framework necessary to 
examine creditor committee service and provided a summary of relevant literature. 
In this theoretical framework, the conflicts of interest inherent to creditor committee 
service emerge as the key dimension of analysis. This is because the creditor 
committee members must serve as both fiduciaries for an entire creditor class, while 
at the same time they are allowed, and expected, to protect their own self-interests. 
Not only is creditor committee service inescapably defined by these conflicts of 
interests, but the social embeddedness of committee service is also bound to have an 
effect on the behavior of individuals and institutions in them. These effects of social 
embeddedness can provide desirable contributions to the social capital of the case as 
resources from outside the case are brought in by these social connections. But these 
effects of social embeddedness are also likely to create additional conflicts of 
interest that ultimately have a negative affect the outcomes of the reorganization 
process. The rest of this research will focus on the examination of whether the 
creditor committee characteristics are likely to create conflict of interest. It will then 
look at professional fees as a distinctive test of creditor committee variables’ effects 
on bankruptcy outcomes.  
This dissertation builds directly upon on two bodies of literature: theoretical 
research on the different aspects of creditor committee service (powers, duties, 
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representation, liabilities, conflicts of interest, and other aspects of committee 
service), as well as the very limited previous empirical research on creditor 
committee service. Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to other significant 
clusters of research. These include theory of principal-agent relationships, research 
on corporate interlocks and other bipartite social networks, theory and empirical 
literature on the small world phenomenon, and empirical literature on bankruptcy 
costs and other outcomes. It also contributes to the body of literature focused on 
bankruptcy fees and, and more precisely, the question of professional fees. More 
specifically, this research builds on the recent debate of overcharging of professional 
fees in large cases and will shed some light on the causes that enable such fee 
abusive practices to take place.   
The next chapter enumerates the research questions for this dissertation and 
lays out a basic framework of analysis for dealing with them. It also provides a 





Chapter 4: Analytical Framework and Datasets  
 
The literature review presented in previous chapters reveals several important 
gaps in previous research. First, despite the critical role committees play in the 
corporate bankruptcy process, no significant dataset of creditor committee 
membership has ever been systematically collected, coded, and analyzed. Second, 
previous literature has failed to examine the social embeddedness dimension of 
creditor committee service. This social analysis has proven useful in explaining 
outcomes in processes where individual members serve repeatedly in groups similar 
to creditor committees. Third, no empirical study has attempted to establish whether 
creditor committee characteristics have an effect on case outcomes. More 
specifically, no previous study has attempted to examine whether conflicts of interest 
indicated by the discussion in previous chapters have an effect on key bankruptcy 
variables. The purpose of this research is to fill those gaps by examining 
membership of creditor committees in large bankruptcy cases and studying potential 
conflicts of interest that might prevent them from providing an effective oversight of 
the reorganization process. It also seeks to test whether creditor committee 
characteristics have an effect on key bankruptcy variables, and more specifically, on 
professional fees.  
The first section of this chapter lays out the research questions explored in 
this dissertation and outlines a basic research framework. The first set of research 
questions raised in this research pertains to the characteristics of creditor committee 
membership.  It postulates various types of committee characteristics—individual 
characteristics, changes over time, and social characteristics—as well as how these 
characteristics are to be examined in this research.  A second set of research 
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questions are about the effect of creditor committee characteristics on the bankruptcy 
reorganization outcomes.  It postulates various research hypotheses about the 
relationship between professional fees in bankruptcy and factors affecting them. It 
starts by studying the characteristics of creditor committee membership and then 
lays out a series of sub questions. The second part of this section, main research 
question 2, investigates whether creditor committee characteristics affect bankruptcy 
reorganization outcomes. It also outlines the basic model used in investigating the 
effect of creditor committee characteristics on professional fees. As the questions are 
presented, this research theorizes about the expected findings for each one of them. 
The second section of this chapter discusses data sources, the documents 
examined and the process followed in the research, including data collection, 
compilation, and a brief discussion on sample size and sampling methods. These 
datasets contain all data used in the empirical analyzes presented in Chapters 5 and 
6.  
  
4.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1.1. Main Research Question 1 
What Are the Characteristics of Creditor Committee? 
 
The first step in this research is to collect creditor committee membership 
information and analyze this membership data along relevant dimensions of analysis. 
Based on the literature reviewed in the previous chapter three separate dimensions of 
analysis are postulated in this research: individual member characteristics, dynamic 
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characteristics of committee membership, and the social characteristics of committee 
service.  
 
4.1.1.1. Individual Member Characteristics 
Individual characteristics of creditor committee members provide us with 
information about individual traits of committee members that affect committee 
performance. Relevant characteristics include previous experience with 
reorganizations and the likelihood of conflicts of interest with the committee’s goals. 
This likelihood of conflicts of interest can also be described as the degree of 
commitment towards committee service. Previous experience with reorganizations is 
likely be an important attribute given the complexity of the process. Other 
characteristics, such as demographic variables of individual members do not appear 
to be relevant in affecting committee performance. Since there is no data indicating 
either previous experience with reorganizations or the degree of commitment 
towards committee service, member affiliation data can be used as a proxy for both. 
Member affiliation tells us whether the individual member represents a financial 
firm or a non-financial firm or individual and such affiliation should be highly 
correlated with experience. This is because one can expect banks and other financial 
institutions to be more experienced with the process than non-financial institutions. 
Member affiliation should also provide information about commitment towards 
committee service. Here, again, one can expect the degree of commitment of 
financial institutions towards committee service to be different from that of trade 
creditors.  Previous research appears to support the use of this proxy. A study on 
bankruptcy valuation of firms112 showed, for example, that vulture fund presence in 
                                                 
112 Gilson, Hotchkiss, and Ruback, "Valuation of Bankrupt Firms." 
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creditor committees representing junior creditors does have a measurable impact on 
firm valuation. Furthermore, bank presence might have an effect of committee 
performance as suggested by the literature on lender control113 and Bussel’s case 
study on creditor committees.114 Finally, the discussion of conflicts of interests 
inherent to committee service is particularly relevant to financial firms. This is 
because of recent changes in the financial industry that have not only resulted in a 
dramatic consolidation and concentration among firms, but also in the use on 
hedging techniques and derivative instruments that have added significant levels of 
complexity to their balance sheets. These changes have resulted in widespread 
regulatory reviews of the industry. 
 
4.1.1.2. Dynamic Characteristics of Committees 
Dynamic characteristics of creditor committees are also likely to have an 
impact on committee performance and provide further insight on individual 
motivation to serve. They might also point at breaches of fiduciary duty and 
defective features of the creditor committee system itself—i.e. self-policing and 
regulatory mechanism failures—. This analysis of dynamic characteristics will study 
both timing of members joining committees as well as length of service on the 
committee. It will then focus on the anecdotal evidence of committee members 
appointed early in the cases, who quit well before the confirmation of the plan of 
reorganization. This type of service might point at members using committees to 
gain non-public information. Finally, this research will look for evidence of 
                                                 
113 See for example K.M. Ayotte and E.R. Morrison, "Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11," 
Journal of Legal Studies 1(2009). 
114 Bussel, "Coalition-Building through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees." 
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committee members joining late in the process. These late entrants to committees 
might derail the consensus building process on which the plan of reorganization is 
built upon or act as stabilizing factors in the operation of the committee.  
 
4.1.1.3. Social Characteristics 
The third dimension of analysis of creditor committees takes into account the 
social embeddedness of committee service. This dimension of analysis appears 
critical given the anecdotal evidence individual creditor committee members serving 
in multiple committees in different cases. This is because large financial institutions 
are often times involved with more than one bankrupt firm and because of the 
presence of investors specialized in claims against distressed and bankrupt firms. 
These investors, often called vulture investors, typically hold diversified portfolios 
of claims in multiple bankrupt firms and end up serving in multiple committees. This 
repeated interaction among committee members, as suggested by empirical 
observations, highlights the social embeddedness of committee service. Ultimately 
these individuals do not act in a social vacuum; their economic behavior in each of 
these committees is likely to be influenced by their social environment and history. 
As the literature on board of directors’ interlocks has demonstrated, interactions in 
multiple boards partly explain director behavior and board policies. By the same 
token, linkages among creditor committees might play a role in the reorganization 
process and have an effect on observable bankruptcy variables. As explained on 
Chapter 3, the number of committee interlocks provides the chosen measure for 
social network centrality. 
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Research Question 1 can then be broken down into three sub-questions, each 
with its own set of sub-questions. The research questions addressed by this research 
are as follows:  
 
Research Question 1.1 
What are the individual characteristics of committee members? 
Sub-Question 1.1.1. 
What is their affiliation? 
Research Question 1.2 
What are the dynamic characteristics of creditor committees? 
Sub-Question 1.2.1 
Is there a group of individuals who quit the committee early? 
Sub-Question 1.2.2 
What are the characteristics of early committee quitters? 
Sub-Question 1.2.3  
Is there a group of individuals who join the committees late in 
the process? 
Sub-Question 1.2.4 
What are the characteristics of late committee joiners? 
 
 
Research Question 1.3 




How many interlocks does each committee have?  
Sub-Question 1.3.2 
Who are the lynchpins of the creditor committee network? 
Sub-Question 1.3.3 
Is there a Small World structure? 
 
4.1.2. Main Research Question 2 
Do Creditor Committee Characteristics Have An Effect On Professional 
Fees? 
In order to address this question a basic model is introduced here.  This 
model will be elaborated and detailed hypotheses pertaining to the relationships 
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From the previous section Creditor Committee Variables will include three 
separate components: individual characteristics, dynamic characteristics, and social 
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This research will focus on professional fees as the key bankruptcy variable 
of interest in the empirical analysis of whether creditor committee variables affect 
bankruptcy outcomes. Professional fees were selected for several reasons. First, 
professional fees address the question of direct costs of bankruptcy. Furthermore, its 
denominator—dollars—makes it easy to understand. Second, from theoretical 
perspective, creditor committees have powerful incentives to minimize professional 
fees in bankruptcy as these costs ultimately come out of their distributions in the 
bankruptcy estate. Furthermore, creditor committees are given operational 
mechanisms through the Bankruptcy Code to challenge professional fee applications 
and, many times, serve on the fee committees that oversee the approval of 
professional fee payments. Thus creditor committees have the power to affect the 
levels of professional fees paid in individual cases. Third, the direction of the effect 
of conflicts of interest in creditors’ committees is unambiguous when it comes to 
professional fees: lack of conflicts of interests in creditors’ committees should 
manifest itself in lower fees, while conflicts of interest should manifest themselves 
as higher professional fees. Finally, recent evidence of abusive professional fee 
practices in large corporate bankruptcy cases makes this focus on fees more relevant 
and current to the ongoing academic debate on fees and bankruptcy reform. This fact 
is compounded by the nominal amount of these fees which can easily reach hundreds 
of millions of dollars in a single large bankruptcy case. 
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While the focus of this research is professional fees, the effects of creditor 
committee characteristics on the other two key variables mentioned in Chapter 3—
time and APR—are studied in more detail in Appendix G.  
 
With this basic model we can then postulate the following sub-questions:  
 
Sub-Question 2.1 
Do creditor committee individual variables have an effect on 
professional fees? 
Sub-Question 2.2 
Do creditor committee dynamic variables have an effect on 
professional fees? 
Sub-Question 2.3 





In order to address the questions posed in this research, this dissertation 
presents two basic working collections of data, the Bankruptcy Case Database and 
the Creditor Committee Participation Dataset, from multiple sources of data. The 
Bankruptcy Case Database is a comprehensive compilation of reference information 
available on large corporate bankruptcy cases. The Creditor Committee Participation 
Dataset includes recorded participations of individuals and organizations as 
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members of a creditor committee in a bankruptcy case. These basic datasets were 
then used to create the social network matrices required in the social network 
analyses and a Case Outcome Dataset which combines the Bankruptcy Case 
Database with data from both the Creditor Committee Participation Dataset as well 
as social network variables calculated in the social network analysis portion of this 
research. Figure 1, Dataset Design Framework, shows a diagram of the relationships 
among the different sources of data and their analysis. A more detailed explanation 
of each source of data, datasets, and their manipulation follow in the following 
sections.   
 
4.2.2. Sources of Data 
4.2.2.1. PACER 
The primary sources of information for bankruptcy creditor committee 
composition for individual bankruptcy cases are the court filings made by the United 
States Trustees. These filings are made at the federal bankruptcy court handling the 
case following the format requirements of the individual judicial districts. Court 
clerks at each of the 94 federal judicial districts maintain their own records. These 
filings can be accessed either in person at the clerk’s office of individual districts or 
via PACER (Public Access to Electronic Court Records). PACER is an electronic 
public service that allows access to case and docket documents via the Internet. It is 
a service of the United States Judiciary and run by the Administrative Office of the 





Figure 1: Dataset Design Framework 
PACER began keeping electronic records of a limited amount of court 
information in 1988 and is accessible via Internet since 2001. Despite its longevity, 
the service has faced much criticism over its relatively slow implementation, the 
limited historical coverage of its archives, the difficulty in finding and accessing 
documents, and the overall deficiencies of the service. As articulated by the New 
York Times: 
 “… the government-run Public Access to Court Electronic Records system 
designed in the bygone days of screechy telephone modems… cumbersome, 
arcane and not free…’the system is 15 to 20 years out of date’…”115  
                                                 
115 John Schwartz, New York Times, 2/13/2009, page A-13.  
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In fact, a search interface was not partially implemented on the PACER 
website until 2010. Despite all of its limitations, PACER is the only comprehensive 
tool to access the hundreds of millions of documents filed in federal courts.  
The United States Congress has given the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, the judicial governing body of the United States Federal Courts, authority to 
charge PACER users for access. Internet access to PACER incurs a charge of $0.08 
per page. A waiver of the access fee can be requested from individual judicial 
districts. The process of such waiver varies from district to district but usually 
requires the filing of a motion before the court to request such waiver. The waiver 
must be filed using local district rules and then approved by the district’s judge. The 
court then issues an order authorizing the waiver. This waiver only applies to 
documents filed before the individual district and such fee waivers appear to be rare. 
All the searches that are required to find the document, however, are not exempt 
from the fee waiver.  
The author of this dissertation determined only to pursue waivers from the 
New York Southern District and the Delaware District as trying to obtain other fee 
waivers proved to be too cumbersome116 to justify the relatively few committee data 
outside those jurisdictions. In collecting data for this dissertation a waiver of fees 
was obtained from Federal Bankruptcy Chief Judge Stuart Bernstein at the New 
York Southern District (see Appendix E). The author, however, was unable to obtain 
such waiver from the Delaware District. All information retrieved from jurisdictions 
outside of the New York Southern District was paid.  
                                                 
116 Filing such motions might require at the very least samples of similar successful request for each 
individual court and, in some cases, the engagement of local counsel. 
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The search for committee related documents was particularly exhaustive in 
the New York Southern District for the 12 year period from 1999 to 2009. The fee 
waiver allowed the author to cross search committee related filings that would have 
been prohibitively expensive in other districts. It also allowed the author to 
download complete case listings for all filings made in the district.  
In the collection of files available through PACER, the author also used 
RECAP during the last stages of data gathering.117 RECAP is a public repository 
database of PACER files and its goal is to make its documents more accessible, 
searchable, and free of charge. The ultimate goal of the project is to make the federal 
court system more transparent and accessible. The author donated all of the paid 
documents to RECAP retrieved after December 31, 2009. No documents accessed 
under the fee waiver were donated to the RECAP project, as such donation would 
have violated the terms imposed by the Court on the fee waiver granted to the 
author. 
The committee data obtained from PACER is in the form of document court 
filings that were downloaded as PDF files (see Appendix D for Calpine’s filings as 
an example of the documents downloaded from PACER). The downloading of each 
file required a case search within the court where the bankruptcy was filed, 
determination of the consolidated case number,118 a filer search within the 
documents, a visual scan for committee related documents, and the manual 
                                                 
117 RECAP is a project of the Center for Information Policy Center at Princeton University. More 
information at www.recapthelaw.com.  
118 Large bankruptcy cases usually involve multiple bankruptcy filings by affiliated firms. Very large 
cases can included literally dozens of simultaneous bankruptcy filings by firms with similar names. 
These multiple filings are then consolidated by the court into a single large case where all documents 
are filed. One of the problems in PACER is the inability to easily determine the identifying 
information of the consolidated case. The author used a third party directory (New Generation’s 
BankruptcyData.Com service) to locate the consolidated case number. 
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download of each document. Thus the author searched for documents filed by the 
local United States Trustee office and then visually scanned them for committee 
information which was then downloaded. Since the United States Trustee is the party 
that files all committee formation and amendment documents, all committee 
documents should have been found using this method. It must be noted, however, 
that different local United States Trustees use different document formats in their 
filings. Furthermore, the author noticed a significant number of errors in filer 
headings and document titles within the PACER system. Reported “quirks” with 
PACER’s document search tool were evident and it is likely a number of creditor 
committee filings of interest that should have been available for this research could 
not be located. This failure to locate documents introduces a source of error in this 
methodology. Since the error appears to be inconsistent across districts, and even 
through the time span of the filings, measurement of this source of error is not 
practical. Such error, however, appears to be small compared to the overall amount 
of data available and should not affect the results of the analysis in this dissertation. 
Given the exhaustive nature of the document search for cases filed in the New York 
Southern District this error should be particularly small in those cases. 
Also, the quality of the PDF file varied greatly, particularly for the older 
documents on PACER. Some of these older committee data included faxed and/or 
scanned printed pages while most of the new files were cleanly formatted PDF files. 
The composition and format of each document varied. These files had to be 
transformed into text files using OCR recognition software. Each text file with 
committee membership information was then manually coded with basic case 
identification. These raw text files was then parsed using software specially written 
for this research by the author. A copy of the code used is shown in Appendix F. 
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Both the OCR recognition, the manual coding, and the automated data parsing could 
all introduce small sources of error. After careful checks of the dataset against the 
original PACER documents this error, however, does not appear to be significant 
and should not undermine of the analysis and the conclusions in this research.119 
PACER was also used to collect plans of reorganization to determine 
whether the absolute priority rule was violated in individual cases filed in the New 
York Southern District. This variable is used in the econometric analysis in 
Appendix G. In each one of the cases, the author downloaded the approved plan of 
reorganization (often including several amendments), analyzed the section 
describing the treatment of individual asset classes, and manually coded the variable 
with a dummy variable of whether the absolute priority ruled was violated 
(1=violation; 0= no violation).  In the case of Calpine, for example, the author 
located the sixth amended plan of reorganization within PACER and looked for the 
section of the plan describing treatment—i.e. distributions per the plan—for all 5 
creditor classes and 20 subclasses on pages 32-43.120 After examining the 
distributions, the author coded the variable as 1 (violation of APR) for Calpine as the 
plan included a distribution to subordinated debt holders—Class D—ahead of full 
payment to senior note claims—Class C1—. It must be noted, however, this variable 
is a proxy for APR violation given the fact that actual APR violation can only be 
computed after all distributions have been made and market values for securities are 
known.121 Also, this research differs with most APR literature as other studies also 
                                                 
119 For a description typical coding of PACER documents for research purposes see L.M. LoPucki, 
"Court-System Transparency," Iowa L. Rev. 94(2008). 
120 See Calpine’s “Debtor’s Sixth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code” filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court Southern New York 
District on December 19, 2007. 
121 Despite the fact most studies go to great length to compute the degree of APR violation, the most 
studied variable is the dummy of whether APR was violated or not. 
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measures the degree of APR violation which also requires the pricing data of 
securities post emergence using securities pricing datasets. Collecting securities 
pricing data post emergence and computing post emergence values of distributions 
is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation. The proxy used for APR violation, 
however, provides an accurate measure of expectation of APR violation at the time 
the plan is agreed upon by creditors. 
 
4.2.2.3. New Generation Research Databases 
New Generation Research is a private company that has compiled one of the 
most comprehensive sets of data related to corporate bankruptcies. The company 
publishes the annual Bankruptcy Yearbook and maintains the online database 
BankruptcyData.com. This online service compiles descriptive information on all 
large corporate bankruptcies and provides search tools not available anywhere else. 
In recent years, the company has also significantly increased the collection of 
creditor committee memberships. This committee data, however, appears to be far 
from comprehensive, it is not indexed, aggregated, and only available by searching a 
limited amount of information for individual cases. . 
 
4.2.2.3.1. New Generation Case Information Database 
This database contains 56 fields of information related to the case, including: 
name of debtor, type of filing, date of filing, district of filing, court number of the 
filing, EIN of debtor, assets, number of employees, plus descriptive information 
about the debtor. Not all information is available for every case, but the most basic 
information is available for most large cases. This directory can only be accessed 
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one case at a time and the information cannot be downloaded from the site: it can 
only display on the screen in a highly formatted basis. The company does not even 
allow for paid queries of their database that yield a significant percentage of the 
dataset. The online utility does allow for queries that show lists of cases sorted by 
date, assets at the time of filing, and district where the bankruptcy was filed. The 
author used New Generation’s Research list of “Public and Major Company 
Database”122 as the base list of cases that could potentially be of interest in this 
research. Included in this database are public company filings and selected private 
company filings with public debt or that we have deemed significant and 
newsworthy. The oldest bankruptcy reported in the dataset was filed in 1978, but the 
majority of the entries in the dataset (over 80%) are post 1995. The next step was to 
capture case specific information for each of those cases using the case directory. 
In order to capture the data in the database, the author had to manually 
display individual directory pages for each case, capture the text on the screen, and 
save a raw text file with the information. This raw data was then parsed using 
software written by the author. Appendix F shows the code written to parse this 
information. The end result was a raw database that somewhat mirrored the New 
Generation Research’s Case Information Database but that could be queried as 
needed. Information for 3108 cases is included in this database. No entries for 
bankruptcies filed after 12/31/2009 were collected. 
 
                                                 
122 Included in this database are public company filings and selected private company filings with 
public debt or that we have deemed significant and newsworthy. The oldest bankruptcy reported in 




4.2.2.3.2. New Generation Creditor Committee Database 
This is a premium database from New Generation Research that contains 
documents filed in court related to the appointment and amended appointments to 
creditor committees.  The format of the documents closely resembles those on 
PACER (i.e., document with an unformatted list of committee members), but while 
Pacer delivers the actual document on a PDF file, New Generation Research delivers 
a text version of the document on the screen. The scope of this database seems to 
have grown significantly over the last 2 years but it still appears to be severely 
limited, particularly as related to cases filed over 5 years ago.   
Like the PACER documents, the author manually displayed and captured all 
committee documents available on the database for the cases screened from the Case 
Information Database. These captured raw files were transformed into a text file 
which were then coded and parsed using custom software written by the author. See 
Appendix F for the code used in parsing this information. 
 
4.2.2.4. The Bankruptcy Research Database  
Prof. Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD) is one of the 
most often used sources of data in empirical studies of bankruptcy. This is the most 
comprehensive dataset in terms of depth of information per case. The scope of the 
dataset, however, is limited to very large cases. This dataset has been thoroughly 
studied and several peer reviewed papers researching key bankruptcy variables have 
used it (including some investigating the same dependent variables in this 
dissertation). As of December 3, 2009, the BRD contained information on 869 cases. 
The BRD is accessible online.123 The BRD has 123 data fields and a total of 563 




cases for the period of interest (1999-2009). This online version allows a diverse, yet 
limited, number of queries. After contacting Prof. LoPucki, the author of this 
dissertation obtained a full copy of the database in Excel format free of charge.  
Furthermore, the author obtained a separate detailed cost dataset used in 
Lopucki et al (2008). This dataset contain fees paid in 74 cases across several 
districts. This dataset collects professional fee information from publicly available 
10-K filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as 
information from fee reimbursement motions filed with the bankruptcy courts. Court 
information is, however, much more detailed and is available for every case; while 
10-K information is not detailed and is only available for companies that emerge as 
public corporations. 
 
4.2.2.5. Professional Fees Information  
Professional fees information was collected from annual reports (10-K 
forms) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by public 
companies after emerging from bankruptcy. These forms can be accessed online via 
the SEC’s website. Data collection for professional fees from 10-K is consistent with 
the methodology used by others in the literature.  
 
4.2.3. Working Datasets 
4.2.3.1. The Bankruptcy Case Dataset 
The Bankruptcy Case Dataset was created by combining the raw database 
extracted from the New Generation Creditor Case Information Database, Prof. 
LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database, PACER information of APR violation, 
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and professional fees data collected individually from 10-K filings with the SEC. 
This dataset includes the following fields: 
CaseCode: A unique case code was assigned to each individual bankruptcy 
case. This was necessary because case numbers are given at the district level 
and different cases filed at different districts can have identical case numbers. 
Also, several companies have filed for bankruptcy protection more than once 
and thus names as well as employer identification numbers (EINs) might be 
involved in more than one bankruptcy case.  
CaseName: Name of the company filing for bankruptcy. 
CaseEIN: Employer Identification Number 
CaseNumber: Case number assigned at the local district.  
District: Judicial district where the bankruptcy was filed 
DateFiling: Date on which the petition for bankruptcy protection was filed 
with the court. 
DateConfirm: Date on which a plan of reorganization was confirmed 
NumberEmployees: Number of employees  
Assets: Assets stated on the bankruptcy protection petition 
SICCode: SIC Code 
ProfFees: Professional fees (10K) 
APRViolationDummy: APR Violation 
 
In addition to the foregoing fields the author collected over 100 additional 
fields specific to each case to be used in future research. These fields includes a list 
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of professionals participating in the case, a list of public securities outstanding at the 
time of the bankruptcy filing 
This dataset contains information on all 3,108 cases appearing on NGR’s 
Public and Major Bankruptcy List. Of these cases, however, only 1887 cases were 
filed within the period of interest (January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2008). 
Also, APR violation and 10-K professional fee information was only collected for 
cases that emerged as public companies and for which data was located in SEC 
filings within the period of interest and for which record of official committee 
formation had been found. 
 
4.2.3.2 Creditor Committee Participation Dataset 
The Creditor Committee Participation Dataset was created by combining 
committee participation data extracted from PACER, committee participation data 
extracted from New Generation Creditor Committee Document Database, and case 
information from the Bankruptcy Case Database, coding individual entries and 
adding a field for creditor committee classification. This resulting dataset contains 
9,401 instances of participation in creditor committees.  
Once the raw version of the Creditor Committee Participation Dataset had 
been assembled, individuals and organizations serving in different instances of the 
dataset had to be coded. Coding large numbers of text data instances from different 
sources is challenging.124 This dataset proved to be particularly difficult because not 
                                                 
124 One of the most salient examples of difficulties in coding names in large sets of data in the social 
network literature is presented by Smith (2006) in his study of the rap music collaboration network. 
This network contained 6,500 rappers whose names not only use very unique spellings (including 
wide variations of spellings for the same name), but they often use pseudonyms. Smith used a fuzzy 
logic algorithm to group names with similar phonetics and then manually coded each artist using his 
own knowledge of the industry and Internet searches. 
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only are there multiple variations of the spelling and abbreviations used in the 
dataset, but also organizations used different names in different instances of 
participation. Thus, for example, Capital Research Management Group—an 
investment management company in Los Angeles, California- appeared in 14 
different instances of committee participation using 11 different names, spelling of 
the names, and abbreviations of the names. They also appeared using completely 
unrelated names—i.e. specific fund names—that were linked back to the company 
by matching contact information on the filings (address, phone number, and 
individual contact). 
After reviewing several automated methodologies in the literature,125 the 
author decided to code the committee members manually. An exhaustive matching 
of the members (including matches of address, telephone numbers, and individuals 
within the organization in the contact information on the filing) was needed to 
properly code individual members and institutions. Despite the care taken by the 
author in this process, there are likely to be a number of instances of incorrect 
coding. The author found no practical way to measure such error. The coding was 
implemented by assigning a numerical code to each member. This coding yielded 
5,269 individuals and organizations that have served in committees during the period 
of interest.  
Individual members were manually classified into “Financial Creditors” and 
“Other Creditors”.126 A finer classification of financial creditors, including, 
                                                 
125 See Wise (Python/Agrepy methodology) for example.  
126 In general, but not always, members whose names included at least one instance of the following 
were classified as “Financial Creditors”: advisors, capital, bank, credit, financial, fund, insurance, 
investment, leasing, and trust. Final classification considered alternative spelling and wordings in 
participation of the same member in different cases. Furthermore, the author used personal knowledge 
and performed Internet searches to determine the classification. 
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categories for large banks, small-regional banks, hedge funds, fund companies, 
insurance companies etc., was attempted but proved to be impractical as changes in 
the financial industry over the last 15 years have created financial companies with 
broad and diverse activities in the industry that many times defy such classification. 
Furthermore, the large number of individuals and organizations further complicated 
such finer classification. Thus, methodologies previously used in the literature, 
which typically included matching names to published directories, were not practical 
or would produce misleading results in this research.  
The final version of this dataset included the following fields: 
CaseCode: Unique number for the bankruptcy case previously assigned in 
the the Bankruptcy Case Dataset.  
CaseName: Name of the debtor company 
District: District where petition was filed 
DateFiling: Date on which bankruptcy petition was filed 
CommitteeNumber: Unique number assigned to each committee 
CommitteeMemberName1: Name appearing on the appointment motion in 
court  
CommitteeMemberName2: Common name of committee member 
CommitteeMemberCode: Unique code assigned to each 
individual/organization serving on committees 
CommitteeMemberClassification: Either “Financial Creditor” or “Other 
Creditor” 
In addition to the foregoing fields, the author collected additional fields with 
member contact information (which includes address, telephone numbers, and—
many times—person within the organization in charge of participation on the 
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committee). All of this information was parsed from the committee appointment 
order on PACER. 
 
4.2.4. Notes on Data Completeness  
Even though the total number of business bankruptcies in the United States 
surpasses 100,000 cases every year, most of those cases are not relevant to this 
study. First, a large number of business bankruptcies are filed by individuals 
operating small businesses, and another large percentage of cases are dismissed, 
transferred, or consolidated.127 Of the remaining bankruptcy filings only a small 
fraction of those can be expected to have creditor committees appointed by the court. 
Creditor committees significantly increase the cost of reorganization and their 
appointment is only considered in large cases. Even then, not all large cases have 
creditor committees. No list of cases with committees is known to exist. In order of 
find cases with committees, the author first compiled a list of cases that would be 
likely to have committees and then searched for committees for each one of the cases 
individually. The first screen of cases of interest included all cases on NRG’s Public 
and Major Company Database (3,108 cases). The author found creditor committee 
information for 1,037 of those cases (both via PACER and NRG’s Creditor 
Committee Document Database). Data completeness for these cases is, however, 
suspect given the lack of free and unrestricted access to PACER. Exhaustive PACER 
searches were only performed on cases filed with the United States Bankruptcy 
Court - Southern District of New York. As discussed previously, the author only had 
free access to cases filed in that district. Data completeness on these cases is likely to 
                                                 
127 For a detailed example of how only tens of thousands of bankruptcy filings are reduced to a net 
214 usable cases in a bankruptcy empirical study see Bris, Welch, and Zhu, "The Costs of 
Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization."  
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be very high. Among those cases, a group of 110 cases was identified as having 
creditor committees appointed to them in the period 1999 through 2008. Furthermore 
14 of those cases were dropped because the firms had not emerged from bankruptcy 
at the time data was collected. Thus only 96 cases remained for which data was 
collected. This group of cases is considered to have complete committee 
membership records and was used in the analysis of dynamic characteristics of the 
committees. This is because dynamic committee analysis is highly sensitive to 
missing data. 
The period 1999 through 2008 was chosen as the focus period. A ten year 
period was selected as the tie decay function required in the generation of the case 
network data needed 5-7 years of historical information, and cases need 2-3 years, 
on average, to emerge from bankruptcy and thus be able to collect case outcome 
information. Thus, a 7-10 year data window was required for this dissertation. 
Furthermore PACER coverage prior to 1999 is likely to be spotty and expected to be 
missing a significant number of filings. That is not to say PACER coverage after 
1999 is complete. As a matter of fact the author found many instances of documents 
filed after 1999 that could not be located on PACER.  
Individual methodologies in this dissertation utilized different ranges of data 
available in the datasets. In the analysis of static characteristics only cases in the 
same focus period—1999 through 2008—were considered (but filed in any district). 
In building the committee social networks committee membership information was 
included from all 1037 cases, as a population census is required in this analysis. The 
fact some of those cases fell well outside of the focus period is not problematic as 
the networks designs (which included tie decay function features) ignore data from 
cases outside the decay period. Depending of the actual setting of the decay function, 
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different numbers of cases were included in the network analysis. Sample size in the 
fee regression analysis was constrained by the fact 10K fees data can only be 
collected for companies that emerged a s public firms and for which 10K SEC filings 
were located. The sample size of the fee regression analysis is 69 cases.  
 
4.3. CONCLUSIONS 
The first section of chapter laid out the basic analytical framework of this 
dissertation. This basic framework guided the design of the working datasets and the 
data collection processes and criteria. Overall, it determined the need for a broad 
collection of data required for the social network analysis (which demands a census 
of the data), as well as the need for a sub-sample of data that minimized the potential 
for missing observations (required for the dynamic analysis which is highly sensitive 
to missing observations). The period of interest includes cases filed from 1999 
through 2008, but additional data was collected prior and posterior to the period of 
interest. The sample has a bias towards large corporate bankruptcy cases as these are 
the cases with creditors’ committees appointed. The resulting datasets include the 
Bankruptcy Case Dataset and the Creditor Committee Participation Datasets (both of 
which include sub-samples of Southern District of New York cases for which data is 
likely to be complete). 
The following two chapters describe the methods, analysis, and results: 
Chapter 5 deals with the questions of creditor committee characteristics and Chapter 









The data collected in this research provides the basis for a systematic large 
scale analysis of creditor committee membership. In this chapter of this dissertation, 
committee data is studied following the basic research framework. It begins by 
looking at creditor committee characteristics and how those change over time. 
Furthermore, by analyzing the links among different committees, this study maps the 
social network of creditor committee interlocks. This social network provides a more 
profound understanding of not only the committees but the individual members 
themselves. This chapter begins with a descriptive summary of the cases for which 
committee information was collected. The rest of this chapter is divided in three 
parts each dedicated to a different dimension of committee and member 
participation: static, dynamic, and social characteristics. The social characteristics 
section includes the small world phenomenon testing and analysis. 
 
5.2. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF THE CASES 
5.2.1. Sample Period of Interest 
Figure 2 shows the number of cases with committees collected per year 
during the period of interest. Business bankruptcy filings tend to be cyclical, with 
significantly more filings taking place during recessions, periods characterized by a 
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relative lack of credit, or industry specific events.128 Furthermore, rates of 
bankruptcy filing among large business can be considerably different than those of 
small businesses. This cyclicality of the case filings numbers needs to be kept in 
perspective as committee composition is analyzed in the following sections.    
 
 
Figure 2: Observed Number of Cases with Committees 1999-2008 
 
The Table 4 shows the summary statistics of bankruptcy cases during the 
period of interest (1999-2008) in all districts for which committee information was 
collected. A total of 1,887 cases were included in the dataset of large and public 
companies. Out of these, committees were located for 687 cases. These cases were 
located on PACER, on the NGR Committee Data sample, and, for many, on both. A 
                                                 
128 Rates of business bankruptcies might also be affected by major changes in the bankruptcy code, as 
was observed in the rates of personal bankruptcy filings prior to the implementation of the 2005 
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total of 739 committees were identified. Only one committee was identified in 545 
cases, while 142 cases had two or more committees. Thus, the average number of 
committees per case was 1.08, and the average number of filings per case was 1.45. 
Also, the average assets listed with the bankruptcy filing were 1.53 billion while the 
median assets listed at filing for the sample was 106 million. It should be noted that 
the average assets listed at filing was significantly affected by a small number of 
large bankruptcies (particularly Lehman and Washington Mutual, with listed assets 
of 693 and 328 billion, respectively). 
 
All Districts: Collected Data Summary 
Cases on Dataset 99-08 1887 
Cases With Committees 687 
% Cases with Committees 36.4% 
Committees 739 
Cases with One committee 545 
Cases with Multiple Committees 142 
Average Committees per Case 1.08 
Average Filings per Case with Committees 1.45 
Average Assets Listed At Filing 1.53 billion 
Median Assets Listed on Filing 106 million 
Table 4: Data Summary of All Districts Collected 
 
The cases for which committees were identified were filed in a total of 64 
districts. The distribution for the cases among the different bankruptcy districts for 
which committee information was collected is shown on Table 5. This table shows 
that 361 out of 687 cases for which committee data was collected were filed in either 
Delaware or the Southern District of New York. Thus over one half of these filings 
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took place in these two districts. The high concentration of cases with committees is 




Delaware  251 
New York - Southern  110 
Texas - Southern  24 
California - Central  24 
Texas - Northern  19 
Illinois - Northern  19 
New Jersey  16 
Nevada  13 
Massachusetts  13 
Virginia - Eastern  12 
California - Northern  12 
Indiana - Southern  9 
Georgia - Northern  9 
Washington - Western  7 
Texas - Western  7 
Michigan - Eastern  7 
Florida - Southern  7 
Florida - Middle  7 
Arizona  7 
Ohio - Southern  6 
Ohio - Northern  6 
Connecticut  6 
New York - Eastern  5 
Maryland  5 
California - Southern  5 
Other  (less than 4 filings each) 81 
Total 687 
Table 5: Cases with Committees by District 
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In fact, the nine largest districts in Texas, California, Illinois, New Jersey, 
Nevada, Massachusetts, and Virginia handled 152 cases, or 22% of the total, during 
the period of interest. The other 53 districts (83% of the total) handled only 174 of 
the bankruptcy cases with committees during the period of interest (1999-2008). No 
committees were identified in 30 bankruptcy districts during the period of interest. 
 
5.2.2. Southern District of New York Sample 
As discussed in Chapter 5, an exhaustive document search was performed for 
cases filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York. Table 6 
shows summary statistics for these cases.   
 
 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court- Southern District of New York 
Collected Data Summary 
Cases on Dataset 99-08 269 
Cases With Committees 110 
% Cases with Committees 35.2% 
Committees 128 
Cases with One committee 94 
Cases with Multiple Committees 16 
Average Committees per Case 1.16 
Average Filings per Case with Committees 2.2 
Average Assets Listed At Filing 11.53 billion 
Median Assets Listed on Filing 488 million 
Table 6: Southern District of NY: Collected Data Summary 
 
Comparing Tables 4 and 6, the percentage of cases with committees in the 
larger sample is in line with those in the Southern District of New York. This 
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provides a good indication that the method used to collect committee data from the 
larger sample was likely to have been successful in identifying at least one filing for 
each committee (which reveals the existence of committees in the case). On the other 
hand, a much higher percentage of cases with committees in the Southern District of 
New York would have likely indicated a systematic failure in the collection of at 
least one committee filing per case. This indication is, however, no absolute proof 
that no error was present. This is because there are particular aspects of the Southern 
District of New York might make it more or less likely to have committees 
appointed to the cases filed there. Since the larger mean assets of the filings in 
Southern District of New York make it more likely for cases there to have 
committees appointed, such error of false negative in finding at least one committee 
in cases in the large sample is likely to be small. As a result of the previous analysis, 
it was concluded the large data sample to be satisfactory for the construction of the 
social networks which require a long term census of the network. 
The comparison between the two sets of data also reveals the number of 
filings per case to be significantly lower for the larger sample of cases (2.2 filings 
per case in the Southern District of New York vs. 1.45 filings per case in the larger 
dataset). Also, the average number of committees per case is smaller in the larger 
dataset (1.06 vs. 1.16). This indicates a possible systematic error in collecting filings 
amending committees and appointing additional committees in cases on the larger 
dataset. This error, however, is likely to be moderated by the fact cases in the 
Southern District of New York are significantly larger—i.e. more likely to have 
more than one committee- and also due to the presence of outliers.129 To minimize 
                                                 
129 In the Southern District of New York three cases had more than 9 filings each. Without those 
outliers, the number of filings per case would have been 1.9. 
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the impact of the potential effects of missing data in the analysis, the author decided 
to use only the Southern District of New York data in the analyses that did not 
require a census of the population of cases. 
 
5.2.3. Description of the Calpine Data 
In order to illustrate the credit committee data and findings, this research will 
take a closer look at Calpine’s bankruptcy and its creditor committees. The Calpine 
Corporation was founded in 1984 in San Jose, California, and quickly became one of 
the country’s largest independent electrical power producers130. Much of the 
company’s growth was due to the rapid deregulation of power markets in the nation 
and the booming power trading business of the 1990’s. By the end on 2005, the 
company ran a fleet of 73 modern clean burning natural gas fired power plants and 
19 geothermal power plants with an aggregate capacity of almost 26.5 MW of 
electricity. The company also ran an active trading desk for electricity, natural gas, 
and other commodities. The collapse of energy markets following the downfall of 
the largest player in that industry—Enron—and the California power crisis of 2000-
2001 not only significantly cut into Calpine’s trading earnings, but also dramatically 
increased its borrowing cost on its highly leveraged balance sheet. These conditions 
eventually led Calpine to voluntarily file a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection on December 20, 2005 with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court Southern District 
of New York. The bankruptcy filing included 254 direct or indirectly wholly owned 
subsidiaries in the U.S. Total assets listed on the bankruptcy petition totaled over 27 
billion dollars and, at the time, was ranked the 9th largest bankruptcy petition ever 
                                                 
130 More detailed description of the Calpine’s past and current operations can be found on its 10K 
filings with the SEC. 
96 
 
filed in the country. Judge Stuart Berstein131 presided over the Calpine bankruptcy 
case. Calpine’s plan of reorganization was approved by the court almost exactly two 
years after its bankruptcy filing on December 19, 2007. The company emerged from 
bankruptcy protection on January 31, 2008, as a public company, with essentially all 
of assets intact, and trading on the New York stock exchange under the symbol CPN. 
The company spent over 474 million dollars in professional fees related to its 
bankruptcy restructuring. The company moved its headquarters to Houston, TX in 
2009. For the fiscal year 2009 and 2010 the company had adjusted earnings before 
interests taxes depreciation and amortization expenses (EBITDA) of around 1.75 
billion dollars. The company currently employs over 2,100 full time workers and 
expects to continue expanding its fleet of power plants in 2011.  
A total of four committee filings were located on PACER for this case (see 
Appendix D). The first one of these filings is the January 9, 2006, appointment of the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. This filing was made three days after 
the January 6, 2006, meeting of creditors at New York’s Grand Hyatt Hotel 
organized by the U.S. Trustee Deidre Martini and referenced in the opening quote on 
Chapter 1. The meeting was attended by over 250 people, from which the seven 
members of the unsecured creditor’s committee were selected.132  
The second filing is a first amendment to the composition of this committee 
filed on January 27, 2006. The third filing is the appointment of an Official 
Committee of Equity Holders to the case on May 9, 2006. The last filing was made 
on January 11, 2007 providing a second amendment to the composition of the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. Both committees appear to have been 
                                                 
131 This is the same judge that approved the fee waiver used in collecting data for this dissertation 
132  More detailed description of the meeting can be found at Lattman (2006). 
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disbanded as the company emerged from bankruptcy protection in early 2008. Table 
7 provides a summary of Calpine’s Case Data.  
 
Calpine Corp.: Data Summary 
Date Bankruptcy Filing Dec. 20, 2005 
Date Plan of Reorganization Confirmed Dec. 19, 2007 
Date Emergence Jan. 31, 2008 
Number of Filings 4 
Number of Committees 2 
Assets Listed on Petition  27.5 billion 
Table 7: Calpine Corp.: Data Summary 
 
5.3. STATIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 8 shows the basic statistics of the individuals and organizations serving 
on the creditor committees during the period of interest (1999-2009). It also 
addresses the first sub-question posed in this study (Sub-Question 1.1.1. What are 





Creditor Committee Member Service 
Individuals/organizations serving on committees 3025
Members Finance 518
Members Non-Finance 2507
Number of service instances 4382
Instances Finance 1457
Instances non-finance 2925
Avg. Number of Cases for Finance Members 2.81
Avg. Number of Cases for Other 1.17
Table 8: Summary of Creditor Committee Member Service  
 
The data shows that even though committee members identified as financial 
companies represent only 17.1% of all individual members, they account for 33.2% 
of all individual participations in creditor committees. By the same token, non-
financial firms and individuals account for 82.9% of all individual members, yet they 
account for only 66.8% of participations. Thus financial firms serve a on a mean 
number of 2.81 committees while non-financial firms serve on 1.17 of cases.   
Table 9 presents the 25 members identified as finance companies that served 
most often in creditor committees. The table includes the number of times 
participation in a committee was observed. Table 10 lists the top 30 members 




List of Financial Institutions with Most Instances of Creditor Committee Service 
1999-2008 
 
Rank Classification Name Number
1 Finance Bank of New York 88 
2 Finance HSBC Bank USA 58 
3 Finance U.S. Bank Trust National Association 56 
4 Finance Wilmington Trust Company 36 
5 Finance Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. 34 
6 Finance Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, NA 30 
7 Finance JP Morgan Chase Bank 30 
8 Finance State Street Bank and Trust Co. 28 
9 Finance Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation 22 
10 Finance Deutsche Bank, AG 21 
11 Finance Oaktree Capital Management, LLC 20 
12 Finance Bank One 18 
13 Finance Prudential. 17 
14 Finance U.S. Trust 17 
15 Finance Merrill Lynch, Inc. 15 
16 Finance Franklin  13 
17 Finance AIG  12 
18 Finance Morgan Stanley  12 
19 Finance Wachovia Bank, N.A. 12 
20 Finance American Express Financial Advisers 11 
21 Finance Capital Group Companies, Inc. 11 
22 Finance Fidelity Management & Research Co. 11 
23 Finance Law Debenture Trust Company of New York 11 
24 Finance Lehman Brothers 10 
25 Finance TIAA 10 
26 Finance Alliance Capital Management L.P. 9 
27 Finance Conseco Capital Management, Inc. 9 
28 Finance Highland Capital Management 9 
29 Finance Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. 8 
30 Finance CIT 8 




List of Non-Financial Institutions and Individuals with the Most Instances of 
Creditor Committee Service 
1999-2008 
 
Rank Classification Name Number
1 Non-Financial Simon Property Group LP 28 
2 Non-Financial United Steel Workers of America 18 
3 Non-Financial Coca-Cola Company 16 
4 Non-Financial AT&T 13 
5 Non-Financial Air Line Pilots Association 10 
6 Non-Financial American Greetings 10 
7 Non-Financial General Growth Properties 10 
8 Non-Financial International Union, UAW 8 
9 Non-Financial Verizon Communications, Inc. 8 
10 Non-Financial Association of Flight Attendants  7 
11 Non-Financial United Parcel Service 7 
12 Non-Financial BP Amoco Chemical Co. 6 
13 Non-Financial Intl Assoc. of Machinists and Aer. Workers 6 
14 Non-Financial Lucent Technologies, Inc. 6 
15 Non-Financial Parkdale Mills, Inc. 6 
16 Non-Financial BASF Corporation 5 
17 Non-Financial Bennett Management Corp. 5 
18 Non-Financial Bowne & Co., Inc. 5 
19 Non-Financial E.I DuPont De Nemours & Co. 5 
20 Non-Financial Mattel, Inc. 5 
21 Non-Financial Tyco Electronics Corporation 5 
22 Non-Financial U.S. Foodservice, Inc. 5 
23 Non-Financial Walt Disney Co. 5 
24 Non-Financial Alcoa  4 
25 Non-Financial AmeriSource Corp. 4 
26 Non-Financial Avnet Electronics Marketing  4 
27 Non-Financial Cummins Inc. 4 
28 Non-Financial Delphi Automotive Systems Corporation. 4 
29 Non-Financial Electronic Data Systems Corp. 4 
30 Non-Financial Equistar Chemicals, LP 4 




It is important to note the classification of both the Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) and the TIAA-CREF as financial firms. The PBGC 
is an independent agency of the U.S. government created to provide pension 
insurance to private pension plans. It currently covers pension plans with over 44 
million beneficiaries. The agency also takes over failed plans and provides direct 
pension benefits to those covered under those plans. The agency currently provides 
direct pension benefits to over 1.4 million people. The agency is funded primarily by 
collecting insurance premiums from privately run plans and from an investment 
portfolio of over 60 billion it manages directly. For practical purposes, the PBGC 
operates as an investment manager and a financial firm. The TIAA-CREF provides 
retirement benefits to employees of non-profit education and research institutions. 
This firm is itself a non-profit and currently manages assets in excess of 400 billion 
dollars. The TIAA-CREF is registered as an investment company with the SEC and 
was also classified as a financial firm. 
 
5.3.1. Concentration of Committee Service 
A closer look at the data on tables 8-10, further reveals a high the level of 
concentration of instances of committee service among the financial institutions 
serving the most often: the top 30 financial firms (around 1% of the total number of 
firms/individuals serving on committees) account for 14.7% of all instances of 
committee service. The top 30 non-financial firms and individuals account for only 
5.3% of total instances of committee service. Overall, the top 1% of institutions and 
individuals account for 15.5% instances of committee service. 
Not only committee service is highly concentrated among those serving the 
most often: this concentration of service is further focused among the bankruptcies 
with the most assets. The top 1% of the firms that serve most often on committees 
can be found on 70.6% of the top 10% of cases ranked by assets, while serving on 
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just 1.4% of the bottom 10% of cases ranked by assets. Moreover, the top 1% of the 
firms that serve the most on creditor committees can be found on 64.8% of the 
largest 20% of cases, while serving in less than 3.6% of the smallest 20% of cases 
with committees. 
 
5.3.2. Calpine’s Committee Member Affiliation 
Calpine’s two official committees had a total of 13 members. Nine of those 
members served on the unsecured creditors committee, and five on the equity 
holders committee. A list of these members, and their affiliation, is presented on 
Table 11.  
 
Calpine Corp. 
Creditor Committee Member Affiliation 
Name Affiliation 
Acadia Power Non-Financial 
Amerada Hess Corp. Non-Financial 
John Thomas Dolan Non-Financial 
Dominion Resources Non-Financial 
Franklin Advisers Financial 
HSBC Financial 
Alan Ku Non-Financial 
Paul Likert Non-Financial 
SPO Partners Financial 
Steelhead Partners Financial 
TransCanada Pipelines Non-Financial 
Michael Willingham Non-Financial 
Wilmington Trust Financial 




Members of the unsecured creditors committee include the Wilmington 
Trust, a Delaware firm that provides banking, investments, and trust services to both 
individuals and firms. It currently has close to $150 billion in assets under 
management.133 It also includes HSBC a global financial firm offering a wide array 
of banking and financial services—including trust services- with over 2.4 trillion 
dollars in assets.134  Franklin Advisers, a member of the Franklin Templeton group 
of companies. The Franklin Templeton group of companies also provides a wide 
array of banking and investment services and manages assets of over 640 billion 
dollars.135 Membership of the unsecured creditor committee also included SPO 
Partners, a well-known private investment firm based in San Francisco, California. 
These four creditor committee members were classified as financial firms. 
Amerada Hess, TransCanada Pipelines, Acadia Power, and Dominion 
Resources rounded up the membership of this committee. Amerada Hess is an 
integrated oil and gas energy company, TransCanada Pipelines provides 
transmission of natural gas via its extensive network of pipelines, Acadia Power is a 
Louisiana-based power company, and Dominion Resources is a power and energy 
company based in Virginia. These four committee members were classified as non-
financial firms.  
The official committee of equity holders included one financial firm, 
Steelhead Partners, and four individual shareholders: Mr. Likert, Mr. Ku, Mr. 
Thomas, and Mr. Willingham. Steelhead is an investment management firm base in 
Belleview, Washington. 
Next this research will look into the changes of the committees over time. 
  
                                                 
133 From Wilmington Trust’s 2010 10K filing. 
134 From HSBC’s 2010 Annual Review. 
135 See Franklin Resources Inc. 2010 10K filing (Franklin Resources is the listed holding company 
for the Franklin Templeton group of companies). 
104 
 
5.4. DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS  
In order to address research question 1.2 (What are the dynamic 
characteristics of creditor committees?) and its sub-questions, committee 
amendments—i.e. PACER filings amending committee composition—throughout 
the life of the committees for bankruptcy cases.  
The low number of filings per case (1.45) in the sample, means only 
approximately 3 filings appointing or amending committees for every two cases with 
committees were found for cases during the period of interest. This number was 
unexpectedly low based on the a priori examinations of motivations for individual 
committee members to join and leave committees during the course of the 
restructuring. The author then decided to perform an in depth search for committee 
filings on a smaller sample of cases with committees filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court Southern District of New York to verify whether the unexpected low 
frequency of filings was due to errors in collection of data in the larger sample or 
whether the number of filings per case is in fact unexpectedly small. Examining each 
document is, however, an expensive task in terms of time and money. Performing 
such in depth analysis of all cases in the sample would have been both onerous and 
unnecessary. Onerous because of both the time required to search through thousands 
of dockets to find mislabeled documents as well as the expense incurred in PACER 
fees for pulling each document. Such in-depth analysis of the large sample was also 
unnecessary because an in-depth search of a smaller sample would provide an 
estimation of the data collection errors for the whole sample. This in depth search 
included an examination of all filings made by the U.S. Trustee in each case as titles 
of documents on PACER are often times non-descriptive. A broader examination of 
folders likely to contain committee filings in error was also performed as filers are 
on occasion mistakenly classified, labeled, or duplicated on PACER. Table 12 and 
13 shows the results of this in depth search.  
These tables revealed a higher frequency of filings per case, but still much 
lower than anticipated. These results reveal committee reconstitutions are not the 
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norm as over 50% of the committees are never amended. They also show that when 
committee membership is amended, they tend to be amended only once. As a matter 
of fact, the average number of filings per case in this sample was significantly 
affected by the Adelphia, Dana, Galey & Lord, and Solutia cases. These cases had 9 
to 21 filings each.136 Without these, the average number of filings per case would 
have been 1.94 filings per case. Thus, there is no evidence of significant numbers of 
committee members systematically joining and/or leaving in between the formation 
and the dismissal of the committees.  
 
Federal Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York 
Creditor Committee Filings Summary: 1999-2008 
Number of Cases Examined 269
Number of Cases with Committees137 96
Total Filings 228
Avg. Number of Filings per Case 2.38
Avg. Number of Filings per Case (no outliers) 1.93
Total Committees 114
Avg. Committees 1.1875
Avg. Filings per Committee 2




Table 12: Creditor Committee Filings Sample NY So District. 
 
 
                                                 
136 The dynamics of the committee amendments for these four cases, as well as their effect of the 
outcomes of each case, deserve to be studied individually and in detail. Such study is, however, 
outside the scope of the present research. 
 
137 A total of 14 cases with committees were not included in the in depth portion of this analysis 




Count Equity Committees 11 
American Banknote, Oneida, Impath, Kasper, Footstar, Loral, Calpine, Delphi, 
Solutia, Dana, Adelphia 
Retiree Committees 
Count Retiree Committees 3 
Northwest, Delphi, Dana 
Other Committees 
Ephedra Committee (Twin Labs) 
Second Unsecured Committee (Global Crossing) 
Table 13: Sample NY So District Other Committees 
 
Figure 3: Number of Filings Per Case: Southern District of New York 
 
Furthermore, Table 14 shows the correlations among total filings and days 
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under restructuring and the number of filings creating and amending creditor 
committees. It thus appears the number committee filings and amendments are 
associated by length of the duration of the case. This was expected result as some 
individuals and firms serving on committees are likely to leave or join committees as 
the time for the firm to leave bankruptcy protection increases. These findings 
provide further evidence that committee amendments, whenever present, do not 
appear to be driven by a systematic joining and leaving committees but rather by 
duration of committee service. Cases with large numbers of filings need to be looked 
on a case by case basis in order to determine the drivers for such unusual number of 








** Correlation is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 14: Correlations Committees Filings vs. Case Duration 
 
5.4.1. Calpine Dynamic Characteristics 
The official unsecured creditors committee in Calpine’s bankruptcy was 
amended twice. The first amendment, dated January 27 2006, Acadia Power was 
replaced by Dominion Resources. Thus Acadia Power served for only 18 days on the 
committee. It should be noted that Acadia Power was 50% owned by Calpine (the 
other 50% of Acadia was owned by power company CLECO) and had sold the 
                                                 
138 The case with the most filings was Adelphia Communications with a total of 21 filings. The 
Adelphia bankruptcy case was dominated by the fraud allegations against the company officers and 
extensive disputes among its creditors. 
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totality of its power output to Calpine through a 20-year contract. Even though the 
reasons for Acadia Power’s departure from the committee cannot be known from 
PACER filings, the close relationship between the debtor and Acadia is likely to 
have had an impact on the short duration of Acadia’s service. Also, it is improbable 
that Acadia had much access to non-public information over this short period of 
time. More importantly, given Acadia’s close relationship with Calpine, one could 
argue Acadia had few incentives to join the committee with the goal of obtaining 
non-public information. In the second amendment to the unsecured creditors 
committee, dated January 11, 2007, Dominion Resources dropped out of the 
membership roster. The reasons for Dominion’s departure are not known, but one 
can expect some turnover of membership after one year of service on the 
committees. Furthermore, the nature of Dominion—one of the largest power and 
energy companies in the country—make it an unlikely candidate to motivate its 
membership with the goal of obtaining non-public information. There were no 
amendments to Calpine’s committee of equity holders throughout the life of the 
committee. 
Calpine’s analysis of changes in its creditor’s committees is consistent with 
those of the larger sample: committee recompositions are rare and changes in 
membership appear to be related to long committee service. No systematic abuse of 
committees with the purpose of obtaining non-public information is observed.  
The next section of this dissertation will address the question of social 





5.5. SOCIAL NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
Service in multiple creditor committees by individuals and institutions 
creates interlocks among the committees that in turn generate a social network 
connecting bankruptcy cases to one another. The social network created by service 
in creditor committees is by definition an affiliation, or bipartite, network. Affiliation 
networks are defined by the existence of events—in this case bankruptcy filings—, 
each connecting a number of individuals associated with that specific event—in this 
case individuals and institutions serving on the creditor committees related to that 
case—. In addition to the clusters of individuals around each event there a potential 
for interconnection among events created by instances of service across different 
cases. These interconnections form the case interlocks that connect individual 
events.  
The overall design of the social network analysis is best summarized by 
Watts139 in his review of social network analysis methods in the Annual Review of 
Sociology (2004). The section of affiliation networks (pages 248-250) describes the 
rational to separate the analysis of these types of networks into two separate 
networks: an event network and a participant network (in this research the case 
network and member network). Watts also provides a significant number of 
examples of the use of the techniques in the literature. A more approachable 
explanation on the rational to create two separate types of is provided by Davis et al 
(2003) on (page 315) in his discussion of corporate boards: 
 
                                                 
139 Watts, "The "New" Science of Networks." 
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Overlapping groups such as boards of directors form a two-
mode membership network in which one can conceive of 
directors as nodes connected by a tie of common board 
membership, or boards as nodes connected by a tie of one or 
more shared directors (Breiger, 1974). Thus, when we say 
that the corporate elite is more or less well-connected, we 
may mean that large companies are well connected (Mintz 
and Schwartz, 1985), or that individual directors are well-
connected (e.g., Useem, 1984). Hence, upon collecting and 
cleaning board membership data, we created for each year 
two matrices: a director-by-director matrix and a company-
by-company matrix. We refer to the first network as the 
director network and the second as the board network.140 
 
Thus, the social network characteristics of affiliation networks are evaluated 
on two separate dimensions of analysis: an event network and an individual network. 
The event network examines how events are related to each other and provides 
information about social characteristics of individual events. The individual network 
provides information on the role individuals play in the network. The following 
sections of this chapter will look in more detail at the event, or case, network and the 
individual, or member, network. A test for small world structure is performed on 
both the event and the individual networks. 
5.5.1. The Case Network 
The case network is defined in Figure 4. This network represents the 
membership interlocks among different cases and allows us to determine how 
individual cases are connected to each other. This network has a single mode (only 
membership in creditor committee service interlocks are considered in connecting 
cases),141 connections are non-weighted (all ties are considered equal), and ties are 
directed (only cases concurrent or previous create a tie, a future interlock does not 
create a tie). Also, ties do not persist indefinitely. Ties decay after a period of time as 
one cannot expect interactions from too far in the past to affect present events. 
                                                 
140 Davis, Yoo, and Baker, "The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001." 
141 Other criteria could be used to connect cases to one another. One could, for example, employ 
shared used of professionals as a criteria to connect different cases. 
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Determining the exact shape of the tie decay function is complex, but the literature 
has consistently used step decay functions with 5 to 7 years as triggers for the step.  
A 5-year step decay function in defining ties is likely to be more appropriate to this 
network given the nature and intensity of the interaction among committee members. 
In other words, the part time, business interaction characteristic of committee 
membership appears to fall in the low end of the scale of interaction intensity used 
other studies such as the one, for example, of a producer and a director working 
together on a Broadway musical.142 An analysis using a 7-year decay step function, 
however, was also performed in order to gain a better perspective of the sensitivity 
of this assumption. 
The networks were generated by using code written by the author of this 
dissertation for this purpose. The code was written using Microsoft Visual Studio 
and is attached in Appendix F. The code generated a text file in DL format that was 
then analyzed using social network analysis software UCINET. Graphs were 
generated using NetView.  
In generating the network all case membership data available was used 
(including data collected for cases prior to the period of interest). The reason for 
including data outside of the period of interest was to improve the network 
characterization of cases filed within the first five years of the period of interest. 
This is because network characterization for individual cases requires historical data 
within the decay function of ties (i.e. in the case of the network with a 5 year decay 
function, network characterization requires 5 year historical network information). In 
fact, unless one were to collect all case membership information for every single 
case since the first committee was ever appointed in a U.S. Bankruptcy court, any 
delimitation on time for data collection produces a series of cases at the beginning of 
the period with incomplete data, which in turn creates an underestimation of ties. 
Any such underestimation of ties only affects those cases within the initial tie decay 
                                                 




period. Thus, to minimize such errors for cases filed during the period 99-02, data 
from cases filed in years prior to that were included. Underestimation of ties, 
however, only reflects missing data from the collected information, and it becomes 
less severe as case is filed later into the period of interest. This way, for example, if 
20% of committee memberships in 1997 were missing from the data, ties for cases 
filed in 2002 could be underestimated by 4%.143 Error in the early years of the 
interest period is likely to be higher. Despite the inability to measure it, such error 
appears to be, however, acceptable for the purposes of analysis in this section.  
 
 
Figure 4. Case Network Definition 
                                                 
143 This calculation assumes a 5-year decay function and no cyclicality in bankruptcy filings -
meaning contributions to the historical network characterization for a case are equally weighted over 




The resulting case network has only four components with at least two nodes, 
and the largest component has 808 nodes (out of 1,037 Nodes). In other words, there 
is a single large dominant component that interconnects almost 78% of the cases, 
while the rest of the cases are in effect isolates (there were only three additional 
components with exactly 2 nodes while the rest were isolates). Care must be taken 
when looking at this network as it contains every single case for which committee 
data was collected, including sparse regions of data well outside of the period of 
interest. Thus, other typical descriptive network measures (such as network density) 
are likely to be misleading and thus not reported in this research.  
Degree centrality, which is equivalent to the number of interlocks for each 
node, for each case was measured and recorded. Table 15 shows the cases with the 
highest measures of degree centrality. No cases outside of the period of interest are 
reported on this table. As discussed earlier, errors in degree centrality measures for 
cases within the period of interest (1999-2008) should be small. Measurements of 
degree centrality for cases outside the period of interest as computed in the network 
above are likely to not be as accurate given the historical regions where sparse data 
was available. The measures of degree centrality during the period of interest ranged 
from 0, for isolates, to 116 for Dura Automotive.  This means the members of all 
creditor committees serving on the Dura Automotive case served on a total of 116 
different cases during the five years prior to Dura Automotive’s bankruptcy filing. 
As discussed on Chapter 3, this measure of centrality provides a proxy for the social 





Case Network: Cases with Highest Measures of Degree Centrality 
Case Name Filing Date Degree Centrality 
Dura Automotive Systems, Inc. 10/30/2006 116
MTS, Inc. (Tower Records, Inc.) 2/9/2004 110
Delta Air Lines, Inc. 9/14/2005 107
Tower Automotive, Inc. 2/2/2005 101
UAL Corporation 12/9/2002 96
Trenwick Group Ltd. 8/20/2003 88
FLAG Telecom Holdings, Ltd. 4/12/2002 87
NTL Incorporated 5/8/2002 85
Alterra Healthcare Corp. 1/22/2003 83
Collins & Aikman Corporation 5/17/2005 82
National Equipment Services, Inc. 6/27/2003 81
Northwestern Corporation 9/14/2003 80
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. 5/20/2002 78
Navigator Gas Transport PLC 1/27/2003 78
AMERCO 6/20/2003 75
Northwest Airlines Corporation 9/14/2005 75
Romacorp, Inc. 11/6/2005 75
Exide Technologies, Inc. 4/14/2002 75
Global Crossing, Ltd. 1/28/2002 75
Key3Media Group, Inc. 2/3/2003 74
ITC-DeltaCom, Inc. 6/25/2002 73
Nutritional Sourcing Corporation  9/4/2002 73
Table 15: Case Network, Cases with Most Degree Centrality 
Since case size, as measured by assets listed at the time of filing, is the most 
significant determinant of other bankruptcy variables, an analysis of case size with 
respect to degree centrality is warranted. The average degree centrality was 17.1, 
while the mean degree centrality was 9. There were a total of 17,747 ties in this 
network. The top 25 ranked by degree centrality have average assets of 5.8 billion, 
while average assets for the top 50% of cases is 4.7 billion. Average assets for the 
bottom half of cases when ranked by degree centrality is only 495 million. 
Moreover, the average assets of non-isolate cases is 3.5 billion while the average 
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assets of isolate cases is 373 million. Figure 5 plots degree centrality vs. the log of 
assets.   
 
 
Figure 5: Plot of Degree Centrality vs. Assets 
5.5.1.1. Decay Function Sensitivity Analysis 
The previous results used a 5 year step decay function in the generation of 
the network. In order to test the sensitivity of the results to a different step decay 
function this section uses a 7-year step decay function and compares the results to 
those in the previous section. Figure 6 shows the resulting case network. It has 216 
components, with a dominating component with 818 nodes (79% of nodes). There 
were only 4 additional components with 2 nodes. There were a total of 22,310 ties in 
this network. Table 16 shows the list of case with the highest measures of degree 















The resulting network has, as expected, a higher density of connections and 
higher overall levels of degree centrality. The findings are, however, consistent with 
those obtained using the 5 year decay function. The rest of this research will use the 




















Case Network: Cases with Highest Measures of Degree Centrality 7 yr 
























Table 16: Case Network, Cases with Most Degree Centrality 
 
5.5.1.2. Small World Test 
Next, the case network data was tested to determine whether the small world 
structure was present. As discussed in Chapter 3, small worlds are characterized by a 
high degree of clustering and short path length between any two nodes. A network’s 
clustering coefficient (C) is defined as the degree to which a node’s directly 
connected nodes are also connected with each other. This coefficient provides a 
measure for connectedness among neighbors of pairs of nodes that are already 
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connected. The characteristic path length (L) is defined as the average number of 
links in the shortest path between two nodes for all pairs of nodes. Also, from 
Chapter 3, the small world coefficient (Q) that is defined as: 
	  
where is the clustering coefficient of the actual network, 	is the 
clustering coefficient of a random network, 	is the characteristic path length 
of the actual network, and 	is the characteristic path length of the random 
network. 
By definition small worlds require networks to be fully connected. This 
means all nodes can be reached from any other node in the network. Since the case 
network is not fully connected, we can only test individual network components (i.e., 
portions of the network that are fully connected) for evidence of small world 
phenomenon. Thus, only the largest network component is included in the analysis. 
Fortunately the creditor committee case network, the largest component connects 
over 80% of all nodes. Also, the case network directional ties to be which, as 
explained in Chapter 3, had to be symmetrized prior to analysis. This is because non-
directionality of ties is one of the key assumptions of the Watts-Strogartz model. The 
symmetrization procedure was performed using UCINET. Finally, the fact the case 
network is not a bipartite network means no correction is needed for imposed 
clustering topology. 
The results of the small world test, using the formulas presented on Chapter 3 
for the case network are presented on Table 17. Table 18 compares the results to 


















Small World Coefficient: Q 16.06 









Table 18: Comparison of Small World Analyses 
The case network shows evidence of the small world phenomenon. This 
means that when compared to a random network, the case network’s exhibits a 
higher clustering coefficient in relation to its shortest average path connecting 
individual nodes. In practice, this small world characterization of the network 
topology tells us cases tend to cluster in groups and cases are interconnected by 
surprisingly short connections.  
120 
 
This result is intuitive, as one can expect clusters of cases around specific 
individual organizations serving on creditor committees in certain industries or types 
of companies. Thus, for example, one can expect a cluster of airline bankruptcies to 
emerge around committee service by the Airline Pilots Association and the 
Association of Flight Attendants. The same could be said about clusters of cases 
around committee service by the United Steel Workers of America or even the 
Simon Group—one of the largest lessors of commercial space to retail companies—. 
Yet these clusters are not isolated from one another. There are links that connect 
them. These ties are likely to be provided by financial firms, either investment 
companies with cross investments in multiple industries or trust companies 
providing trust services for publicly traded securities. An in depth analysis of cliques 
and subgroups in the network would help better elucidate the internal dynamics of 
the clusters. Such analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
In interpreting these results it is critical, however, to keep in mind the 
network tested for small world phenomena is not exactly the same as the case 
network defined in Figure 3. This is because of the symmetrization procedure 
required to perform the analysis. The symmetrized network has no directional ties 
and thus more recent cases are connected to older cases in an identical manner as an 
older case is connected to a more recent case. In this symmetrized network the 
interpretation of degree centrality, for example, would be very different from that of 
the original network, as it would no longer represent the accumulated social capital 
for the case but rather a measure of uniqueness of the case.144 
 
                                                 
144 The degree centrality is likely to be an inverse measure of “uniqueness” of the case, meaning a 
low degree centrality would mean a highly unique case that shares very few creditor committee 
members with others. 
121 
 
5.5.2. Case Network Analysis: Calpine 
A closer examination of Calpine’s case helps to illustrate the network 
analysis of the case network. Calpine scored a degree centrality of 43. This indicates 
the 13 organizations and individuals who serve on Calpine’s two creditors’ 
committees served on an aggregate 43 other cases within the five years immediately 
previous to Calpine’s bankruptcy filing. As defined on the case network, all 
committee interlocks for a case are aggregated, thus both interlocks for Calpine’s 
unsecured creditors committee as well as those for the committee of equity holders 
are aggregated in its measure of degree centrality. Not only Calpine has 43 direct 
connections to other cases, but those many of those cases have direct connections 
among themselves. These connections can be visualized on Calpine’s ego network 
(1-degree) on Figure 7.  
 




The ego network is defined as the network made out of all nodes directly 
connected to the ego (i.e. alters) plus all direct ties among those nodes. Analysis of 
the ego network reveals a highly dense network structure (size=43, ties=565, 
pairs=1806, density=31.28). Table 19 shows all cases with direct ties to the Calpine 
case on the case network (5 yr decay function). The average assets of Calpine’s 
alters is 7.2 billion 
 
 
Case Network: Calpine Alters 
Name Filing Date Assets 
Calpine 12/20/05            27,216 
Delphi Corporation 10/08/05            16,593 
Northwest Airlines Corporation 09/14/05            14,042 
ASARCO LLC 08/09/05              1,108 
Tower Automotive, Inc. 02/02/05              2,846 
Pegasus Satellite Communications, Inc. 06/02/04              1,814 
RCN Corporation 05/27/04              2,346 
Dan River, Inc. (2004) 03/31/04                  466 
FiberMark, Inc. 03/30/04                  400 
MTS, Inc. (Tower Records, Inc.)  02/09/04                  476 
ATX Communications, Inc. 01/15/04                  179 
Solutia Inc. 12/17/03              3,342 
Aurora Foods Inc. 12/08/03              1,251 
Northwestern Corporation 09/14/03              2,673 
DVI, Inc. 08/25/03              1,672 
Trenwick Group Ltd. 08/20/03              5,278 
Loral Space & Communications Ltd. 07/15/03              2,693 
Mirant Corporation 07/14/03            19,415 
Top-Flite Golf Company, The 06/30/03                  394 
Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (2003) 06/01/03 1,369 
NRG Energy, Inc. 05/14/03 10,884 
Magellan Health Services, Inc. (2003) 03/11/03 1,004 
Key3Media Group, Inc. 02/03/03 1,057 
Alterra Healthcare Corp. 01/22/03  1,038 
UAL Corporation 12/09/02  25,197 
Case Network: Calpine Alters (cont.) 
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US Airways Group, Inc. (2002) 08/11/02              8,025 
Budget Group, Inc. 07/29/02              4,470 
WorldCom, Inc. 07/21/02          103,914 
ITC-DeltaCom, Inc. 06/25/02                  878 
Adelphia Communications Corp. 06/25/02            21,499 
XO Communications, Inc. 06/17/02              7,930 
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. 05/20/02                  470 
NTL Incorporated 05/08/02            16,834 
Williams Communications Group, Inc. 04/22/02              5,992 
Exide Technologies, Inc. 04/14/02              2,299 
FLAG Telecom Holdings, Ltd. 04/12/02              3,477 
Orbital Imaging Corp. 04/05/02                  360 
Adelphia Business Solutions, Inc. 03/27/02              1,889 
Kellstrom Industries, Inc. 02/20/02                  573 
Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc.  12/05/01              2,811 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation 10/15/01              5,467 
Exodus Communications, Inc. 09/26/01              3,894 
Loews Cineplex Entertainment  02/15/01              1,907 
First Wave Marine, Inc. 02/05/01                  123 
Table 19: Calpine Alters in Case Network 
The second part of the social network analysis of creditor committees in 
bankruptcy court involves the network created by individuals and organizations 
serving on these committees.  
 
5.5.2. The Member Network 
The member network is defined in Figure 8. This network represents the 
social ties among different committee members and allows us to determine the social 
characteristics of individual members. Unlike the case network, which included all 
cases in the dataset, the member network takes a snapshot of individual members 
serving in committees on a specific year and builds the social network for those 
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members using instances of committee service going back up to N years (where N is 
the defined by the tie decay function).  
Thus, this network has a single mode (only creditor committee service 
interlocks are considered in connecting cases), connections are non-weighted (all ties 
are considered equal), and ties are non-directed (a tie affects both sending and 
receiving nodes equally). Provided the results from the sensitivity analysis in the 
previous section, the ties decay function was assumed to have a 5-year step function 
shape. No additional sensitivity analysis for tie decay was performed on the member 
networks. Like the case network on the previous section, member networks were 
generated by using code written for this purpose (see Appendix F) and analyzed 
using UCINET and NetView. 
Since the member network only captures a snapshot of the data at a specific 
point in time a separate networks each year from 2004 to 2008 was generated. These 
five separate analyses should help determine the stability of the data through the 
period of interest. This is because social characteristics of individual members 
change over time as they serve in more cases or ties to older cases decay. The social 
characteristics of cases in the case network, on the other hand, do not change once 
all committees for that case have been appointed and all amendments, if any, have 
been filed.  
Also, unlike the case network, generation of the member networks only uses 
data from the period of interest as historical data required for all the networks, 
including the 2004 member network, only goes back to 1999 when using a 5-year 




In order to find out individual members with the most social capital in the 
member networks for the period 2004-2008, degree centrality was measured and 
recorded for each individual member for every year during that period of time. Table 
20 shows the individual members with the highest degree centrality scores during 
that time period. 
 
 





Member Network: Members with Highest Degree Centrality 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bank of New York 326 265 282 188 183 
HSBC 327 167 141 100 136 
U.S. Bank N.A. 221 219 225 181 196 
PBGC 144 186 188 135 147 
Wilmington Trust 89 121 136 111 146 
Wells Fargo 116 128 107 87 77 
Simon Property 125 83 82 79 93 
JP Morgan Chase 109 114 97 88 35 
Deutsche Bank 109 109 94 80 78 
United Steelworkers 102 102 71 43 43 
Wachovia 84 84 69 55 55 
Merrill Lynch 78 74 59 45 31 
Table 20: Organizations with Highest Degree Centrality Member Network  
 
5.5.2.1. Small World Test 
Next, the member networks were tested for evidence of small world 
structure.  Like the case network, the procedure for small world testing entails 
comparing the clustering coefficient and characteristic path length of the actual 
networks to those of random networks. Unlike the case network, however, the 
member networks have bipartite structures which overestimate the clustering 
coefficients. The procedure discussed in Chapter 3 was used to correct for bipartite 
structure. MAPLE145 was used to execute the calculations. Table 21 provides a 
summary of the results of the small world test for the member networks uncorrected 
for its bipartite structure, while Table 22 provides the results for the corrected 
analysis.. 
                                                 
145 Mathematical software by MAPLESOFT. 
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 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of Nodes (n) 1133 1044 902 837 917
Number of Links 7096 6578 4742 3904 4828
Average Degree (k) 6.26 6.30 5.26 4.66 5.26
ln(n) 7.03 6.95 6.80 6.73 6.82
ln(k) 1.83 1.84 1.66 1.54 1.66
 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.88
 0.0055 0.0060 0.0058 0.0056 0.0057
 3.04 3.05 2.96 3.16 3.18
 3.83 3.78 4.10 4.37 4.11
⁄  160.10 150.12 155.62 160.61 153.97
⁄  0.79 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.78
Small World Coefficient: Q 201.61 185.86 215.63 222.05 198.57
Table 21: Summary Small World Tests for Member Networks Uncorrected 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of Nodes (n)  1133 1044 902 837 917
Number of Cases (M)  71 68 50 46 62
Number of Links Actual  7096 6578 4742 3904 4828
Average Degree Actual  6.26 6.30 5.26 4.66 5.26
Cactual  0.89 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.88
Crandom  0.45 0.43 0.47 0.44 0.41
Lactual  3.04 3.05 2.96 3.16 3.18
Lrandom  3.14 3.41 3.18 3.22 3.32
cactual/crandom  1.97 2.11 1.93 2.03 2.16
lractual/crandom  0.97 0.89 0.93 0.98 0.96
Small World Coefficient: Q  2.03 2.36 2.07 2.07 2.25
Table 22: Summary Small World Tests for Member Networks Corrected 
These results show that, as expected, the member networks do exhibit a 
strong small world phenomenon when uncorrected for their bipartite nature. This 
means the member networks do contain the combination of clustering—from due to 
the inherent structure of committees- as well as the existence of ties providing shorts 
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paths of communication among the different clusters. Once the analysis is corrected 
for the bipartite nature of the networks, the results fail to show a strong small world 
topology of the corrected network. This is because even though the characteristic 
paths of the corrected networks are short, clustering coefficients of the corrected 
networks are small. 
These findings tell us that even though committee service does take place in 
the form of clusters (i.e., committees are by definition composed of clusters of 
individual members), there is no evidence individual members tend to consistently 
group themselves in teams that serve in different cases.  
 
5.6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: CREDITOR COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS 
This chapter presents the analysis of a large dataset of creditor committee 
participation observations. The first significant finding is the prominent role 
financial institutions play in creditor committees. Perhaps most importantly, this 
research reveals the high frequency of committee service for a relatively small 
number of individuals and institutions serving on creditor committees. The top 1% 
of these committee member account for over 15% of instances of committee service. 
Furthermore, repeat service in creditor committees is concentrated on cases with the 
most assets. Thus, over 70% of the bankruptcy cases in the top decile of cases, 
ranked by assets, had at least one of the top 1% individuals and institutions that 
served most often in creditor committees. 
The analysis of the dynamic characteristics of the creditor committees 
revealed a significant amount of stability in the membership of creditor committees, 
with over half of all committees remaining unaltered throughout the life of the 
committees. A small number of outlier committees with significant instability in 
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their memberships, however, were observed. These cases of instability appear to be 
motivated by case specific drivers and thus need to be studied in detail in case 
studies.  
The social network analysis of creditor committee data was divided in two: 
the study of the case network and the study of the member networks. The case 
network analysis revealed larger cases, as measured by assets at the time of 
bankruptcy, tended to have significant higher levels of degree centralities than 
smaller cases. The small world topology analysis of this network revealed the 
presence of small world phenomenon. Care should be taken in the interpretation of 
the small world phenomenon results as the network had to be modified in order to 
test it. 
 The analysis of the member networks helped identify the particular members 
that are most central, as measured by degree centrality, to the creditor committee 
social networks. By repeating the analysis for 5 separate years (2002-2008), this 
research further investigates the stability of the network and its key players. A small 
world test of these networks failed to find evidence of the strong presence of small 
world phenomena once the analysis was adjusted for the bipartite nature of the 
networks.  
The following chapter in this dissertation investigates whether creditor 





Chapter 6: Effects of Committee Variables on Professional Fees 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided a descriptive analysis of creditor committees 
and computed social network characteristics of individual creditor committees. This 
chapter investigates whether those characteristics help explain professional fees in 
bankruptcy cases. As discussed on Chapter 3, professional fees provide a direct 
measure of cost of bankruptcy. Since the unit of measure of this variable is in 
dollars, it provides a clear and understandable measure of the costs of reorganization 
to firms. Furthermore, the sheer magnitude of professional fees—Calpine’s 
professional fees, for example, exceeded 474 million dollars in that case alone—and 
the facility for the public to grasp those numbers makes it a commonly used metric 
in the bankruptcy policy debate. Recent evidence of abusive fee practices in large 
bankruptcy cases has also motivated an increased interest in the professional 
bankruptcy fees and the variables that drive them. This chapter presents econometric 
models of professional fees in which creditor committee appear as explanatory 
variables. It then uses linear regressions and the datasets presented on Chapter 4 to 
find out whether these variables help explain professional in large corporate 
bankruptcy cases.  
This chapter begins with a section that will introduce the models used in the 
regressions. It is followed by a section discussion of the data used in this chapter. 
This discussion focuses in particular on the sample selection which has proven to be 
problematic in the literature of empirical bankruptcy studies. Next, the results of the 
regressions of the models are presented. Last, a short conclusion presents a brief 





The basic model introduced in Chapter 4 is: 
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The dependent variable in this model is professional fees incurred throughout 
the bankruptcy reorganization period as reported on 10K filings retrieved from the 
SEC website. As other empirical studies have consistently done,146 the natural log of 
fees is used in the models. 
The variables of interest are the creditor committee variables. A dummy 
variable DummyFin=1 if a financial firm is present on the case creditor committee of 
a case and DummyFin=0 otherwise. This dummy variable serves as a proxy for the 
static committee characteristics of the case. As discussed previously in this research, 
financial firms introduce a set of intrinsic committee characteristics—which include 
the likely presence of complex conflicts of interest—that differ significantly from 
most non-financial firm creditors. 
After examining the creditor committee dynamic characteristics, i.e. 
observed changes of committees over time in the previous chapter there is sufficient 
evidence to show that most creditor committees are never amended. Further, those 
                                                 
146 See for example Bris, Welch, and Zhu, "The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus 
Chapter 11 Reorganization." 
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committees that are amended are highly correlated to time of service—mostly 
members resigning after long periods of service- or to particular events in the case 
that drives the number of amendments (i.e., outliers). Therefore, including this 
variable in the model is likely to be problematic and add little to the analysis and 
understanding of creditor committees.   
Finally, degree centrality on the case network is used as a proxy for the social 
variables of the case’s committee. Degree centrality of a case provides a measure of 
social capital available to the case in the form of interlocks to other committees. 
These interlocks can be interpreted as a measure of the collective experience and 
access to outside resources accumulated by individual committee members through 
service, on previous and concurrent committees, in other cases. More importantly, 
for purposes of this research, degree centrality of an individual case provides a 
measure of the social liabilities individual committee members have and serve as a 
proxy for conflicts of interest that are likely to have an effect on professional fees. In 
other words, social embeddedness of repeat players causes conflict of interests that is 
theorized to results in higher fees in the case. The natural log of degree centrality is 
included in the model explaining professional fees. 
The control variables included in the model seek to capture both “inherent 
case complexity”147 as well as case specific variables. Many different variables have 
been used to provide a proxy for a case’s inherent complexity. These include case 
size, as measured by the firm’s assets listed on the bankruptcy filing, as well as 
measurements of the complexity of the firm’s financial and operational structure. 
Some of the variables used in previous research include the ratio of debt to assets, 
                                                 
147 For an in depth discussion of inherent case complexity see LoPucki and Doherty, "Professional 
Overcharging in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases." 
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the ratio of secured debt to assets, and a variety of other financial measures. 
Employee count at the time of the bankruptcy filing has also been used as proxy for 
overall complexity as it is typically highly correlated to both financial and 
operational complexity of the firm. This study will use total number of employees as 
a proxy for financial and operational complexity of the firm. Therefore both total 
assets and number of employees at the time of the bankruptcy filing are used in this 
study as proxies for “inherent case complexity” and are thus included as control 
variables. The natural logs of both assets and employees are used in the regression 
equations. 
It is important to recognize that most econometric studies of bankruptcy also 
control for the bankruptcy district where the case is filed. This is because different 
court venues have consistently been shown to affect case proceedings and outcomes. 
It should be noted that while recognizing the importance of controlling for filing 
district, most studies in the literature group vast numbers of districts in regressions 
studies. This is due to the fact many of these empirical investigations lack sufficient 
data points for districts other than Delaware and the Southern District of New York, 
and introducing control variables for other districts is impractical. In order to deal 
with districts with low numbers of filings, most researchers either severely constrain 
the number of districts from which observations are collected or simply group all 
data from districts different from Delaware and the Southern District of New York. 
This research will use the later technique, using two dummy variables one for cases 
filed in Delaware and another one for those cases filed in the Southern District of 
New York. 
Forum shopping is another variable often times used as a control variable in 
professional fee regressions. Forum shopping, or venue shopping, is the 
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phenomenon of a case being filed in a different geographic region from the firm’s 
headquarters, typically due to perceived benefits a different judicial district might 
provide the debtor.148 Forum shopping has been found to be highly correlated with 
district of filing and thus appears to be an acceptable proxy for district.149 By the 
same token, filing district is an acceptable proxy for forum shopping. Since the 
models in this dissertation already control for filing district, however, forum 
shopping variables are not included. 
Finally, the model will include a trend variable that accounts for fee inflation 
during the period of interest.150 The variable is coded as follows: cases filed in 1999 
have a trend variable with a value of zero, cases filed in the year 2000 a value of 1, 
cases filed in 2001 a value of 2, and so on.  
Including the committee characteristics and control variables discussed 
above, the model can be stated as follows: 
 
	
	 	 	 	 ,
	 	 ,





                                                 
148 There is substantial evidence that forum shopping is a common occurrence among large 
bankruptcy cases. For an extensive discussion of forum shopping see LoPucki, Courting Failure: 
How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts. 
149  For a discussion of the relationship between the forum shopping and filing district variables see 
L.M. LoPucki and J.W. Doherty, "Delaware Bankruptcy: Failure in the Ascendancy," The University 
of Chicago Law Review 73, no. 4 (2006).  
150 This fee inflation accounts for prices increases in the provision of professional services which are 
likely to be different from the rate of inflation of the CPI. The model does assume, however, the rate 
of increases of professional fees rates is constant throughout the period of analysis.  
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Furthermore, previous literature has consistently modeled the natural log of 
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(6.2) 
In addition to this model, regressions were also performed on a base model 
which does not include the variables of interest (Model I), and one that only included 
the variable of interest DegreeCentrality (Model II). The complete model on 
equation 6.2  is presented as Model III in the results. 
 
6.3. DATA  
Sample selection in bankruptcy outcome regressions has proven problematic 
in other studies in the literature. Each bankruptcy is unique and cases can take many 
different paths that make them difficult to compare to each other. Thus, for example, 
bankruptcy filings filed as under Chapter 11 cannot readily be compared to cases 
filed under Chapter 7 as the two processes are inherently different. Not only that, but 
cases originally filed as Chapter 11 and later converted to Chapter 7 are onto 
themselves basically different from cases originally filed under Chapter 7. Also, 
cases with occurrences of 363 section asset sales behave much differently than those 
without. Furthermore, prepackaged bankruptcies—i.e., where a plan of 
reorganization is negotiated prior to the filing—also exhibit dramatically different 
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outcome metrics. And then, there are specific characteristics of the case that can 
significantly affect outcome variables, such as the presence of mass tort issues (such 
as asbestos liabilities, presence of fraud as a contributing cause of the firm failure, 
and other tort causes), and even industry specific conditions that also have 
significant effects on outcome variables. Last, but not least, there is the issue of 
forum shopping and court specific effects that in most instances must to be 
controlled for. Not surprisingly some of the most cited studies in empirical 
bankruptcy use small and carefully constructed samples. Next two examples of data 
samples used in widely cited bankruptcy econometric studies will be examined in 
more detail. 
The first data sample example is Bris et al (2006). In this study, the authors 
limits their sample to two judicial districts (Southern District of New York and 
Arizona) and examine over 10,000 business bankruptcies filed in those two districts 
over the period of 1995 through 2001. About half of those cases are subsequently 
dismissed or transferred to other district and are therefore dropped from the samples. 
Another 2,000 of the remaining cases are also deleted as they are consolidated into 
larger cases. Also, all prepackaged bankruptcies are eliminated. After all 
eliminations and consolidations, only 225 Chapter 11 cases remain (117 in Southern 
District of New York, and 108 cases in Arizona). The authors drop from their sample 
an additional 11 cases that had still not emerged from bankruptcy protection by the 
time their research was undertaken. The overall sample (214 Chapter 11 cases) is 
considered one of the largest samples of data—if not the largest- used in an 
empirical bankruptcy study. The actual number of observations used in the different 
models estimated was, however, smaller depending on the case information available 
for each model. Furthermore, this sample did not explicitly exclude observations 
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often discarded in other studies because of the issues previously identified in the 
literature (for example asbestos liabilities/fraud/other tort and Chapter 11 to Chapter 
7 conversions). The models, however, do account for Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 
conversions and the fact cases had been filed in two separate districts by using 
dummy variables for districts of filing in the models estimated.  
The second example of sample selection is LoPucki et al. (2004) and 
LoPucki et al. (2008). Both of these data samples are used for estimating regression 
models explaining professional fees in bankruptcy of large public companies. 
Sample selection starts with a screening of Lopucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database 
discussed in Chapter 5 from which 48 and 74 cases are used for the 2004 and the 
2008 studies respectively. The sampling, however, was not random. It was limited to 
companies for which information was available and filed in a select number of 
districts. Though, not explicitly explained in the papers, the samples also appear to 
have been screened for Chapter 11 to 7 conversions, mass tort cases, and significant 
section 363 asset sales.151  
The sample of cases selected for the regressions in this dissertation only 
includes cases that emerged as public companies and for which post-bankruptcy 10K 
reports were located on the SEC website. This screen in effect removed all Chapter 
11 cases that were converted to Chapter 7, and cases with significant 363 section 
asset sales. Also, mass tort cases were also removed from the sample. The resulting 
sample has a total of 69 cases filed. Data collection was explained in detail in 
Chapter 4.  
  
                                                 
151 Section 363 assets sales allow the debtor to sell assets held by the bankruptcy estate free and clear 
of any liabilities. These sales must be approved by the court, and can involve a substantial portion of 




6.4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 23 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
analysis. This table is important because it allows us to confirm that compared to the 
large universe of corporate bankruptcies and the relative small size of the sample 
used in the regressions, the observations appear to have a significant amount of 
variability as represented by the standard deviations of the individual variables, with 
the exception of the variable accounting for the participation of financial institutions 
in the creditor’s committee. This means most of the observations have a value of one 




 Mean Std. Dev. N 
lnFees (Fees) 3.69 1.39 69
lnAssets (Assets) 7.37 1.95 69
lnTime (Time) 5.80 .89 69
lnEmp (Employees) 8.63 1.79 69
Trend 3.87 2.20 69
DEDistrict (dummy Delaware) .35 .48 69
SoNYDistrict (Dummy So. NY) .38 .49 69
lnCentr (Degree Centrality) 3.33 1.19 69
DummyFin (Dummy Participation of 
Financial Member in Cred. Comm.) 
.88 .32 69
 









 lnFees lnAssets lntime lnEmp DEDistrict SoNYDistrict Trend lnCentr DummyFin
lnFees  1 .867** .570** .691** -.093 -.158 -.202 .590** .525** 
lnAssets  .867** 1 .301* .708** -.206 -.103 -.206 .644** .495** 
lntime  .570** .301* 1 .390** .239* -.200 -.272* .074 .269* 
lnEmp  .691** .708** .390** 1 .051 -.164 -.232 .440** .427** 
DEDistrict  -.093 -.206 .239* .051 1 -.568** -.347** -.159 -.021 
SoNYDistrict  -.158 -.103 -.200 -.164 -.568** 1 .184 -.095 -.185 
Trend  -.202 -.206 -.272* -.232 -.347** .184 1 -.026 -.022 
lnConn  .590** .644** .074 .440** -.159 -.095 -.026 1 .519** 
DummyFin  .525** .495** .269* .427** -.021 -.185 -.022 .519** 1 
** Correlation is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 24: Correlation Matrix of the Regression Variables  
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A summary of the correlations among all variables is shown on Table 24. 
Examination of this table reveals a significant correlation of two of our variables 
of interest, number of financial institutions present in the case’s creditor 
committees (DummyFin) and the case’s degree centrality (lnCentr), to the assets of 
the case (lnAssets).  
These results are consistent with the observations on Chapter 5. First, the 
significant correlation among asset size (lnAssets), degree centrality of the case 
(lnConn), and the number of financial institutions serving on the case 
(DummyFin) is consistent with previous observations as large cases are more 
likely to include the institutions that most often serve in creditor committees and 
these tend to be financial institutions. Another significant correlation is that 
between the financial firms serving on committees and the natural log of the total 
number of employees employed by the debtor when the case is filed. This 
correlation is intuitive as employees is a proxy for the financial complexity of the 
firm and one can expect that more financially complex firms will have more 
complex relationships with financial firms and investors. In contrast, a firm with a 
simpler financial structure is more likely to have a higher proportion of its 
creditors be trade creditors instead of financial firms.  
Among the variables of interest, the significant positive correlation 
between time (lnTime) and number of employees (lnEmp) was also expected. 
Again, as a proxy for financial and operational complexity, cases with a larger 
number of employees are intuitively more come complex and they should take 
longer to reorganize. Also, professional fees (lnFees) are directly related to case 




6.4.2. Regression Results  
 
 
Determinants of 10-K Fees in Large Public Company Bankruptcies 
  
          
I  II III 
lnAssets 0.521 *** 0.462 *** 0.458 *** 
lnTime 0.542 *** 0.566 *** 0.558 *** 
lnEmp 0.035  0.034 0.031 
 
DEDistrict -0.075  -0.081 -0.081 
 
SoNYDistrict -0.086  -0.066 0.057 
 
Trend 0.032  0.024  0.022  
lnCentr  0.140 ^ 0.127 ^ 
DummyFin   0.138  
Constant -3.659 *** -3.791 *** -3.768 *** 
R² 0.861  0.869 0.870 
 





   
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10 
 
Key variables are highlighted 
 
 
Table 25: Models Summary 
 
The first model (model I) is the base model, containing only control 
variables. As expected, assets and time explain a large amount of the variation in 
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the model. The R² of 0.861 is consistent with previous results in the literature.152 
None of the other control variables was found to be significant. Model II adds one 
of the variables of interest: the case degree centrality. As theorized, degree 
centrality has a positive and significant coefficient on the regression results 
(p=0.056). It should be acknowledged, however, that despite the statistical 
significance of the coefficient of degree centrality its impact in the model’s ability 
to explain variance in the dependent variable is quite modest. Model III adds the 
dummy variable that accounts for participation of one or more financial institution 
on the case’s creditor committee. After adding the new variable to the model 
degree centrality remains significant—barely—with a p of 0.10. The dummy of 
financial institution participation does have a positive coefficient but it is not 
significant. Given the problematic nature of the values of this variable in the 
sample, no conclusion can be drawn from this regression concerning the effect of 
participation of financial companies on professional fees.  
Given the significant correlation coefficients on Table 24 between the 
variables of interest and some of the control variables it is important to investigate 
whether collinearity is an issue with the model. Table 26 presents the variance 
inflator factors (VIF) for all variables in all three models. From this table it 
becomes clear that collinearity is not a problem with the models. 
  
                                                 
152 For example, LoPucki and Doherty (2008) found R² in their models of 0.80 to 0.88 with 





Collinearity Statistics: VIF Table 
  
          
I  II III 
lnAssets 2.549  3.403  3.441  
lnTime 1.287  1.316  1.357  
lnEmp 2.268  2.268  2.286  
DEDistrict 1.282  1.300  1.318  
SoNYDistrict 2.124  2.125  2.125  
Trend 1.619  1.625  1.642  
lnCentr   1.791  1.988  
DummyFin     1.579  
 
Table 26: Collinearity Statistics  
 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents a set of econometric models that investigate the 
effect of creditor committee variables on professional fees in large corporate 
bankruptcy cases. The models use professional fees reported on 10K filings to the 
SEC as the dependent variable the regression analyses that included a sample of 
69 cases. The results confirm previous findings that size and time are dominant 
factors in explaining variance in professional fee models in corporate 
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bankruptcy153. They also confirm the high level of explanatory power of the 
models postulated in this chapter (over 88%). More importantly, the models 
confirm the theorized hypothesis that creditor committee variables have an effect 
on professional fees as this analysis provides evidence degree centrality of 
creditor committees in a bankruptcy case has a positive and significant effect on 
the professional fees in a bankruptcy case. Controlling for various dimensions of 
case complexity and overall size of the case, cases where committee members 
have dense links to other cases are more likely to pay higher professional fees 
than those that do not. These results are not surprising given previous empirical 
research results from LoPucki and Doherty that showed fee overpayment in large 
cases and the theoretical logic for highly connected cases to have conflicts of 
interest that allow such overpayments to take place. One plausible explanation for 
this is that as individual committee members have increasing numbers of social 
connections within the bankruptcy network, they are less likely to challenge fee 
applications from professionals they are likely to encounter in the future and 
avoid confrontational situations with judges and other repeat players that might 
tacitly benefit from large cases being brought to their districts.  
It must be noted, however, that the effect of degree centrality only very 
modestly improves the models’ ability to explain variation in the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, the models failed to show any effect of the participation of 
financial firms on professional fees. Given the issues noted with the variable’s 
values in the observations used in the analysis the sample size could be enlarged 
and this strategy might provide more definitive conclusions.   
                                                 
153 Bris, Welch, and Zhu, "The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 




Chapter 7: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
In large corporate bankruptcy cases the Bankruptcy Code entrusts 
creditors’ committees with a unique set of tools to help oversee the bankruptcy 
process.  These committees, made out of the largest unsecured creditors in a case, 
have both statutory powers and the financials means to pursue this role. The 
rational is simple: no other party has as clear incentives as unsecured creditor 
committees to ensure the debtor, other creditors, professionals, and even the 
courts handle the case with fairness and efficiency. The purpose of this research is 
to determine the characteristics of those serving in creditors’ committees and to 
find out whether differences in those characteristics help explain outcomes in the 
bankruptcy reorganization processes. This research specifically tests whether 
creditor committee variables have an effect on professional fees. This research 
generates  in the literature that systematically collects a large sample of creditor 
committee participation observations and then analyses them. 
This research focuses on the problematic nature of the fiduciary 
relationship between creditor committee members and the rest of creditors they 
represent. This is because committee members serve dual roles: a fiduciary 
responsibility towards other creditors and that of an individual claimant seeking to 
protect its own specific interests. The conflicts of interest that emerge from these 
competing roles of creditor committee members are likely to affect creditor 
committee performance and their ability to provide an effective oversight of the 
case. Recent has provided evidence of abusive fee practices in large corporate 
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bankruptcy cases which point at malfunctions in the oversight mechanisms of the 
process and, by extension, to failures of creditor committees’ role.  
Committee membership data was studied along three separate dimensions 
of analysis that are likely to point at conflicts of interest that interfere with the 
oversight functions of the committees. These are: individual characteristics of 
members serving on committees, changes of committees’ composition over the 
life of the committees, and social characteristics of committees’ interlocks. The 
dissertation then performed small world analysis on the social networks created 
by the creditor committee service interlock. Chapter 6 of this research offers a 
model for professional fees and tests whether creditor committee characteristics 
help explain differences in professional fees in the models. The Calpine 
Corporation bankruptcy case was used throughout the research to help illustrate 
the analysis.  
This chapter first presents a list of findings followed by policy 
implications derived from those. The chapter ends with a short section of 
suggested further research.  
 
7.2. FINDINGS 
This dissertation finds that creditor committee service is highly 
concentrated among those serving the most often in bankruptcy cases with the 
most assets in large bankruptcy cases. In fact, the top one percent of the 
committee members that serves most often in creditors’ committees account for 
almost 16% of all instances of committee services. More importantly, over 70% 
of cases in the top decile of the cases (ranked by assets) included at least one of 
these top 1% members in their committees. Thus, in practice, Congress has 
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entrusted a significant portion of the supervision of large corporate bankruptcy 
cases to a fairly small number of institutions that frequently serve in creditor 
committees in multiple bankruptcy cases. Several of these firms serving on large 
creditor committees served in dozens of cases during the period of study. Creditor 
committees in smaller cases, on the other hand, are dominated by firms and 
individuals that tend to serve in only one case. While not surprising, these 
findings, however, had not been documented in earlier research. 
This research also finds that committee members identified as financial 
companies represent only 17.1% of all individual members, yet they account for 
33.2% of all individual participations in creditor committees. Furthermore, the 
majority of repeat players are financial firms and they are almost always present 
is committees of large cases. Thus, large cases not only tend to have creditor 
committees with concentration of repeat players, but these tend to be financial 
firms. By the same token smaller cases tend to be dominated by non-financial 
firms and individuals. 
Analysis of the data also reveals that over 50% of creditor committees are 
never amended and finds no systematic recompositions of the remaining 
committees. Thus, there is no evidence of significant numbers of committee 
members systematically joining and/or leaving in between the formation and the 
dismissal of the committees. These findings are counter intuitive as one would 
expect to observe a number of creditor committee members to drop in and out of 
committees as result of the inherent conflict of interest of committee service. 
In the social network analysis, the creditor committee network was 
separated into two separate networks (case network and member network). The 
case network shows evidence of the small world phenomenon. This result was 
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expected as cases are likely to cluster around specific individual organizations 
serving on creditor committees in certain industries or types of companies. Thus, 
as explained in Chapter 5, one can expect a cluster of airline bankruptcies to 
emerge around committee service by the Airline Pilots Association and the 
Association of Flight Attendants. Yet these clusters are not isolated from one 
another. There are links that connect them. These ties are likely to be provided by 
financial firms, either investment companies with cross investments in multiple 
industries or trust companies providing trust services for publicly traded 
securities. An in depth analysis of cliques and subgroups in the network would 
help better explain the dynamics across the different clusters.  
A test of small-world topology in the member creditor committee network 
found a strong small-world structure in the member social network but once the 
calculation for imposed network topology this dissertation failed to find strong 
small-world structure. These findings tell us that even though committee service 
does take place in the form of clusters (i.e. committees are by definition 
composed of clusters of individual members), there is no evidence individual 
members tend to consistently group themselves in teams that serve in different 
cases.  
This dissertation develops a reduced form regression model for examining 
the relationship between bankruptcy professional fees and various factors 
explaining this including various creditor committee characteristics. Ordinary 
least squares method was used to test the statistical significance and direction of 
the relationship between professional fees and its determinants. The results of this 
analysis were consistent with previous findings in the literature, with case size 
and time from filing to confirmation as significant variables explaining a sizeable 
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variation of the dependent variable. The analysis also found a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between the social centrality measure of the 
creditor committee case and the professional fees paid. This finding points at 
conflicts of interest among the repeat creditor committee players and their 
constituents. This research, however, fails to find a significant relationship 
between the presence of financial firms in creditors’ committees and professional 
fees paid in the case.  
Aside from these findings, this research compiled a unique dataset on 
creditor committees and other bankruptcy variables with significant potential for 
future research.  
Several weaknesses in this research must be acknowledged. First, this 
dissertation’s focus on creditors’ committee left out other key players in the 
bankruptcy process that are likely to have large impacts on the performance of 
creditors’ committees and outcomes of the process. Second, while the dataset is 
the largest of its kind, the completeness of data outside of the Southern District of 
New York is questionable. Thus, this research’s findings could be strengthened 
with more data. Third, limiting the fee analysis to firms with 10K fee data 
severely reduced the sample available for analysis and introduced biases proper to 
the sample. This is because 10K information is only available for cases that 
emerge as public companies, which tend to be larger firms and with characteristic 
that are likely to be different from those that do not emerge as public 
corporations. Fee data collected from court records would provide a much wider 
data sample and reduce these biases. Fourth, the regression models in Chapter 6 
might benefit not only from a larger sample, but also from the introduction of 
control variables not available in the current dataset and used in fee models used 
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by other researchers. Research agenda proposed next addresses some of these 
weaknesses while proposing further projects that extend beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
 
7.3. FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
There are several research projects that emerge from this research. The 
first undertaking could involve a broader sociological study of bankruptcy that 
includes all the relevant parties involved the reorganization process. Once all the 
components of the bankruptcy reorganization are taken into account—committee 
members, attorneys, financial advisors, and even judges—one can expect to find a 
social network that is highly dense and very likely to have an effect on bankruptcy 
outcomes. This new social network could also be tested for small world 
phenomenon, which could in turn better explain how both professionals and 
committee members interact and influence outcomes of different cases. This 
research would be comparable to similar studies done in the film industry and 
Broadway musicals productions that include not just actors or directors, but all 
other parties involved in the production of the films and musicals (including 
actors, directors, producers, and other relevant players). Such research would not 
only provide a much better understanding of the bankruptcy reorganization of 
large corporations, but also contribute to the current academic debate on 
professional fees and venue shopping. All the data necessary for that study has 
already been collected, and the methods used are very similar to the ones used in 
this research.  
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Another study that could follow this research is a focused study on the role 
of creditor committees in cases resulting in significant asset sales (363 sales). This 
study would involve the selection of relevant cases, the collection of relevant 
empirical case data for those cases (most of which has already been collected in 
this dissertation), and the qualitative information relating to the conditions of the 
sale.  
Also, case studies should be conducted on bankruptcy cases with very 
high frequency of creditor committee amendments. Such study would help 
understand the circumstances involved in these committees’ recompositions and 
shed light in the overall functioning of creditor committees. A sample of 3-5 cases 
can be easily selected using the data collected in this dissertation.    
A fourth research project that emerges from this research, is to explore the 
role unions play in bankruptcy proceedings via their participation in creditor 
committees. As noted earlier in this research, as a group labor unions are the most 
frequent non-financial participants in creditor committees. Most of the empirical 
data needed for that study has also already been collected in this research. 
A fifth project involves a clique and subgroup analysis in the case 
network, as such analysis is likely to reveal further insights into the internal 
dynamics and network topology of bankruptcy cases.  
A final research project that emerges from this dissertation is a focused 
look at the ad-hoc creditor committees, their influence of case outcomes, their 
effect on fees (both directly and indirectly), and their membership.   
While a rich research agenda arises from this dissertation, there are also 
specific policy recommendations that emerge. The next section of this chapter 




7.4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first policy recommendation addresses the data collection process that 
was required in this research. This is because despite the fact most court filings in 
bankruptcy cases are public and scanned in an electronic format, their practical 
availability remains problematic. The electronic court filing system (PACER) is 
cumbersome, outdated, and expensive. More importantly, the system lacks a 
modern search engine that would make all the information contained in its files 
readily accessible. Shortcomings of the system pose grave limitations on the 
information available to the public and researchers. PACER inadequacies are not 
the result of insurmountable technological limitations but rather it is a policy 
choice. In addition to greater transparency from PACER, the U.S. Trustee should 
compile and make publicly available all creditor committee information it 
handles. At the very least, U.S. Trustee offices around the country should make an 
effort to standardize the formatting of the documents they file with individual 
bankruptcy districts, as permitted by local rules.  
The second policy recommendation addresses the finding that Congress 
has entrusted a significant portion of the supervision of large corporate 
bankruptcy cases to a fairly small number of institutions that frequently serve in 
creditor committees in multiple bankruptcy cases.  
Moreover, many of these repeat members in creditors’ committees are 
financial institutions serving as indenture trustees of publicly traded unsecured 
notes. In other words, these institutions are often not the beneficial owners of the 
claims against the bankrupt company but rather serve as administrative trustees of 
notes owned by third parties. Thus, as trustees, their motivation is driven by the 
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contractual trust obligation to the beneficial owners and not by any financial 
incentives directly derived from the actual outcomes of the cases. What is more, 
the contractual terms of the trustee obligation often make it difficult and/or 
impractical for minority beneficial owners to have much leverage over how these 
trustees work on their behalf in bankruptcy cases. Perhaps more importantly, the 
large scale consolidation of financial firms in the United States over the last 20 
years has merged some of the most active debenture trustees into large diversified 
financial conglomerates. This ownership structure poses important questions as 
the inherent conflicts of interest debentures trustees face in the absence of 
effective governance mechanisms by beneficial owners.  
Even when not serving as indenture trustees, financial firms holding 
claims against bankrupt firms often have to deal with other conflicts of interests 
that undermine their role in committees. First, in financial firms the net risk 
exposure to a bankrupt firm is often different from that derived solely from 
ownership of direct claims against the debtor. This is because of the pervasive 
availability of third party derivative contracts and active firm-wide risk 
management in most modern financial firms. Thus, the largest holders of claims 
against a firm, which is the metric used for selection for committee service, might 
actually have much smaller—and even negative—net exposures to the debtor.  
Second, consolidated financial firms often offer services that inherently 
conflict with their roles as committee members. Thus, for example, many firms 
serving on committees often continue trading claims against the debtor throughout 
the reorganization process. Perhaps as importantly, these financials firms often 
have competing fiduciary responsibilities with other parties with financials stakes 
in the case. Some of these conflicts of interest might affect the outcome of the 
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case but many of these impose can costs on the debtor, other stakeholders, and 
even third parties. Some of these conflicts of interest, particularly those that arise 
from access to non-public information through committee membership, are 
mitigated with the use of internal information screens that separate committee 
service from the rest of the firm. These screens, however, have limited outside 
supervision and no reporting requirements. 
Finally, the use of hedging investment strategies, now common not just 
among specialized hedge funds but also among large financial institutions, 
involves a significant diversification of investments across the capital structure of 
the firms. This means financial firms serving on creditor committees because of 
their holdings of unsecured claims might also hold significant claims in different 
class from that represented by the committee. Any holdings of either more senior, 
or less senior, claims against the assets of the debtor create a direct conflict of 
interest that is usually ignored by the courts and the U.S. Trustee.   
Despite the fact the results of the empirical test on Chapter 6 proved 
inconclusive in determining whether the presence of financials firms has an effect 
on professional fees, there appears to be enough theoretical logic to further study 
the effect of such presence in corporate bankruptcy cases. 
Last, repeated committee service across different cases with the same 
players, including other committee members, as well as judges and professionals, 
introduce social constrains of behavior. Thus, for example, a financial firm 
routinely serving on committees might choose not to antagonize a judge or a 
professional that it is likely to encounter in the future case. Repeated committee 




The data also reveals the low frequency of amendments to committees 
after they are formed. Thus, there is no evidence of systematic abuse of 
committee membership by members who join committees in order to gain inside 
information and then leave to trade claims on the debtor. Even though this finding 
appears to reassure concerns about the trading of claims based on inside 
information after committee service, it might also be point at potential failures of 
information screens. This is because, given the possibility of abuses of 
information screens, members would not have to leave committees in order to 
profit from inside information.  
One could argue the current bankruptcy code is somewhat naïve in its 
handling of creditor committee selection. This is particularly true of large cases. 
First, creditor committee member are first and foremost representatives of a whole 
class of creditors and thus their incentives should be as clearly aligned as possible 
with those of the rest class. For practical purposes this means creditor committee 
member should be selected not on the basis of gross holdings of claims in the 
creditor class, but rather based on the net holdings in the creditor class. These net 
holdings calculations should take into account any offsetting assets or contracts 
they have with third parties. Second, members of the creditors’ committees should 
disclose all their holdings across the capital structure of the debtor to insure there 
are no blatant conflicts of interests with other classes of creditors. Third, the U.S. 
Trustee should only appoint beneficial owners of securities willing and ready to 
serve and avoid indenture trustees representing large numbers of note holders. 
The reason for this recommendation is that financial firms serving on creditor 
committees often serve not as beneficial owners of the claims but as indenture 
trustees for claims against the bankrupt firm. The reasoning behind this 
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recommendation is that indenture trustee contracts appear not to include the 
proper governance oversight of these trustees. Alternatively, indenture trustee 
contracts should include governance provisions that would insure effective 
oversight by principals during bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, the court 
should require a full disclosure of all potential conflicts of interest a potential 
committee member might have with respect to the case and actively investigate 
any disclosure. 
The net effect of these suggestions would be to improve the monitoring of 
repeat players in the committees and research whether replacing them with more 
independent members whose interests are better aligned with those who comprise 
the rest of unsecured creditors. These committees would have fewer inherent 
conflicts of interest and be much more likely to protect minority holders of 
unsecured claims. A significant number of smaller—yet representative—holders 
of claims in the committees would also help protect the case from potential 
hijacking of the case by a few large holders of unsecured claims. Such hijackings 
often end in large asset sales or plans of reorganizations that might allow these 
large holders to appropriate value from other claimants. By emphasizing the 
concept of “representative membership” of committees, versus one based solely 
based on the size of claim holdings, creditor committees would be more likely to 
have incentives better aligned with those of the rest of creditors in their class. 
Creditor committees would then be more likely to play the role of “bankruptcy 


















































SUBCHAPTER I--OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATION 
  
Sec. 1102. Creditors' and equity security holders' committees 
 
    (a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), as soon as practicable after the order 
for relief under chapter 11 of this title, the United States trustee shall appoint a 
committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional 
committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the United States trustee 
deems appropriate. 
    (2) On request of a party in interest, the court may order the appointment of 
additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders if necessary to 
assure adequate representation of creditors or of equity security holders. The 
United States trustee shall appoint any such committee. 
    (3) On request of a party in interest in a case in which the debtor is a small 
business debtor and for cause, the court may order that a committee of creditors 
not be appointed. 
    (4) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court 
may order the United States trustee to change the membership of a committee 
appointed under this subsection, if the court determines that the change is 
necessary to ensure adequate representation of creditors or equity security 
holders. The court may order the United States trustee to increase the number of 
members of a committee to include a creditor that is a small business concern (as 
described in section 3(a)(1) of the Small Business Act), if the court determines 
that the creditor holds claims (of the kind represented by the committee) the 
aggregate amount of which, in comparison to the annual gross revenue of that 
creditor, is disproportionately large. 
    (b)(1) A committee of creditors appointed under subsection (a) of this section 
shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest 
claims against the debtor of the kinds represented on such committee, or of the 
members of a committee organized by creditors before the commencement of the 
case under this chapter, if such committee was fairly chosen and is representative 
of the different kinds of claims to be represented. 
    (2) A committee of equity security holders appointed under subsection (a)(2) of 
this section shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the 
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seven largest amounts of equity securities of the debtor of the kinds represented 
on such committee. 
    (3) A committee appointed under subsection (a) shall-- 
        (A) provide access to information for creditors who-- 
            (i) hold claims of the kind represented by that committee;  
        and 
            (ii) are not appointed to the committee; 
 
        (B) solicit and receive comments from the creditors described in     
subparagraph (A); and 
        (C) be subject to a court order that compels any additional     report or 
disclosure to be made to the creditors described in  
    subparagraph (A). 
 
(Pub. L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2626; Pub. L. 98-353, title III,  
Sec. 499, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 384; Pub. L. 99-554, title II, Sec. 221, Oct. 27, 
1986, 100 Stat. 3101; Pub. L. 103-394, title II,  
Sec. 217(b), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4127; Pub. L. 109-8, title IV,  
Secs. 405, 432(b), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 105, 110.) 
 
 
Historical and Revision Notes 
 
                         legislative statements 
 
    Section 1102(a) of the House amendment adopts a compromise between the 
House bill and Senate amendment requiring appointment of a committee of 
creditors holding unsecured claims by the court; the alternative of creditor 
committee election is rejected. 
    Section 1102(b) of the House amendment represents a compromise between the 
House bill and the Senate amendment by preventing the appointment of creditors 
who are unwilling to serve on a creditors committee. 
 
                        senate report no. 95-989 
 
    This section provides for the election and appointment of committees. 
Subsection (c) provides that this section does not apply in case of a public 
company, as to which a trustee, appointed under section 1104(a) will have 
responsibility to administer the estate and to formulate a plan as provided in 
section 1106(a). 
    There is no need for the election or appointment of committees for which the 
appointment of a trustee is mandatory. In the case of a public company there are 
likely to be several committees, each representing a different class of security 
holders and seeking authority to retain accountants, lawyers, and other experts, 
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who will expect to be paid. If in the case of a public company creditors or 
stockholders wish to organize committees, they may do so, as authorized under 
section 1109(a). Compensation and reimbursement will be allowed for 
contributions to the reorganization pursuant to section 503(b) (3) and (4). 
 
 
                         house report no. 95-595 
 
    This section provides for the appointment of creditors' and equity security 
holders' committees, which will be the primary negotiating bodies for the 
formulation of the plan of reorganization. They will represent the various classes 
of creditors and equity security holders from which they are selected. They will 
also provide supervision of the debtor in possession and of the trustee, and will 
protect their constituents' interests. 
    Subsection (a) requires the court to appoint at least one committee. That 
committee is to be composed of creditors holding unsecured claims. The court is 
authorized to appoint such additional committees as are necessary to assure 
adequate representation of creditors and equity security holders. The provision 
will be relied upon in cases in which the debtor proposes to affect several classes 
of debt or equity holders under the plan, and in which they need representation. 
    Subsection (b) contains precatory language directing the court to appoint the 
persons holding the seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds 
represented on a creditors' committee, or the members of a prepetition committee 
organized by creditors before the order for relief under chapter 11. The court may 
continue prepetition committee members only if the committee was fairly chosen 
and is representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented. The court 
is restricted to the appointment of persons in order to exclude governmental 
holders of claims or interests. 
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) requires similar treatment for equity security 
holders' committees. The seven largest holders are normally to be appointed, but 
the language is only precatory. 
    Subsection (c) authorizes the court, on request of a party in interest, to change 
the size or the membership of a creditors' or equity security holders' committee if 
the membership of the committee is not representative of the different kinds of 
claims or interests to be represented. This subsection is intended, along with the 
nonbinding nature of subsection (b), to afford the court latitude in appointing a 
committee that is manageable and representative in light of the circumstances of 
the case. 
 
                       References in Text 
 
    Section 3(a)(1) of the Small Business Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(4), is 





                               Amendments 
 
    2005--Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 109-8, Sec. 432(b), inserted  
``debtor'' after ``small business''. 
    Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 109-8, Sec. 405(a), added par. (4). 
    Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 109-8, Sec. 405(b), added par. (3). 
    1994--Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-394 substituted ``Except as provided  
in paragraph (3), as'' for ``As'' in par. (1) and added par. (3). 
    1986--Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 221(1), amended subsec. (a) generally, 
substituting ``chapter 11 of this title, the United States trustee shall appoint a 
committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional 
committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the United States trustee 
deems appropriate'' for ``this chapter, the court shall appoint a committee of 
creditors holding unsecured claims'' in par. (1) and ``United States trustee'' for 
``court'' in par. (2). 
    Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 221(2), struck out subsec. (c) which read as 
follows: ``On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court 
may change the membership or the size of a committee appointed under 
subsection (a) of this section if the membership of such committee is not 
representative of the different kinds of claims or interests to be represented.'' 
    1984--Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 98-353 substituted ``commencement of the case'' 
for ``order for relief''. 
 
                    Effective Date of 2005 Amendment 
 
    Amendment by Pub. L. 109-8 effective 180 days after Apr. 20, 2005, and not 
applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before such effective 
date, except as otherwise provided, see section 1501 of Pub. L. 109-8, set out as a 
note under section 101 of this title. 
 
                    Effective Date of 1994 Amendment 
 
    Amendment by Pub. L. 103-394 effective Oct. 22, 1994, and not applicable 
with respect to cases commenced under this title before Oct. 22, 1994, see section 
702 of Pub. L. 103-394, set out as a note under section 101 of this title. 
 
                    Effective Date of 1986 Amendment 
 
    Effective date and applicability of amendment by Pub. L. 99-554 dependent 
upon the judicial district involved, see section 302(d), (e) of Pub. L. 99-554, set 
out as a note under section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. 
 




    Amendment by Pub. L. 98-353 effective with respect to cases filed 90  
days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Pub. L. 98-353, set out  




































SUBCHAPTER I--OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATION 
 
Sec. 1103. Powers and duties of committees 
 
    (a) At a scheduled meeting of a committee appointed under section 1102 of this 
title, at which a majority of the members of such committee are present, and with 
the court's approval, such committee may select and authorize the employment by 
such committee of one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to 
represent or perform services for such committee. 
    (b) An attorney or accountant employed to represent a committee appointed 
under section 1102 of this title may not, while employed by such committee, 
represent any other entity having an adverse interest in connection with the case. 
Representation of one or more creditors of the same class as represented by the 
committee shall not per se constitute the representation of an adverse interest. 
    (c) A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may-- 
        (1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning     the 
administration of the case; 
        (2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and     financial condition 
of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's     business and the desirability of the 
continuance of such business,     and any other matter relevant to the case or to the 
formulation of a     plan; 
        (3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those     represented by 
such committee of such committee's determinations as     to any plan formulated, 
and collect and file with the court     acceptances or rejections of a plan; 
        (4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under     section 1104 of 
this title; and 
        (5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those     represented. 
 
    (d) As soon as practicable after the appointment of a committee under section 
1102 of this title, the trustee shall meet with such committee to transact such 
business as may be necessary and proper. 
 
(Pub. L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2627; Pub. L. 98-353, title III, Secs. 324, 




                      Historical and Revision Notes 
 
                        senate report no. 95-989 
 
    This section defines the powers and duties of a committee elected or appointed 
under section 1102. 
    Under subsection (a) the committee may, if authorized by the court, employ 
one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents to represent or perform 
services for the committee. Normally one attorney should suffice; more than one 
may be authorized for good cause. The same considerations apply to the services 
of others, if the need for any at all is demonstrated. 
    Under subsections (c) and (d) the committee, like any party in interest, may 
confer with the trustee or debtor regarding the administration of the estate; may 
advise the court on the need for a trustee under section 1104(b). The committee 
may investigate matters specified in paragraph (2) of subsection (c), but only if 
authorized by the court and if no trustee or examiner is appointed. 
 
                         house report no. 95-595 
 
    Subsection (a) of this section authorizes a committee appointed under section 
1102 to select and authorize the employment of counsel, accountants, or other 
agents, to represent or perform services for the committee. The committee's 
selection and authorization is subject to the court's approval, and may only be 
done at a meeting of the committee at which a majority of its members are 
present. The subsection provides for the employment of more than one attorney. 
However, this will be the exception, and not the rule; cause must be shown to 
depart from the normal standard. 
    Subsection (b) requires a committee's counsel to cease representation of any 
other entity in connection with the case after he begins to represent the committee. 
This will prevent the potential of severe conflicts of interest. 
    Subsection (c) lists a committee's functions in a chapter 11 case. The committee 
may consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration 
of the case, may investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities and financial 
condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business, and the desirability 
of the continuance of the business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to 
the formulation of a plan. The committee may participate in the formulation of a 
plan, advise those it represents of the committee's recommendation with respect to 
any plan formulated, and collect and file acceptances. These will be its most 
important functions. The committee may also determine the need for the 
appointment of a trustee, if one has not previously been appointed, and perform 
such other services as are in the interest of those represented. 
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    Subsection (d) requires the trustee and each committee to meet as soon as 
practicable after their appointments to transact such business as may be necessary 
and proper. 
 
                               Amendments 
 
    1984--Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98-353, Secs. 324, 500(a), substituted ``An attorney 
or accountant'' for ``A person'', substituted ``entity having an adverse interest'' for 
``entity'', and inserted provision that representation of one or more creditors of the 
same class as represented by the committee shall not per se constitute the 
representation of an adverse interest. 
    Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 500(b)(1), substituted ``determinations'' for 
``recommendations'', and ``acceptances or rejections'' for ``acceptances''. 
    Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 500(b)(2), struck out ``if a trustee or 
examiner, as the case may be, has not previously been appointed under this 
chapter in the case'' after ``section 1104 of this title''. 
 
                    Effective Date of 1984 Amendment 
 
    Amendment by Pub. L. 98-353 effective with respect to cases filed 90 days 
after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Pub. L. 98-353, set out as a note under 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix G: Creditor Committee Composition Effects on Time and APR 
 
G.1. Introduction 
This Appendix examines the role of creditor committee characteristics in 
explaining outcomes of the bankruptcy cases, as measured by two commonly 
studied variables in empirical bankruptcy studies: time from bankruptcy 
protection filing to confirmation and APR violations. The purpose of this chapter 
is to test the hypothesis that models, explaining time and APR violations, 
including creditor committee variables provide statistically superior predictive 
functions than basic regression models not including them. 
As discussed on Chapter 3, the span of time a firm stays under bankruptcy 
protection is considered a noisy proxy for the measurement of indirect costs. This 
is because operation of the firm under the shadow of bankruptcy reorganization 
increases uncertainties that can negatively affect the firms’ relationships with 
others. Thus, operating under bankruptcy protection might hurt market share, 
lower employee morale, recruitment and retention, increase operating costs, 
distract management from operating the business, and induce a short term focus in 
the operation of the firm. These costs can be substantial as typical bankruptcy 
reorganizations usually take almost two years to resolve, and even much longer in 
a significant number of cases (Calpine’s bankruptcy reorganization, for example, 
lasted 772 days, a little over 2 years). Thus, time is considered a key metric of the 
process as it is thought to be one of principal proxies of efficiency. And 
bankruptcy efficiency is at the core of the calls for corporate bankruptcy reform. 
Not surprisingly, debates over bankruptcy code reform policy routinely point at 
long lags between bankruptcy filing and the firm’s reorganization as an indication 
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of failure of the current code. This raises the question whether it is possible for 
Congress to come up with a faster mechanism to deal with corporate failures.  
Also, as discussed in Chapter 3, measures of APR violations are 
commonly used to measure the outcomes of the bankruptcy reorganization 
process. This is because APR violations are often seen as aberrations of the 
corporate bankruptcy system and ones that potentially introduce profound 
distortions to the whole economic system as contracts throughout the economy 
price in the uncertainty of creditor priority. Thus, for example, Calpine’s 
distribution to subordinated note holders -Class D creditors- ahead of an explicit 
full payment to senior note claims -Class C1- on the plan of reorganization, 
provides a strong indication of an APR violation and, for many, a disturbing sign 
of a failure of the current system. APR violations has also been the focus of 
discussion in the bankruptcy policy debate, as it might point at the wider 
implications for the economy of the current corporate bankruptcy code and how it 
potentially affects almost every single contract negotiated by firms.  
This Appendix begins with a section that will introduce the models used in 
the regressions. It is followed by a section discussing of the data used in this 
Appendix. This discussion focuses in particular on the sample selection which has 
proven to be problematic in empirical bankruptcy studies. Next, the results of the 
correlations analysis and the regressions are presented. Last, a short section 
presents a brief discussion of the results. 
 
G.2. Methods 
The basic model explaining bankruptcy outcomes introduced in Chapter 4 
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where the variables of interest are the creditor committee variables. 
Including the three creditor committee dimensions of analysis investigated in the 
previous chapter the model then becomes: 
 
	 	
	 	 	 ,
	 	 	 	 ,




For the dependent variable, , is the number of days the firm i remains 
under bankruptcy protection (from day the bankruptcy petition is filed to the day 
of emergence), this equation becomes: 
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Furthermore, previous literature has consistently modeled time as a linear 
function of the natural logs of the control variables used here. Therefore the 
model can be expressed as: 
 
	 	 	 	 	





Finally, for the equation explaining APR variable, the basic model 
becomes: 
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Where the dependent variable, , is the dummy variable coded as 1 
when a violation of the APR is expected from the analysis of the approved plan of 
reorganization filed with PACER and coded 0 (zero) when no APR violation is 
expected after the analysis of the plan of reorganization. This function can be 
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G.3. Data  
The sample selected for the regressions in this Appendix only includes 
large cases filed in the Southern District of New York with committees and for 
which an in depth search of court records was performed. Further, only cases that 
had emerged as independent operating companies were considered. This screen in 
212 
 
effect removed all Chapter 11 cases that were converted to Chapter 7, and cases 
with significant 363 section asset sales. Also, mass tort cases were also removed 
from the sample. The resulting sample has a total of 36 cases filed. Only 20 of 
these cases emerged as public companies and thus there were only cases for 
which 10K fees were available.  
 
G.4. Results 
G.4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table F1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
regressions. This table is important because it allows us to confirm that despite the 
relative small size of the sample used in the regressions, the observations appear 
to have a significant amount of variability as represented by the standard 
deviations of the individual variables. 
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
CaseAssets 5.29E9 7.993E9 36 
LnAssets 7.45 1.58 36 
CaseEmp 14500.11 32615.37 36 
LnEmp 8.40 1.567 36 
NumFinancial 4.33 2.70 36 
FilingsPerComm 1.95 1.61 36 
Connections 39.83 28.92 36 
TimeDays 520.17 387.16 36 
Fees10K 1.25E8 1.213E8 20 
APRViol .42 .50 36 




A summary of the correlations among all variables is shown on Table G2. 
Examination of this table reveals a significant correlation of two of our variables 
of interest, number of financial institutions present in the case’s creditor 
committees (NumFinancial) and the case’s degree centrality (Connections), to the 
assets of the case (CaseAssets).  
These results are consistent with the observations on Chapter 6. First, the 
significant correlation among asset size (CaseAssets), degree centrality of the case 
(Connections), and the number of financial institutions serving on the case 
(NumFinancial) is consistent with previous observations as large cases are more 
likely to include the institutions that most often serve in creditor committees and 
these tend to be financial institutions. Another significant correlation is that 
between the number of financial firms serving on committees and the natural log 
of the total number of employees employed by the debtor when the case is filed. 
This correlation is intuitive as employees is a proxy for the financial complexity 
of the firm and one can expect that more financially complex firms will have 
more complex relationships with financial firms and investors. In contrast, a firm 
with a simpler financial structure is more likely to have a higher proportion of its 









rComm Connections TimeDays 
Fees 
10K APRViol 
CaseAssets Pearson Correlation 1 .850** .430** .506** .460** .172 .439** .205 .723** -.093 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .009 .002 .005 .315 .007 .230 .000 .589 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
LnAssets Pearson Correlation .850** 1 .453** .630** .572** .146 .476** .232 .647** -.063 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .006 .000 .000 .397 .003 .173 .002 .714 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
CaseEmp Pearson Correlation .430** .453** 1 .675** .118 .152 .075 .452** .334 -.233 
Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .006  .000 .493 .375 .662 .006 .150 .172 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
LnEmp Pearson Correlation .506** .630** .675** 1 .330* .308 .268 .420* .306 -.175 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .000 .000  .050 .067 .115 .011 .190 .309 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
NumFinanci
al 
Pearson Correlation .460** .572** .118 .330* 1 .110 .468** .022 .106 .085 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .000 .493 .050  .522 .004 .898 .658 .623 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
FilingsPerC
omm 
Pearson Correlation .172 .146 .152 .308 .110 1 .065 .374* .555* .027 
Sig. (2-tailed) .315 .397 .375 .067 .522  .705 .025 .011 .875 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
Connections Pearson Correlation .439** .476** .075 .268 .468** .065 1 -.114 .097 -.189 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .003 .662 .115 .004 .705  .510 .684 .270 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
TimeDays Pearson Correlation .205 .232 .452** .420* .022 .374* -.114 1 .514* -.047 
Sig. (2-tailed) .230 .173 .006 .011 .898 .025 .510  .020 .783 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
Fees10K Pearson Correlation .723** .647** .334 .306 .106 .555* .097 .514* 1 .301 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .150 .190 .658 .011 .684 .020  .198 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
APRViol Pearson Correlation -.093 -.063 -.233 -.175 .085 .027 -.189 -.047 .301 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .589 .714 .172 .309 .623 .875 .270 .783 .198  
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 20 36 
** Correlation is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table G2: Matrix of the Correlation of Regression Variables  
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Among the outcome variables, the significant positive correlation between 
time (TimeDays) and number of employees (CaseEmp) was also expected. Again, 
as a proxy for financial and operational complexity, cases with a larger number of 
employees are intuitively more come complex and they should take longer to 
reorganize. Also, professional fees (Fees10K) are directly related to case size and 
thus the strong correlation between the two is not surprising. Furthermore, fees 
are also significantly and positively correlated with the number of filings per 
committee (FilingsPerComm). The last correlation is also intuitive as the number 
of filings per committee is correlated to time, which has been found in the 
literature to be a significant determinant of fees.  
Next individual estimated models incorporating creditor committee 
variables and other control variables are presented. 
 
G.4.2. Time  
The first dependent variable analyzed is time (TimeDays).Two models are 
compared: Model 1 and Model 2. Model 1 is the control model with three 
predictors: Constant, LnEmp, and LnAssets. Model 2 adds the three creditor 
committee variables: FilingsPerComm, Connections, and NumFinancial. The 





Time to Reorganize in Large Corporate Bankruptcies 
      
I  II 
lnAssets -13.165  36.481
lnEmp 113.031 * 84.127
NumFinancial  -12.481  
FilingsPerComm  65.814  
Connections  -3.377  
Constant -331.393  -397.997
R² 0.179  0.306




   
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10 
 
Key variables are highlighted  





Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .179 3.586 2 33 .039 
2 .128 1.838 3 30 .162 
 
Table G4: Time Models Change Statistics 
 
 
These results tell us the control model (Model1) explains around 18% of 
variation and is a better predictor than an intercept only model at a 0.05 
significance. The model including the committee variables explains around 30% 
217 
 
of variation and is also a better predictor than an intercept only model at a 0.05 
significance. The change in the F test from Model 1 to Model 2 is, however, not 
significant. This means the improvement of the predictive power of Model 2 over 
Model 1 is not significant and thus Model 2 is not statistically better than Model 
1.  
The regression coefficients only reveal one significant coefficient at a 0.05 
significance level: the natural log of the number of employees in Model 1. The 
coefficient is, however, suspect given the high level of correlation between assets 
and the number of employees on Table 26. 
 
G.4.4. APR Violations 
The dependent variable for APR violations is the dummy variable coded 
as 1 when a violation of the APR is expected from the analysis of the approved 
plan of reorganization filed with PACER and coded 0 (zero) when no APR 
violation is expected after the analysis of the plan of reorganization. A logistic 
function in this regression . The analysis of APR violations compares three 
separate models: a starting model with no predictor variables (block 0), an 
intermediate model that only includes the control variables (block 1), and a 
complete model that includes both control as well as study variables—i.e., 
creditor committee characteristics—on block 2. Tables G5, G6, and G7 present 










 APRViol Percentage 
Correct  0 1 
Step 0 APRViol 0 21 0 100.0 
1 15 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   58.3 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500, n=36 
Variables in the Equation
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.336 .338 .991 1 .320 .714
Table G5: APR Model Block 0 
 
 
It is important to notice that the results from the starting model, with no 
predictor variables, results in the correct prediction of 58% of the observations. 
As a matter of fact, the average model with no predictor variables and random 
samples should correctly predict 50% of observations. The next block introduces 




Block 1: Only Control Variables Included 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 1.245 2 .537
Block 1.245 2 .537




Step -2 Log likelihood 




1 47.657a .034 .046
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 8.052 7 .328
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
 
APRViol = 0 APRViol = 1 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 4 2.910 0 1.090 4 
2 3 2.685 1 1.315 4 
3 1 2.540 3 1.460 4 
4 1 2.468 3 1.532 4 
5 2 2.341 2 1.659 4 
6 3 2.211 1 1.789 4 
7 3 2.146 1 1.854 4 
8 2 2.037 2 1.963 4 





 APRViol Percentage 
Correct  0 1 
Step 1 APRViol 0 19 2 90.5 
1 12 3 20.0 
Overall Percentage   61.1 
Variables in the Equation
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a LnAssets .102 .283 .129 1 .720 1.107
LnEmp -.304 .296 1.052 1 .305 .738
Constant 1.451 2.044 .504 1 .478 4.267
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LnAssets, LnEmp. 
b. N=36 
Table G6: APR Model Block 1 
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This model correctly predicts 61% of observations. Furthermore, the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test, tells us that we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the observed and the predicted 
values of the model. This means the variance explained by the model is explained 
in a significant degree. But the model only explains a small amount of the 
variance (Cox & Snell R Square = 0.076 and Nagelkerke R Square = 0.116). 
Moreover, the chi-square goodness-of-fit test rejects the null hypothesis. Thus, the 
model including the control variables is no better than the constant-only model. 
The next block introduces the study variables: number of financial firms serving 
in the committees, the number of filings per committee, and degree centrality. 
 
 
Block 2: Control Variables and Variables of Interest Included 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 3.386 3 .336
Block 3.386 3 .336
Model 4.631 5 .463
Model Summary
Step -2 Log likelihood 




1 44.271a .121 .162
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter 
estimates changed by less than .001. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig. 






Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
 
APRViol = 0 APRViol = 1 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 4 3.540 0 .460 4 
2 3 3.001 1 .999 4 
3 0 2.753 4 1.247 4 
4 4 2.532 0 1.468 4 
5 3 2.270 1 1.730 4 
6 2 2.115 2 1.885 4 
7 2 1.916 2 2.084 4 
8 3 1.653 1 2.347 4 






 APRViol Percentage 
Correct  0 1 
Step 1 APRViol 0 17 4 81.0 
1 8 7 46.7 
Overall Percentage   66.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
Variables in the Equation
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a LnAssets .115 .355 .105 1 .746 1.121
LnEmp -.411 .332 1.533 1 .216 .663
NumFinancial .234 .185 1.608 1 .205 1.264
FilingsPerComm .119 .245 .236 1 .627 1.126
Connections -.024 .017 2.114 1 .146 .976
Constant 1.914 2.269 .711 1 .399 6.778
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: NumFinancial, FilingsPerComm, Connections. 




This model correctly predicts almost 67% of observations. The Hosmer 
and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test, however, tells us that we can reject the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the observed and the predicted 
values of the model. This means the variance explained by the model is not 
explained in a significant degree. Furthermore, the model only explains a small 
amount of the variance (Cox & Snell R Square = 0.121 and Nagelkerke R Square 
= 0.162). Moreover, the chi-square goodness-of-fit test rejects the null hypothesis 
this step is justified. Thus, the model including the study variables is no better 
than the constant-only model.  
 
G.5 Conclusions 
Most of the bankruptcy outcome variables failed to confirm the 
hypotheses that base models are statistically different to those including the 
creditor’s committee descriptive variables. However, this should not detract from 
the fact creditor committee variables do provide valuable information about each 
case. As a matter of fact, creditor committee variables can be used as noisy 
proxies for some of the basic case metrics such as case assets and case duration 
given their significant correlations levels. 
Furthermore, both the samples used in the modeling and well as the 
models themselves could be enlarged and improved in order to enhance the 
predictive power of the models. Thus, for example, the sample could be expanded 
to include another district of filing by using the case database created in this 
dissertation and then collecting data from pre-determined targeted cases. Also, the 
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models could be greatly improved by including a wider number of control 
variables.   
Perhaps more importantly, creditor committee variables could be 
enhanced by including broader measures of the bankruptcy “ecosystem”, meaning 
the inclusion of information of case key participants, such as professionals 
working for the debtor and the committees. In other words, looking at just creditor 
committee membership misses other important aspects of the bankruptcy players 
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